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This dissertation argues that Henry James’s late novels produce the textual 
effects of subjectivity (feeling, a sense of psychological depth) while dissolving the 
subject who ostensibly experiences them. James’s incorporation of dramatic point of 
view into the novel is widely recognized as a foundational moment for narrative 
theory, but it has rarely been analyzed in conjunction with the theatrical structure of 
consciousness that emerges in late Jamesian characterization. James presents character 
through various theatrical means—for instance, by transferring the work of 
characterization from narration to dialogue or objectifying a character’s consciousness 
as a building with which she interacts. In the same gesture, however, he dematerializes 
the subject who is thereby being made available; the proliferating dialogue only more 
insistently announces a character’s disappearance from the diegetic space of the novel, 
and the building that ostensibly figures consciousness threatens to collapse amid a 
dizzying involution of alternative referents.  
Processes of theatrical objectification and dematerialization are therefore 
inextricably linked in late James. In economics, dematerialization refers to a reduction 
in the amount of material required to serve a given function; in James, that material is 
most often human, whether it be a consciousness whose perspective is never actually 
inhabited by the narrator who seems to be dwelling in it, or a character who literally 
disappears from the pages of a novel in order for her “development” to be narratively 
 expedited. Despite James’s famed prolixity in the service of elaborating 
consciousness, much of his late prose is dedicated to registering the effects of material 
that has pointedly disappeared or never existed. My dissertation approaches James’s 
late novels as sites of persistence of feelings and textual effects that, by rights, should 
not have survived their unauthoring. In fact, a more intense pathos may emerge to 
register the affective austerity seen in James’s late works. 
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Introduction: Embarrassments to Fiction 
Nature itself dictated the response of that barbarian to whom were vaunted the 
magnificences of the circus and the games established at Rome. “Don’t the 
Romans,” asked this fellow, “have wives or children?” The barbarian was right. 
People think they come together in the theatre, and it is there that they are 
isolated. It is there that they go to forget their friends, neighbors, and relations in 
order to concern themselves with fables, in order to cry for the misfortunes of the 
dead, or to laugh at the expense of the living. 
—JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, LETTER TO M. D’ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE 
 
 Henry James’s late style weds intensity of feeling to the elaboration of consciousness. As 
is often the case in his fictions, however, the marriage is a troubled one. It is difficult to say 
where or how the two parties make contact; that they do at all seems vouchsafed only by the 
unease attending the question. On a first inspection, the stylistic and the emotive aspects of late 
James appear at cross purposes. The numberless recursions, syntactical ambiguities, and pointed 
theatricality that characterize the late style are constantly in the process of dismantling the highly 
refined consciousnesses they simultaneously help to construct. At the same time, feeling survives 
these tumults—but whose feeling is it? And how does it come about? While the experience of 
reading James has rightly been described as wrenching, this potency of response seems to belie 
the late fiction’s thoroughgoing excision of subjective depth. Consciousness, rendered through 
free indirect discourse, shades visibly into and out of the texture of James’s language. It is a 
paradox of the late novels that characters like Milly Theale and Maggie Verver, evocative and 
“memorable” as they are as individuals, are in fact strongly deindividualized. Their voices, as is 
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often noted, are interchangeable with other characters’, and what little we glean of their personal 
histories seems far less to determine their present thoughts, emotions, and actions than do the 
highly wrought logic of Jamesian figuration and the grammar of desire. Psychology does not 
pertain in the world of the late fiction. Feeling, then, attaches to something, but it is not to 
character; or rather, if characters do magnetize feeling, they are characters that emphatically can 
never be extrapolated or distinguished from the process of characterization. Insofar as 
“[c]haracter,” for James, “is action,” the action of the late fiction is what takes place within the 
structure of spectatorship that shapes narration; relations between people; and the self-relation 
that constitutes consciousness.
1
 Spectatorial scenes abound, externalizing what is usually 
conceived as the interior Jamesian world of thought and feeling. The late style, I will argue, 
renders characters not as subjects of psychological depth but as explicitly theatrical subjects and 
objects, yet this theatrical materializing and dematerializing of the centers of consciousness 
intensifies rather than etiolates the feeling surrounding these characters.  
 Theatricality occupies an avowedly privileged place in James’s narrative theory. James’s 
failed foray into playwriting and his subsequent transmutation of dramatic form into narrative 
technique have become a familiar story, one that has become not only central to James 
scholarship but foundational to theories of the novel. In the standard account, the established 
novelist James is left traumatized by the disastrous London premiere of his play Guy Domville 
(1895), where an unsympathetic audience rains abuse on the humiliated author. Abandoning the 
stage but holding fast to drama, James imports into the form of the novel a dramatic organizing 
principle: “the scenic method…my absolute, my imperative, my only salvation.”2 Stories are to 
be organized around dramatic scenes, with “only relevant stage ‘properties’” included in 
                                                 
1
 James, “Anthony Trollope,” 1336. 
2
 James, The Complete Notebooks of Henry James, 167.  
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descriptions of the physical environment.
3
 The novels produced during this fertile period, 
influentially deemed the “major phase” by F.O. Matthiessen, are still widely regarded as the 
culmination of James’s novelistic practice and theory. In lieu of recounting the action of the 
material world, James’s late works—The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), 
and The Golden Bowl (1904)—stage the “drama of…consciousness”4 through a type of 
perspectival alchemy: the “mystic conversion” of an objectively “mild adventure” into the “stuff 
of drama or, even more delightful word still, of ‘story.’”5 The primary mechanism of this 
conversion is what we would call free indirect discourse. In the Prefaces to the New York 
Edition (1907-9) of his works, James elaborates and ultimately champions a novel form purged 
of the Victorian novel’s officious narration (and narrator) and consisting instead of scenes 
organized around a single point of view or “centering consciousness.” For the early- to mid-
century literary critics who enshrined James’s reputation, the novel as we know it is born out of 
James’s abortive encounter with the stage. The Master emerges from the immolation of the failed 
playwright.  
Pat as this teleological history may be, I am less interested in adding to the many 
illuminating revisions of this account that already exist than in pressing further upon the question 
of theatricality’s role in the late fiction—in particular, the theatricality of consciousness. James’s 
formal investment in dramatic method is echoed thematically by his frequent use of the theatrum 
mundi trope, the classical conceit best known in the form of Shakespeare’s “All the world’s a 
stage.” The distinction between types of theatrical engagement is significant. In 1915, the year 
before his death, James wrote to a newspaper editor: “I’m afraid you impute to me a more 
continued interest in the theatre than I am conscious of, or have been for long; I am only now, 
                                                 
3
 Edel, Henry James: A Life, 434.  
4
 James, The Art of the Novel, 16. 
5
 Ibid., 56. 
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and in a deeply obscured and discouraged way, interested in the drama—which is in our 
conditions so very different a thing.”6 Versions of this sentiment can be found in his letters and 
notebooks of the time. What James called drama was an aesthetic experience of perspectival 
circumscription and intensification that should prevail in art as it might in much of life. An oft-
cited passage in his memoir A Small Boy and Others (1913) places an eleven-year-old James in 
the role of spectator as a cousin is scolded by her father:  
“Come now, my dear; don’t make a scene—I insist on your not making a scene!” That 
was all the witchcraft the occasion used, but the note was none the less epoch-making. 
The expression, so vivid, so portentous, was one I had never heard—it had never been 
addressed to us at home; and who should say now what a world one mightn’t at once read 
into it? It seemed freighted to sail so far; it told me so much about life. Life at these 
intensities clearly became “scenes”; but the great thing, the immense illumination, was 
that we could make them or not as we chose.
7
 
Scenes and the making thereof were a totem of artistic freedom and aesthetic distinction. 
Theatre, on the other hand, referred to the contemporary theatrical culture that James perceived 
as having rejected him, as well as to the kind of work that did achieve popular success (for 
instance, Oscar Wilde’s An Ideal Husband, whose premiere James attended on the night of Guy 
Domville’s devastatingly poor reception). The distinction between drama and theatre as sketched 
by James can be usefully elaborated by examining a separate but imbricated pair of terms: 
theatricality and performance. These concepts, whose tense interdigitation has been the subject 
of much recent critical discussion, are productive to the extent that the slippery medial, modal, 
and disciplinary vocabularies clustering around each can be provisionally distinguished even as 
they tend to shade into one another.  Following a brief overview of the history of this debate, I 
                                                 
6
 James, The Scenic Art, 217-8n.  
7
 James, Autobiography: A Small Boy and Others, Notes of a Son and Brother, The Middle Years, 106-7. 
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will argue that the phenomenality of James’s late style constitutes a theatre of consciousness that 
imports the material principles of performance into narrative theatricality.  
 In contemporary criticism and scholarship, theatricality has achieved a ubiquity resulting 
in, as Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis note, an “extraordinary range of meanings, making 
it everything from an act to an attitude, a style to a semiotic system, a medium to a message.”8 
Often deployed in the form of the theatrum mundi topos, theatricality as a metaphor for various 
social phenomena has become so common as to be “almost transparent.”9 While this contextual 
flexibility has enabled the term’s deployment across various disciplinary and axiological 
contexts, it also, as Janelle Reinelt observes, makes for a “diffuse history” that risks confounding 
any “prospective genealogy of this discourse.”10 In particular, valuations of theatricality have 
been diverse and can suffer from a certain historical amnesia related, perhaps, to the term’s 
vernacularity; theatricality’s detractors,11 for instance, often seem unreflectively to ventriloquize 
classical critiques of theatre’s perceived polarities—“both its tendency to excess and its 
emptiness, its surplus as well as its lack.”12 Due in part to the paucity of technical delineation, the 
import of theatricality as both a term and a concept seemed to wane in the 1980s with the 
emergence of performance studies and of performance as a new conceptual polestar.  
While itself open to varied and sometimes conflicting interpretation and usage, 
performance was from the start a more politically coherent and purposive disciplinary term. The 
rise of performance studies indicated a shift from the narrower literary focus of theatre studies 
toward a more inclusive emphasis encompassing anthropological, sociological, and cultural 
                                                 
8
 Postlewait and Davis, 1.  
9
 Carlson, “The Resistance to Theatricality,” 238.  
10
 Reinelt, 205.  
11
 See, for instance, most famously, Fried’s Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of 
Diderot. Jonah Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice offers a cogent history of anti-theatrical attitudes in Western 
cultures.   
12
 Postlewait and Davis, 4.  
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studies scholarship. Much of the subsequent theorization of theatricality arose from the 
ostensible opposition between the two concepts, an opposition, as Marvin Carlson writes, 
“usually based on some variation of theater's association with semiotics and formal structures, 
and that of performance with the inchoate, still uncodified material of life itself.”13 Generally, 
theatre and performance scholars who have most richly theorized the relationship between these 
two terms tend to draw upon their “productive dissonance”14 or interlineation rather than their 
mere opposition. Josette Féral’s seminal articles, “Performance and Theatricality: The Subject 
Demystified” and “Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language,” formulate theatricality 
in ways that enfold the resistant materiality of the performative
15
 into the process of the 
theatrical. Féral remarks:  
Theatricality does not exist as a pure form, nor does performativity. If ‘pure theatricality’ 
existed, it would be a repetitive, dead form of art, where all signs would be identifiable, 
decodable and meaningful—a kind of ‘museum play’ that would recreate old art forms as 
museum pieces, not as living art forms. … On the other hand, a performance based on 
performativity alone would be carried away by the action itself, without any possibility 
for the spectator to understand it as a meaningful process linked to signs, codes or 
references.
16
 
Theatricality, then, emerges from a “play of ambivalence”17 between body as legible sign system 
and body as irreproducible, material singularity; between “meaning and its displacement”;18 and 
between sameness and alterity. A dialectical process of materialization and dematerialization 
emerges wherein, as Erika Fischer-Lichte explains, the non-fungible and uncodified live body 
                                                 
13
 Carlson, 242.  
14
 Reinelt, 201.  
15
 While not synonymous with “performance,” the performative is used by Féral and her translator more or less 
interchangeably. For a critical history of these terms, see Reinelt. 
16
 Féral, “Foreword,” 5.  
17
 Ibid., 9.  
18
 Ibid., 12.  
 7 
 
resists total legibility, at the same time that this “human body can, indeed, be recalled by another 
body or even an object, and an object can be replaced by another random object or a human body 
because, in their capacity as theatrical signs, they can signify one another.”19 Of the many 
rigorous and indeed celebratory theories of theatricality, Féral’s is among the most expansive in 
her definitional scope. Theatricality for her is not limited to the stage or even to a more catholic 
catalog of theatrical practices or events, but can arise out of any “act of recognition on the part of 
[a] spectator”20 that constitutes a “definite will to transform things.”21 Most usefully for an 
understanding of late Jamesian fiction, Féral posits theatricality not as a property, but as a certain 
kind of “process”—one inaugurated by a “‘gaze’ that postulates and creates a distinct, virtual 
space belonging to the other, from which fiction can emerge.”22 The spectator, crucially, is an 
active and indispensable participant in creating the theatrical. Here, as in the eleven-year-old 
James’s discovery, “scenes” and the phantasmatic frame that predicates them are things “we 
could make…as we choose.”  
James’s late style, I would argue, stages precisely this process, whereby shifting and 
often nested relations of spectatorship and action continually posit and dissolve the material of 
the individual character. While the theatrum mundi topos often explicitly appears in the late 
fiction, the significance of the relationship between spectator and actor and of this relationship’s 
continual rearticulation exceeds this overt thematic concern. Theatricality lies at the heart not 
only of relations between people, but of the principal hallmark of late Jamesian fiction: the action 
of consciousness. I argue in the vein of antipsychological readings of James (which I discuss 
further below) that the Jamesian subject is predicated not on psychological depth, but on 
                                                 
19
 Fischer-Lichte, 129-43. 
20
 Ibid., 10. 
21
 Ibid., 12. 
22
 Féral, “Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language,” 97.  
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theatrical relations with the self. Although the language of depth certainly abounds across his 
oeuvre, its relationship with surface is not necessarily one of opposition or even verticality, as an 
exchange from the early novella Washington Square (1880) demonstrates:  
“Shall a geometrical proposition relent? I am not so superficial.” 
“Doesn’t geometry treat of surfaces?” asked Mrs. Almond, who, as we know, was clever, 
smiling. 
“Yes; but it treats of them profoundly.”23 
Slipperier still is the false symmetry of the passage in the essay “The Future of the Novel” 
regarding the “revolution taking place in the position and outlook of women—and taking place 
much more deeply in the quiet than even the noise on the surface demonstrates.”24 The “surface” 
is a sounding-board for the din of revolution, but there is a deceptive lack of corresponding 
“depths” in which the real substance of women’s changed circumstances goes quietly about its 
business; “deeply” stands in something other than hieratic opposition to “on the surface.” 
Elsewhere, James describes women as “delicate and patient observers; they hold their noses 
close, as it were, to the texture of life. They feel and perceive the real with a kind of personal 
tact, and their observations are recorded in a thousand delightful volumes.”25 This close-nosed 
observation gestures toward the penetrative, inward trajectory of olfactory acuity, only more 
strongly to evoke the image of the “nose in a book,” thereby coupling the richness of novelistic 
observation with a flat, albeit textured, surface. Most significantly, in those provinces of the 
novelistic enterprise that we might categorize as depth psychology, James often has recourse to 
the spatially oriented idiom of the theatre—hence his preferred term for the crucial narrative 
                                                 
23
 James, Washington Square, 115. 
24
 James, “The Future of the Novel,” Literary Criticism: Essays on Literature, American Writers & English Writers, 
109.  
25
 James, “Anthony Trollope,” Literary Criticism: Essays on Literature, American Writers & English Writers, 1333.  
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technique that we would call free indirect discourse: “going behind.”26 While this trope could 
certainly be read as interiorizing—as in going behind the veil, or standing behind the “dead wall” 
of the “house of fiction”27—the preponderance of backs and moments when backs are 
scrutinized in James’s novels28 suggests that his narrative goings-behind fashion themselves after 
a similar spatial orientation, and find obverses to be similarly perspicuous.
29
 This formulation 
casts the narrative elaboration of individual consciousness not as a submersion in moral and 
psychological “abysses,” to use another favored Jamesian term, but rather as a furtive 
reconnoitering of exteriors. Indeed, when James introduces the term going behind in the Preface 
to The Tragic Muse (1890), he emphasizes that his narrator never goes behind the eponymous 
muse, the actress Miriam Rooth, but that his other main characters do attempt to do so—while 
the narrator, in turn, only goes behind them.
30
 This layering of behindness—the narrator goes 
behind a character who is a spectator, who goes behind a character who is an actress—requires a 
mixed ontology that corresponds to a mixture of theatrical and narrative conceits. In James’s 
account of The Tragic Muse’s mode of characterization, an immaterial narrator’s going behind 
an embodied character operates within the same phenomenal grammar as that character’s going 
behind another embodied character. This admixture suggests that the generic coordinates of 
                                                 
26
 James discusses “going behind” in the Prefaces to the New York Editions of The Tragic Muse and The Awkward 
Age.  
27
 James, The Art of the Novel, 46.  
28
 These moments occur throughout The Awkward Age, as well as The Sacred Fount. I will make note of two 
especially suggestive instances in the latter. In the first, the first-person narrator notices “a gentleman whose identity 
was attested by his back, a back somehow replete for us, at the moment, with a guilty significance” (James, The 
Sacred Fount, 40). The second example is arguably more complex; the narrator comments on his having “‘studied’ 
Mrs. Brissenden’s back. Study of a profound sort would appear needed in truth to account for it. It was as handsome 
and affirmative that she at once met and evaded my view, but was not the affirmation (as distinguished from the 
handsomeness, which was a matter of stature and mass,) fairly downright and defiant? Didn’t what I saw strike me 
as saying straight at me, as far as possible, ‘I am young—I am and I will be; see, see if I’m not; there, there, there!’ –
with ‘there’s’ as insistent and rhythmical as the undulations of her fleeing presence, as the bejewelled nod of her 
averted brow?” (137). One could read the narrator’s sense of his gaze being cannily “at once met and evaded” as an 
affective correlate for the ambivalence of “going behind” as a figure for the investigation of consciousness.  
29
 Trask mines The Awkward Age for anal economies, and discusses moments when “backs” are brought to the fore 
and, catachrestically, penetrated (105-38).  
30
 James, The Tragic Muse, 91.  
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Jamesian free indirect discourse were always unreliably located along axes of materiality, even 
prior to the relative outlier-case of the highly spectral The Awkward Age (1899).  
It bears emphasizing that the first instance of the going-behind trope aligns the Jamesian 
narrator with embodied individuals within a fiction who attempt to observe an actress. Individual 
characters, by the logic of this term, possess the same givenness for the narrator that they do for 
each other; they are objects of sight and investigation that exist in some sense prior to the 
narrator’s spectatorship—“interesting him and appealing to him,” writes James in an approving 
paraphrase of Ivan Turgenev, “just as they were and by what they were.”31 All this is to say that, 
even bracketing the idiosyncratic case of The Awkward Age in which the narrative function is 
explicitly delegated to a hypothetical “spectator” or “observer,” it would be more accurate to 
describe Jamesian narratorial behindness as a spectatorial position than to speak of a plunge into 
hidden depths. Of course, “going behind” is exactly what a theatre-goer cannot hope to 
accomplish from his fixed vantage point. The term, then, proves ironically apt for the “novelist’s 
trade”: as James takes pains to note in his Preface, there is no narrator in the theatre (at least not 
in the late nineteenth century), and hence there can be no going behind—that is, no elaboration 
of consciousness. Instead, the theatre permits only the “objectivity” of “direct presentation” 
through dialogue (and, of course, the actor’s physicality). James’s metaphor presents the 
voyeuristic poring over of a particular surface—often a character’s literal back—as the 
privileged practice of the novelist, a practice that is understood in terms of the physical stage, but 
that presumably cannot be discharged by the theatre. I would suggest, however, that the fraught 
phenomenality of going behind inherits its strangeness from the dialectical composition of 
theatrical performance; Jamesian narrativity, too, proceeds from the presumed starting point of 
the encountered, irreproducible materiality of the embodied individual, only to remind us 
                                                 
31
 James, The Art of the Novel, 42.  
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constantly of this individual’s implantation in and construction through a certain technology that 
renders their actions and self minimally legible—in theatre, a diffuse system of repeatable signs 
and conventions, and in James, free indirect discourse. 
 Feeling and theatricality have been thought to be essentially entwined since Aristotle’s 
enjoinder that tragedy evoke pity and fear. The Poetics is clear about what should be prompting 
these feelings and where they should be directed: “the most important devices that tragedy uses 
to affect the emotions are parts of the story—namely, reversals and discoveries.”32 Plot, Aristotle 
repeatedly insists, is the emotional fulcrum and hence the most important element in tragedy, 
with moral character coming in a distant second: “The point is action, not character.”33 Even the 
unperformed text should be able to produce catharsis through the strength and consistency of the 
plot.
34
 Yet with regard to the tragic emotions, he specifies that pity “has to do with undeserved 
misfortune,” while fear “has to do with someone who is like ourselves.”35 James wrote of the 
novel: “Character, in any sense in which we can get at it, is action, and action is plot, and any 
plot which hangs together, even if it pretend to interest us only in the fashion of a Chinese 
puzzle, plays upon our emotion, our suspense, by means of personal references. We care what 
happens to people only in proportion as we know what people are.”36 While James seems to be 
writing explicitly contra Aristotle, he arguably describes and prescribes a daisy-chain of 
Aristotelian effects that constitutes narrative: plot is an effect of character—what people do as a 
consequence of being themselves—and emotions are an effect of plot.  
These links are rarely so tidily maintained in the late fiction, however. This dissertation is 
                                                 
32
 Aristotle, 25.  
33
 Ibid., 24. 
34
 Ibid., 24, 33.  
35
 Ibid., 32.  
36
 James, “Anthony Trollope,” Literary Criticism: Essays on Literature, American Writers, and English Writers, 
1336.  
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interested primarily in the difficulty of precisely identifying the origin or site of emotive effects, 
even as feeling tends to be amplified by this unlocalizability. Emotion’s worrying vagrancy has 
been helpfully theorized by opponents of the theatre. Rousseau famously condemned theatre for, 
among other failings, its faulty claim that moral probity could be instilled through its passionate 
exhibition:  
The harm for which the theatre is reproached is not precisely that of inspiring criminal 
passions but of disposing the soul to feelings which are too tender and which are later 
satisfied at the expense of virtue. The sweet emotions that are felt are not in themselves a 
definite object, but they produce the need for one. They do not precisely cause love, but 
they prepare the way for its being experienced. They do not choose the person who ought 
to be loved, but they force us to make this choice.
37
 
Theatrical emotions, according to Rousseau, are harmful to the extent that they act independently 
of the characters or dramatic situations in which they originally arise. Virtuous passion depicted 
onstage infects theatre-goers with a sensitivity to and desire for passion in reality, without also 
transmitting a propensity for virtue. Moral character may very well be represented in the theatre, 
but this representation only relegates high morality to the stage while promiscuously 
disseminating the emotions that accompanied it. For Rousseau, the “passions are all sisters”; 
theatrical emotions are dangerous even if they are not initially attached to corruptive objects, 
because they “make the heart more sensitive” to all strong feeling.38 The particular intention of 
the original emotion—and it bears emphasizing that in Rousseau’s account, theatrical 
representation is emotion’s first instance—is irrelevant.  
 The relationship between theatricality and feeling, slippery as it has proven, is often 
implicitly adduced in critiques of late James. Of the many readers the late style has succeeded in 
                                                 
37
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 51.  
38
 Ibid., 21.  
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confounding, one of the more sympathetic—and by her account, more genuinely confounded—
was James’s close friend Edith Wharton: 
His latest novels, for all their profound moral beauty, seemed to me more and more 
lacking in atmosphere, more and more severed from that thick nourishing human air in 
which we all live and move. The characters in The Wings of the Dove and The Golden 
Bowl seem isolated in a Crookes tube for our inspection: his stage was cleared like that of 
the Théâtre-Français in the good old days when no chair or table was introduced that 
was not relevant to the action  (a good rule for the stage, but an unnecessary 
embarrassment to fiction). Preoccupied by this, I one day said to him: “What was your 
idea in suspending the four principal characters in The Golden Bowl in the void? What 
sort of life did they lead when they were not watching each other, and fencing with each 
other? Why have you stripped them of all the human fringes we necessarily trail after us 
through life?”  
He looked at me in surprise, and I saw at once that the surprise was painful, and 
wished I had not spoken. I had assumed that his system was a deliberate one, carefully 
thought out, and had been genuinely anxious to hear his reasons. But after a pause of 
reflection he answered in a disturbed voice: “My dear—I didn’t know I had!”39 
Wharton’s sentiment has been echoed by James’s detractors in the subsequent century: that the 
late style is cold, inhuman, devoid of life (life as signaled by those untidy laciniations that real 
people should be seen to “trail”). F.R. Leavis, an admirer of the earlier The Portrait of a Lady 
(1881), complained of the “emptiness” of The Wings of the Dove’s (1902) Milly Theale—“she 
isn’t there”40—and wrote of The Golden Bowl that James “clearly counts on our taking towards 
his main persons attitudes that we cannot take without forgetting our finer moral sense, our finer 
                                                 
39
 Wharton, 343. 
40
 Leavis, 158.  
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discriminative feeling for life and personality.”41 This attitude has proved resilient enough that in 
2004, the so-called “Year of Henry James,”42 Martin Amis could refer to the “arctic labyrinth 
known as Late James.”43 What is seen as a failure of realism tends to be imputed to the failings 
of theatricality; indeed, the language of James’s critics often reproduces that of classical and 
Enlightenment writings against theatre. It is revealing that Wharton frames the putative poverty 
of the late style not only through a theatrical comparison, but as an “embarrassment,” subtly 
reiterating traditional critiques of theatre’s simultaneous hollowness and superfluity—as H.G. 
Wells famously wrote of James, an “elaborate, copious emptiness.”44 This sense of gratuity 
gratuitously expressed (not just an embarrassment, but an “unnecessary embarrassment”) gives 
point to an essential irony in the relationship between James’s late style and his late substance: 
the Jamesian sentence’s apparently interminable elaboration of consciousness does little to 
diminish the impression of a bare stage, one “cleared” of humanity, of “life” itself. Wharton’s 
anecdote holds up the exact aesthetic antinomies that James’s experimental and late fiction place 
in complex relation: a novelistic realism that is the privileged representational form of the human 
subject on the one hand, and on the other, James’s formal and phenomenal innovation and the 
subject of this study—a bewilderingly theatrical dematerialization of the human that, as Wharton 
ironically demonstrates, continually fuels what what Rei Terada calls the “economy of pathos,” 
whereby the perceived absence of emotion within the artwork or the human subject generates an 
intense “second-order emotion”45 in response to this lack. Wharton’s solicitousness toward the 
characters in The Golden Bowl (1904) accomplishes what, in her estimation, James’s novel does 
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not; if his characters lacked the distinction of being “human,” her assessment of their pitiable 
treatment at the hands of their author provides the emotion that she would prefer to see inscribed 
objectively within the text.  
 Whether a feeling is objective or subjective is a question that opens onto crucial 
philosophical and aesthetic discourses surrounding emotive art. Terada’s work has perhaps done 
the most to disaggregate emotion from the necessity of an experiencing subject, and in doing so 
puts paid to antinomies such as objective and subjective, rationality and feeling. “The attraction 
of objectivity,” Terada writes, “is the flattering mirror it offers to subjectivity”46—that is, 
objectivity reinforces a notion of an interior depth that has its correlate in a delimited external 
reality. Sianne Ngai’s reading of minor affects like paranoia and disconcertedness shows how the 
content of these feelings precisely collapses the objective/subjective distinction by asking, “Is the 
enemy out there or in me? Confusion about feeling’s objective or subjective status becomes 
inherent to the feeling.”47 Similarly, the unease generated by James’s late fiction registers, as 
Fredric Jameson writes, “how difficult it is for us to escape this fatal prejudice by which we are 
obliged to decide whether something is subjective or objective from the outset.”48 When one 
complains of the lack of feeling in The Golden Bowl, but feels passionately about this lack and, 
in fact, aims one’s feeling more or less in the direction of the characters who are supposedly 
short-changed as a result of their insufficiently substantialized humanity, where does that leave 
the distinction between objective and subjective feeling? But for this terracing effect, the feeling 
in question would be nameable as pathos; yet its intensity seems to crest as its objectivity 
diminishes—when it is directed not at a pitiable subject but at the subject’s pitiable absence or 
attenuation. What this dissertation aims to show in late James is that, as Terada writes, 
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“theatricality is an attribute of all emotion, not pity alone.”49  
At this point, I will briefly clarify my use of the terms “feeling,” “emotion,” and “affect,” 
bracketing for the time being the inevitable tendency of these distinctions to blur, in late James 
and elsewhere. For the most part, I hold to Terada’s gloss: “by emotion we usually mean a 
psychological, at least minimally interpretive experience whose physiological aspect is affect. 
Feeling is a capacious term that connotes both physiological sensations (affects) and 
psychological states (emotions).”50 I will use feeling to denote 1) the represented or reported 
emotional state of characters, 2) the less localized but equally objective tone or mood of a 
passage or work, as understood by the reader, and 3) an intensity whose site of registration 
productively ambiguates between an individual character and the scene or passage in which s/he 
appears. While I use the word intensity, a term most often linked with affect, I am interested 
primarily in how late Jamesian style transposes the type of generalized, non-intentional 
experience associated with affective, bodily sensation onto the dis- or under-embodied realm of 
feeling as such. Jameson, drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard, writes: “Affects 
are singularities and intensities, existences rather than essences, which usefully unsettle the more 
established psychological and physiological categories.”51 This work of unsettling takes place in 
late James at the level not of physiology but of ontology. Therefore, when an adjectival form is 
needed, I will generally use “emotive” rather than “affective,” as emotion does not insist upon an 
embodied subject quite as strenuously as affect does, and to the extent that emotion traditionally 
does invoke an experiencing subject that may not in fact be stably present in the fiction at hand, 
the specter thereof helpfully limns the process of dematerialization at the heart of Jamesian 
characterization. So while feeling by its very nature can migrate and point across the provisional 
                                                 
49
 Terada, 37.  
50
 Terada, 4. 
51
 Jameson, 35-6. 
 17 
 
enclosure of the subject or boundaries between text and reader, indicating both feeling of and 
feeling about, emotion might act as a productive catachresis, tracing the effects of a subject that 
consists entirely of the shadow it casts.  
 Feeling, then, is a crucial problematic in late James insofar as its site of intelligibility and 
effectivity becomes most richly ambiguous in its moments of greatest intensity. Even the 
nameable Jamesian feelings that sometimes give particular shape and amplitude to feeling as 
such tend, if anything, to exacerbate this muddling of where feeling lies (on the surface or within 
subjective depths, in oneself or in the world). Out of this catalog—whose items include irritation, 
embarrassment, excruciation, awkwardness, pain—I would nominate unease as the quintessential 
Jamesian feeling, the one that troublingly blends not only the sense of the self with the sense of 
the world, but the experience of feeling with the action of thinking, the body with the mind. 
According to Terada, “the first emotion is cognitive difficulty.”52 Unease, then, constitutes a 
structure of feeling in Raymond Williams’s strongly dialectical sense in late James—an 
unarticulated and unarticulable emergence of effects that have not yet retroactively resolved into 
originating in either subjectivity or objectivity, knowledge or emotion. Ruth Bernard Yeazell’s 
incidental uses of the word go a long way toward pinpointing some of the most idiosyncratic 
qualities and actions of the late style. She writes of F.R. Leavis’s critique of Jamesian metaphors: 
“Some of our unease – Leavis’s sense that the imagery is not ‘immediate and inevitable’ – stems 
from the fact that James’s metaphors seem almost invariably responses of the brain, not of the 
senses.”53 She writes further of The Golden Bowl’s Maggie Verver and her metaphorical pagoda: 
“She knows only that she has begun to feel distinctly uneasy; she is as yet far from knowing 
why. And she is frightened – frightened both of the feeling itself and of inquiring too closely into 
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its causes.”54 The primacy of unease in late novels like The Golden Bowl and The Wings of the 
Dove, which at least maintain a pretext of phenomenal realism, becomes all the more visible in 
comparison with a consciously fantastical novel like The Sense of the Past, where the explicitly 
fanciful inhabitation of a man’s consciousness by that of his dead doppelgänger allows unease to 
emerge in its generically specific form as uncanniness and, eventually, to sharpen into overt 
panic. Unease, then, in its properly inchoate form in the late fiction, locates the fantastic within 
the realist. It registers the displacement of the subject whose coherence should be indexed by her 
self-contained consciousness, feeling, and demarcation from the world—a displacement from 
reassuring subjective depths into a theatrical relation of self-difference. Jamesian 
consciousness’s genre is non-mimetic; its mode is theatrical. 
What, then, does a theatrical consciousness look like alongside theatrical forms of 
feeling? To give these distinctions more concrete form, let us briefly examine two moments in 
James’s What Maisie Knew (1897), a Bildungsroman centering on the burgeoning consciousness 
of a young girl caught in the middle of her parents’ nasty divorce. Early in the novel, this acute 
child is positioned as her own captive audience: 
So the sharpened sense of spectatorship was the child’s main support, the long habit, 
from the first, of seeing herself in discussion and finding in the fury of it—she had had a 
glimpse of the game of football—a sort of compensation for the doom of a peculiar 
passivity. It gave her often an odd air of being present at her history in as separate a 
manner as if she could only get at experience by flattening her nose against a pane of 
glass. (WM 90) 
The nose not just pressed but flattened against a glass bespeaks the guileless urgency of 
childhood, but also points toward the phenomenal implications of the theatrum mundi topos as 
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more generally employed by James. A lifelong theatre-goer and ardent admirer of dramatic form, 
James, when he does explicitly invoke the language of theatricality and spectatorship, displays 
none of the moral revulsion of many of his Victorian precursors, and little of the humanistic 
melancholy that clings to Shakespeare’s mere players. Maisie’s “peculiar passivity” is an 
atypical case of Jamesian theatricality marking an attenuation of experience rather than a 
vouchsafing or a heightening—though even here Maisie’s spectatorship is what makes 
experience, albeit an etiolated version of it, possible. The “compensation” furnished to Maisie in 
“seeing herself in discussion” consists in the pleasure of being the occasion for an otherwise 
inaccessible passion, but it also points toward the thrill of specularity—of being able to see 
oneself because of one’s externalization into something other, into theatre.  Because she sees 
herself being discussed, Maisie can see herself. Figured as a flattening (and notably, the narrator 
declines to specify which side of the glass the child’s nose is flattened against: does she look into 
or out at herself?), spectatorship is posited in a prosthetic capacity—a “main support”—as the 
condition and form of self-relation.  
Later in the novel, the nose-against-the-glass figure returns with a new ground. Her 
guardians’ impecunity bars Maisie from a formal education, and this state of material exclusion 
is figured by what appears to be a near replication of the earlier image: “She was to feel 
henceforth as if she were flattening her nose upon the hard window-pane of the sweet-shop of 
knowledge” (WM 113). Yet the differences are salient. For one thing, the figure now articulates a 
feeling—Maisie’s feeling—and does so in language we can ascribe at least partially to the 
focalizing character who feels it.  Earlier, Maisie’s self-theatricalization “gave her often an odd 
air.” Aside from the figure illustrating in the next instance a feeling, the actual figure changes 
because of the change in perspective. When it is a feeling, the nose-against-the-glass figures 
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Maisie’s pitiable awareness of and attitude toward exclusion; when it is an air, it figures an 
observable attribute of detachment and distance. The image registers a third-person assessment 
of a character that eventually becomes that character’s own feeling. One might also note the 
difference in tenses: Maisie’s “odd air,” remarked by a narrator who is distinct from Maisie, 
occurs in the past imperfect of observation; Maisie’s feeling is discussed in future terms, from a 
temporal position that could only be occupied by a narrator with access both to her emotional 
experience and to the narrative future. Insofar as “access” in this instance names the imbrication 
of the narrator’s language with the character’s experience, it closely resembles free indirect 
discourse. If we might hesitate to call the above sentence free indirect discourse, our hesitation 
registers the term’s inadequacy in the face of an uncomfortably strong perspectival ambiguity. At 
the least, we can note that the movement of the image from observable trait to experienced 
feeling is decidedly not a plunge inward, but a sidling of the narrative point of view into a 
discomfiting non-place, neither inside nor outside the character, neither an active participant in 
her experience nor solely a spectator. (Incidentally, this is akin to the phenomenal position the 
image describes.)
55
 
The realist critique of these elaborations of consciousness is helpfully summarized by one 
of William James’s fraternal ribbings regarding the “rum way” of the late style.56 Having read 
The Golden Bowl, William implores his younger brother to “sit down and write a new book, with 
no twilight or mustiness in the plot, with great vigor and decisiveness in the action, no fencing in 
the dialogue, no psychological commentaries, and absolute straightness in the style.”57 No such 
butch cri de coeur was in the offing, as readers of James’s ever more “rum” fictional, 
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autobiographical, and travel writings of the early 1900s can attest. But a number of present-day 
James critics would aver that “psychological commentaries” are in fact expunged from his late 
works, indeed from The Wings of the Dove and The Golden Bowl most thoroughly. I loosely 
group these critics, among whom I include Leo Bersani, Sharon Cameron, and, more recently, 
Kevin Ohi and David Kurnick, as the antipsychological school of James criticism. Their work, in 
effect or explicitly, offers a corrective to prevailing notions of James as the preeminent writer of 
the “novel of psychological depth,” a form that, as Kurnick notes, has come to seem 
“tautologically connected with the epithet ‘Jamesian.’”58  
These critics build on ground definitively broken in Bersani’s 1976 essay “The Jamesian 
Lie.” Bersani begins by distinguishing James’s fiction from the nineteenth-century novel of 
ideas; while for George Eliot and Dostoevski moral passions and principles “have an active 
social life,” James remains “consistently ironic about the independent value of an idea—that is, 
about an idea presented apart from the desire which it both expresses and disguises.”59 This 
distinction echoes T.S. Eliot’s widely quoted encomium: “James's critical genius comes out most 
tellingly in his mastery over, his baffling escape from, Ideas; a mastery and an escape which are 
perhaps the last test of a superior intelligence. He had a mind so fine that no idea could violate 
it.”60 For both Eliot and Bersani, the difference lies partly in James’s pursuit of a sustained 
perspective through free indirect discourse. In Eliot, the superiority of James’s mind over the sort 
of “brain” that “swarms with ideas” opposes the action of thinking to the coarse materiality of an 
infestation by thing-like “ideas.”61 Yet while Bersani tentatively describes James’s work as 
“notoriously dense in what I suppose we have to call psychological detail,” he emphasizes its 
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resistance to “an interest in psychological depth,” arguing that the “grounds for what we might 
think of as ‘vertical’ motive (plunging down ‘into’ personality) eventually disappear from 
James’s fiction.”62 In eliminating the psychological referent for what we think of as motive—the 
deep personal history that makes individual characters’ actions, speech, and emotions available 
to our understanding, identification, and sympathy—James produces 
a language responsive almost exclusively to the inspirations of its own surfaces. The 
mind of the Jamesian center of consciousness is free in the sense that it invents and 
satisfies desires which meet only a minimal resistance from either the external world or 
internal depths. Language would no longer be principally a reflection or sublimation of 
given desires; it would promote new versions of being.
63
 
Sharon Cameron resolves Bersani’s taxonomic conflict—that psychological detail proliferates 
despite the absence of psychological depth—by framing her argument in terms of the late novels’ 
wholesale dissociation of “consciousness from psychology.”64 Cameron finds the central 
problematic of James’s work to be “[mastery] by conversion, specifically the working on 
consciousness until it has transformative power” over objects and events in the world as well as 
over itself.
65
 Power is thus the action of Jamesian consciousness, which in turn cannot be 
understood independently of what it does. For Cameron as for Bersani, consciousness in James 
generates desires either disproportionate to or qualitatively unaccountable by the realist contexts 
of situation and character in which these desires should, psychologically speaking, originate. 
Cameron’s claim as to the irrelevance of plot in James extends the depsychologizing move. 
Character psychology is always four-dimensional; its basic premise demands that desires in the 
present be predicated on an individual’s deep affective history. Dissociating plot from 
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consciousness simply sees this logic through to its conclusion; even the relatively shallow 
affective history of events unfolding in the novel’s present projects too far backward and inward. 
Yet while Cameron’s reading returns again and again to the language of dissociation, it is clear 
that some relationship obtains between plot and problematic—in the case of The Golden Bowl, 
between the adultery plot and a “structural opposition between thinking and speaking.” This 
relationship, for which Cameron scrupulously leaves negative space in her argument, simply 
receives no positive definition: 
This is not to suggest that the subject of adultery is insufficient to explain the passion the 
novel generates over it. But it is to say that power seems, in addition, “purely” vested in 
the novel’s exchanges, in what characters speak to each other and what they think in 
manifest opposition to what they speak. These exchanges, while in one sense absurd 
without reference to the plot, are, in another sense, perfectly contained by the structural 
opposition of thinking and speaking which itself seems to generate them….66 
So while a relationship between plot and problematic cannot be done away with altogether, it is 
nonetheless true that the problematic itself offers a wholly sufficient account of the novel’s real 
concerns. Bersani makes a similar end-run around this relationship: “It’s as if the geometry of 
human relations implied what we call human feelings into existence. The feelings are real 
enough, but they are, so to speak, the elaborations of surfaces—they have no depth.”67 Here I, as 
these critics arguably do, group together feeling, plot, and character on the one hand, and style 
and “problematic”—the concerns of the novel as an abstraction of the structural principles of 
consciousness—on the other. Other ways to formulate this opposition would be realism and 
modernism, or narrative world and text. Both Bersani and Cameron acknowledge, as against a 
zero degree of relation, some connection between what is traditionally considered the 
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psychological equipment of the realist character (feeling, situation) and the workings of a near-
autonomous textuality, but this relation seems 1) insignificant enough that it warrants no more 
than a negative or trivializing acknowledgment (to imagine its absence would be “absurd,” and 
the feelings are “real enough”), and therefore 2) crucial enough to go almost without saying, a 
relationship of necessity that persists despite not registering any particular meaning. This 
apparent contradiction reformulates the marital crisis with which I opened: what kind of relation 
obtains between feeling and consciousness? 
 I propose that it is precisely the theatricality of relations (between characters, within the 
self, and between consciousness and the narrative fabric) that creates the emotive intensity of late 
Jamesian fiction. The quality of “excruciation” Susan Sontag attributed to The Awkward Age and 
The Wings of the Dove, for instance, originates in the subjective dislocation caused by these 
nested theatricalities. The coherent psychological subject is not so much altogether absent as it is 
constantly insisted upon, contested, soliciting emotional response and engendering narrative 
effects, and dematerializing into the texture of the narrative. Like theatre, the late fiction 
“deliberately provides an experience of the ‘very process of construction and the conditions 
underlying it.’”68 James famously decried Trollope’s habit of dropping the “illusion” of an 
internal fictional reality by having his narrator announce that the story was “make-believe,” 
objecting that these “winks” seemed to disclose the “arbitrary” nature of the events in the 
novel.
69
 In his own late fiction, however, James constructs a style around the perpetual 
dematerialization and rematerialization of his painstakingly elaborated individuals. If the 
Jamesian narrator does not exactly “wink” at us, his characters seem to revolve into and out of 
the theatrical frame of the realist novel that demands credulity for its contents. Instead of 
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attenuating feeling, however, this dynamic heightens it, uncoupling emotional response from the 
individual character or plot event. Andrew Sofer’s writing on theatrical “dark matter”—material 
that is invisible to audiences but constitutes a “felt absence” responsible for “most of the event 
we call theatre or performance”—pertains to late Jamesian style, insofar as the material (human 
and otherwise) in James is never only invisible; it is also tantalizingly, provisionally there.
70
 
Subjectivity in the late novels continually discloses that it is not subjectivity, all the while relying 
on our responding to it as such. Our response, however, is precisely to these subjectivities’ 
transience, their dislocation, their provisionality. The dynamic recalls Bersani’s claim that “Few 
things are more difficult than to…prevent our connection to [others] from degenerating into a 
relationship.”71 It is this kind of tenuous (or rather, tenuously tenuous—threatening to stabilize) 
connection that predicates not only sociality but self-relation in late James. The so-called subject 
always comprises a theatrical process that struggles to refuse a final sedimentation into a 
subjectivity, a psychology, or a “relationship.” 
 To see how these principles might play out in practice, let us turn our attention to a 
passage from The American Scene (1907), a collection of travel essays written in the late period, 
after James’s visit to his country of origin. This excerpt recounts James’s experience of a 
skyscraper-crowded Lower Manhattan: 
Yet was it after all that those monsters of the mere market, as I have called them, had 
more to say, on the question of “effect,” than I had at first allowed?—since they are the 
element that looms largest for me through a particular impression, with remembered parts 
and pieces melting together rather richly now, of “down-town” seen and felt from the 
inside. “Felt”—I use that word, I dare say, all presumptuously, for a relation to matters of 
magnitude and mystery that I could begin neither to measure nor to penetrate, hovering 
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about them only in magnanimous wonder, staring at them as at a world of immovably-
closed doors behind which immense “material” lurked, material for the artist, the painter 
of life, as we say, who shouldn’t have begun so early and so fatally to fall away from 
possible initiations. This sense of a baffled curiosity, an intellectual adventure forever 
renounced, was surely enough a state of feeling, and indeed in presence of the different 
half-hours, as memory presents them, at which I gave myself up both to the thrill of Wall 
Street (by which I mean that of the whole wide edge of the whirlpool), and the too 
accepted, too irredeemable ignorance, I am at a loss to see what intensity of response was 
wanting. The imagination might have responded more if there had been a slightly less 
settled inability to understand what every one, what any one, was really doing; but the 
picture, as it comes back to me, is, for all this foolish subjective poverty, so crowded with 
its features that I rejoice, I confess, in not having more of them to handle. No open 
apprehension, even if it be as open as a public vehicle plying for hire, can carry more 
than a certain amount of life, of a kind; and there was nothing at play in the outer air, at 
least, of the scene, during these glimpses, that didn’t scramble for admission into mine 
very much as I had seen the mob seeking entrance to an up-town or a down-town electric 
car fight for life at one of the apertures.
72
 
In five sentences, the passage traces a gingerly route through a counterintuitive relation between 
feeling and consciousness. In the first sentence, James proposes to reevaluate the tall buildings of 
which he had originally thought so little, since they are the element that seems to “loom” through 
an otherwise hazy impression of “‘down-town’ seen and felt from the inside.” The focus, in the 
next sentence, shifts from the buildings themselves to a definitional question: does “feeling” 
adequately describe an experience whose predominant conscious registration is an awareness of 
failed comprehension? This sensation of cognitive distress is staged as a redundant simile. James 
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recalls staring “as at a world of immovably-closed doors behind which immense ‘material’ 
lurked,” creating a figural parallelism with the actually extant world of closed doors on Wall 
Street—a figure so close to its ground as to exacerbate all the more the stubborn gap between the 
two. The exclusion is three-fold: consciousness’s inability to “penetrate” or comprehend its 
objects; this incomprehension’s figuration through the simile of the immovable door; and the 
distance between figuration and the material world from which the figure borrows its imagery. 
James’s “baffled curiosity” here seems dire, but in the next sentence becomes itself a source of 
certitude: in a deft transvaluation, feeling “surely enough” is seen to have originated in James’s 
state of “ignorance.” The balletic rhetorical interplay of certainty and failed cognition in this long 
sentence is revealing. James’s ignorance is “surely enough” a state of feeling, while his having 
“[given] myself up” to the experience of bafflement precipitates an incalculable “intensity of 
response.” Self-evacuation enables emotive intensity. It is unclear here if the particular emotion 
is one of “baffled curiosity, an intellectual adventure forever renounced,” or if a more 
generalized “state of feeling” is engendered by this frustration or foreclosure of intellection. In 
either case, James resolves that feeling, rather than waxing and waning in tandem with the 
success or failure of consciousness, is amplified in the very absence of intentional cognition. 
Indeed, in the sentence’s subtle enactment of this equation, even distance from the original 
feeling seems to intensify it. James claims, for instance, that “in presence of the different half-
hours, as memory presents them,” he is “at a loss to see what intensity of response was wanting.” 
The putative immediacy of the past’s presence is quickly undercut by the qualifying condition of 
how memory presents it; yet rather than diluting the intensity of James’s experience, this 
filtering lens ensures and possibly augments it. The fourth sentence builds on the role of 
“subjective poverty” in vouchsafing experience, and the final sentence inverts the direction of the 
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“immovably-closed doors” figure. Whereas it was James who failed to “penetrate” the 
metaphorical doors of comprehension, here it is the vast volume of stimuli that fails to wedge 
itself into James’s “public vehicle”-like consciousness. The comparison to a “mob” attempting to 
board an electric car adds another turn of the screw: in both similes, cognitive difficulty—the 
“first emotion”—is figured as a person trying to gain admission to an unavailable space. Late 
Jamesian feeling appears nimbus-like around such moments of failed subjectivity, registering as 
an intense unease or tonal ambivalence. In this light, we can afford to concur with both readers 
of James who deem his late work uninhabitably cold and those who find therein an excess of 
emotional intensity. It is, if not the death of the subject, certainly its dematerialization—its 
continual and theatrical emptying out and reinstatement—that generates the subject effect of 
feeling. This dynamic (and a quotation from James, to be discussed below) gives my dissertation 
its title. Jamesian theatricality, paradoxically, is desolate in the sense of de-peopled; its positing 
of a theatrical form of characterization that splits the self, often unneatly, into spectator and actor 
leaves a haunted space where that self should be found—a desolation that nonetheless draws, 
generates, and hosts intense feeling. 
 Alongside the dematerialization of the subject, some attention must be paid to the status 
of the object, as well as to the language of objectivity and objectification. While my use of the 
term subject is informed and more or less contained by the poststructuralist critique of the 
realist/Enlightenment figure of deep subjectivity, discussion of objects and objectivity in James 
will by necessity be less available to technical consolidation. Part of the reason for this difficulty 
is that, as should be evident by now, the material world can be hard to come by in James’s late 
fiction. Objects might appear and embody enormous significance, but, I would argue, these 
objects tend to be more significant in terms of the gestures enacted around them than as self-
 29 
 
sufficient repositories of sensate or emotional meaning. One example might be Milly Theale’s 
iced coffee in The Wings of the Dove, whose importance seems to be its distillation of the 
elevated manners of her environment, but ultimately comes down to the ease with which “she 
had vaguely accepted [it] from somebody” (175). Yet these objects, often metaphorical or, as in 
the passage from The American Scene, a strange transumption of the concrete into the realm of 
simile or metaphor, can themselves develop the ability to choreograph the reality they 
metaphorize. They become, in Robin Bernstein’s term, “scriptive things,” things that, “like a 
play script, broadly [structure] a performance while simultaneously allowing for resistance and 
unleashing original, live variations that may not be individually predictable.”73 An example that I 
will analyze at length in a later chapter is The Golden Bowl’s pagoda metaphor, a figure that 
metamorphoses not only in its relation to its ground, but in relation to the character whose figure 
it supposedly is, and ultimately in relation to the narrative logic of the novel. As an object, the 
pagoda becomes varyingly material and immaterial; objectively fixed and ontically unstable; 
determined by the diegetic reality of the text and able to determine the trajectory of these “real” 
events. These three uses of object index its main discursive axes: 1) the presence or absence of a 
material world, a world of substance or matter, 2) a phenomenal relation whereby something has 
been objectified, that is, isolated and stabilized as an object for a comprehending subject; this 
something constitutes the nodal point of a dynamic relation, and can be non-corporeal, like a 
consciousness, a felt absence, or a moment in time, and 3) the shaky distinction between a fixed 
point to or around which things happen, and the happening of those things. In each of these axes, 
objectivity stands in a tensely productive relation with theatricality. If objects pose a problem in 
late James, it is because these objects are always implanted within a dramatized process of 
objectification; these processes are, on the one hand, objects’ condition of emergence and, on the 
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other, inextricable from the objects they enact. While these objects are highly performative, there 
can be, as Judith Butler writes, “no performer prior to the performed.”74 A theatrical process is 
the only means by which an object can signify, elicit feeling and action, and work for and upon 
subjects.  
 It is in light of this fundamental doubleness that my dissertation situates late James within 
an anti-mimetic, anti-realist aesthetic, consonant with the high modernist movements that would 
follow. In a letter to Hugh Walpole, James himself wrote, in what we now think of as the 
language of Eliotic modernism, “Make it your rule to encourage the impersonal interest as 
against the personal—but remember also that they are interdependent.”75 Reading late James 
benefits immensely from a dual attention to 1) the sinuous, sentence-level materialization and 
dematerialization of individual subjects through the staging of consciousness and 2) the 
endurance or amplification of emotive intensity in the face of these desubjectifying 
theatricalizations. But while late Jamesian fiction holds up this cleft proposition—which we may 
safely call a form of irony—its attitude toward its own doubleness is both axiologically and 
philosophically quite different from that of, say, The Waste Land, Ulysses, or the much earlier 
Les Fleurs du Mal (which James reviewed). In a discussion of this last, Peter Nicholls notes of 
the paradigmatically modernist irony in “À une Mendiante rousse”:  
It is as if there are two voices at work in the poem: one which sympathises with the girl 
and expresses admiration for her “natural” charms and another which simply takes her as 
an occasion for a poem. This second, more devious voice will force upon the reader the 
unsentimental and cruelly ironic recognition that in fact she is nothing without the artifice 
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of his poem to commemorate her.
76
 
I tend more or less to concur with this gloss of Baudelaire (and with similar assessments of 
Joyce’s touchstone works77), to the extent that the poems do grant priority and authority—and 
expect the reader to grant these in tandem—to the voice of ironic recognition over that of 
sympathetic admiration, and that this prioritization is itself a fulcrum of meaning-making within 
Les Fleurs du Mal. The reader’s ability, that is, to align themselves with the poems’ real attitude 
over and against their overtly stated content is part of these poems’ condition of legibility; they 
only make sense as literary texts if the reader can identify the correct perspective to occupy. To 
this extent, the modernism of Baudelaire remains a literature of intention—if not the 
psychobiographical intention of the author, certainly that of the text. In response to the adage that 
the modernist text teaches you how to read it, one might specify that a certain kind of modernist 
text teaches you first and foremost how not to read it. James’s late style, by contrast, is effective 
precisely to the extent that it is impossible for the reader to ally solely with the “meta-textual” 
stance (from which perspective characters are readily deconstructed as character-effects) over a 
more realist comportment that takes the coherency and continuity of individual characters for 
granted. The late fiction requires both positions for its emotive effects—requires the tense 
simultaneity of deconstructive formal analysis and a reifying receptivity to realist conventions. If 
readers of late James are tempted to think, à la Wharton’s anecdote, that James the author was 
“unaware” or naïve of this central contradiction, it may be more accurate to say that it is late 
Jamesian style that is unintending.  
The following chapters examine the ways in which James theatricalizes consciousness 
and feeling in 1) a playscript-like novel, The Awkward Age, 2) a time-travel novel, The Sense of 
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the Past, 3) the House of Fiction metaphor and The Golden Bowl, and 4) the opening book of 
The Wings of the Dove. My first chapter, “Visible for Us,” argues that the experimental novel 
The Awkward Age enacts a tension between novelistic and dramatic attitudes that belies James’s 
prefatory claim of an achieved “marriage” of form and subject. In lieu of free indirect discourse, 
James writes predominantly in dialogue and deploys a raft of hypothetical spectators and 
observers who would, were they actually present, report the visual signs of a subjectivity to 
which we are otherwise denied access. Theatricalization here works through the elision of the 
tools of deep consciousness (free indirect discourse) without necessarily also relinquishing the 
premise that there is deep subjectivity. The Awkward Age’s direct presentation of character 
through dialogue stops short of eliminating the expectation of depth; it merely gives us more of 
the surface. We “miss” deep consciousness because we feel its uneasy usurpation by theatrical 
volubility and by social relations governed by the phenomenal laws of spectatorship.  
 In my second chapter, “Something Turned on,” I examine how James’s unfinished time-
travel novel The Sense of the Past stages the unraveling of a fantasy of psychological coherency 
through this fantasy’s own internal contradictions. Ralph Pendrel, an historian obsessed with the 
idea of inhabiting a fetishized “dead past,” is unable either to desire the temporal present or to 
understand himself apart from his aspiration toward an ever more cohesive and masterful 
subjectivity. In the course of the novel, he travels ninety years back in time as his own long-
deceased ancestor, experiencing the dead man’s consciousness through his own continuous and 
effortless performance of it. However, Ralph’s initial euphoria at the apparent seamlessness with 
which he performs the other man’s consciousness eventually slides into an uneasy awareness of 
the visible seam that this euphoria constitutes. To take pleasure in the enactment of one’s 
consciousness is to be aware of it as a spectacular object separate from one’s spectatorship of it. 
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Ralph feels himself as theatrically split at the moment—and as a result—of his keenest sense of 
himself as whole. 
 In my third chapter, “So as Not to Arrive,” I examine a late Jamesian principle I call 
dramaterialization, a complex process by which consciousness vacillates between being an 
object and being a scene, being materially available and dematerializing. This process lies at the 
center of the famous House of Fiction metaphor for authorial consciousness and two key 
moments in The Golden Bowl, the pagoda metaphor and the novel’s final scene. While these 
moments tend to be read in terms of their intricate elaboration of consciousness, I will show 
through formal analysis that the staging of consciousness at its most objectifying and figurally 
particularizing is always also the staging of consciousness’s dislocation and processual 
theatricality. The individual realist subject in these moments (the authorial voice or Maggie 
Verver) is not altogether dispensed with, but effectively kept in place to the extent that the 
intense feeling these subjective dislocations elicit still condenses around the subject’s apparent 
displacement, if not around a stable subject itself.  
 To describe the demands exacted by Jamesian characterization in this way is, to some 
degree, to describe textuality tout court. Characters in novels—even realist novels—are of course 
not “real people,” fringed though they may be, to varying degrees, with the conventional signs of 
life; they are textual effects in the same way that tone, temporality, and narrative voice are. Yet 
while emotion in the novel could be attributed or at least connected to any number of these 
effects, late Jamesian fiction makes persistent appeals to the reader’s emotive response on behalf 
of characters who are just as persistently showing themselves to be the fictional machinery’s 
moving parts. My dissertation will argue that it is only insofar as these characters are shown to 
be theatrical parts that they have the ability to move.  
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“Visibly for Us”: Theatricality and Dematerialization in The Awkward Age 
 In an 1891 letter to Robert Louis Stevenson, Henry James qualifies his praise for his 
friend’s South Sea writings with a plea for sight: “I missed the visible in them – I mean as 
regards people, things, objects, faces, bodies, costumes, features, gestures, manners, the 
introductory, the personal painter-touch.”78 This keening admonition ends axiomatically: “No 
theory is kind to us that cheats us of seeing.” James would close out the decade with the novel 
The Awkward Age (1899), featuring an experimental version of the dramatic principles that came 
to underpin the late style. Theatricality and narrativity in this novel grip firmly at each other, a 
formal pressure most notable in the novel’s severe curtailment of the visible and the embodied. 
These, of course, were the very qualities whose distinct absence from Stevenson’s writings so 
aggrieved James, an absence compounding the “perpetual ache” of his South Sea-traversing 
friend’s own long absence from visibility.79 
Quasi-visible and under-embodied figures command a similar potency of desire in the 
hauntingly spectral world of The Awkward Age. Unique among James’s work for the prevalence 
of dialogue over narration, the novel largely forgoes free indirect discourse and the “centers of 
consciousness”80 that would become crucial to the late-Jamesian narrative and stylistic apparatus. 
Arguably at the center of the plot is Mr. Longdon, the elderly gentleman whose return to London 
and introduction to a circle of garrulous socialites precipitate the novel’s marriage plot. Mrs. 
Brookenham (Mrs. Brook), the group’s linchpin, has been exposing her nineteen-year-old 
daughter, Nanda, to the mature “talk” bandied by the friends, rendering Nanda precocious and 
compromised in the eyes of the traditionalist Longdon and the marriage market. Longdon, whose 
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name draws a disturbingly modern “London” over the temporal axis of the longue durée, is 
shown in the novel’s first pages buttonholing his new acquaintance Vanderbank (Van), a 
member of Mrs. Brook’s circle and the object of both her and Nanda’s affections. Longdon years 
ago loved and unsuccessfully courted Nanda’s grandmother, and now makes a bid to rescue 
Nanda from the corrupting influence of her mother and her social circle. He attempts, with the 
aid of a promised bequest, to persuade Van to marry her. Van prevaricates and delays; 
eventually, the match is rendered impossible through the decidedly theatrical machinations of 
Mrs. Brook. The novel concludes with Nanda’s decision to return permanently with Longdon to 
his country estate. 
In his remarks on The Awkward Age, James touted its formal experimentalism, wherein 
the direct volubility of the diegetic world places a limit on the free-indirect narration. As is often 
the case in the Prefaces written for the New York Edition of his works, however, James’s 
account of this novel’s genesis darts from one possible origin story to another. At first, James 
somewhat cheekily ascribes the formal conceit of a playscript-like novel to a desire to produce a 
“light and ironical” popular fiction in the style of the French humorist Gyp. Later, he discusses 
the appeal of a certain “guarded objectivity,” an effect endemic to the theatre’s mode of direct 
presentation and produced here by the “imposed absence of that ‘going behind’” (i.e., free 
indirect discourse) that is the novelist’s favored tool.81 Another avowed ambition—avowed only 
after the published work met with widespread critical bafflement—was to permit of “no telling 
about the figures save by their own appearance and action and with explanation reduced to the 
explanation of everything by all the other things in the picture.”82 The novel’s “scenes” aspire to 
the quality of dramatic enclosure James admired in the theatre: a sense that no narrative strand in 
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a piece would fail to exert a visible pull on another—this in contrast to the English novel, that 
“perfect paradise of the loose end” (AA 14). Given this formal hybridity, James’s claim of having 
brokered an immaculate “marriage” of “substance and form” seems particularly suggestive, if 
particularly puzzling (15).
83
 More mystifying still, “substance” in the material sense of the word 
tends, in this novel, to dematerialize—to become invisible, to diminish, and to disappear—
through the very dramatic strategies one might think would render this substance more available 
to the senses. What we might hear when James exults in a “marriage” between “substance and 
form,” then, are the banns of a polygamous arrangement among novel, drama, and a 
desubstantialized fictional world.  
While critics have long noted the elusive nature of materiality in The Awkward Age, this 
phenomenon is generally assumed to be a given quality like spectrality, rather than traced as a 
set of overlapping processes of dematerialization. I use dematerialization here to refer 
specifically to the staged disappearance of elaborations of the human from the surface of the 
novel: descriptions of bodies, verbal notations, social relations, and narrative access to 
consciousness. The Awkward Age both theatricalizes and renders immaterial some of the most 
salient elements of the novel as practiced and theorized by James: character, the narrative 
function, realist time, and the social role of theatricality. In so altering the generic composition of 
the “James novel,” James also transforms the instruments of that alteration. Theatricalization, the 
avowed method and intent of this formal experiment, ostensibly makes possible such desirable 
aesthetic traits as phenomenal objectivity and representational directness. Yet the 
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correspondences in this novel between theatricalization and novelistic dematerialization belie the 
aesthetic orthodoxies held up by James himself—formal prescriptions linking the dramatic with 
the objective, the direct, and the present.  
The Awkward Age’s formal idiosyncrasies thus speak to a persistent counter-note in 
James’s work that complicates prevailing perceptions of James as the preeminent novelist of 
psychological depth and interiority. In the dislocative effects of its explicit theatricality, The 
Awkward Age consciously enacts—and presents as a formal experiment—the externality of 
character. While narrativity in this novel tends to be summarily explained by way of its 
thoroughgoing difference from that in James’s better-known late works, the theatrical paradigm 
at work in The Awkward Age is more closely related to James’s theatrically inflected conception 
of free indirect discourse than is generally thought. The volume of critical conceptualizations of 
theatricality produced in recent years speaks to the multiform, multivalent nature of this term, 
even absent considerations of its relationship to narrative. Janelle Reinelt wisely cautions against 
using “‘theatricality’ uncritically to mark aspects of texts or performances that gesture to their 
own conditions of production or to metatheatrical effects.”84 While such metatheatrical effects 
are in abundant supply in The Awkward Age and across James’s oeuvre, this novel’s theatricality 
can also be particularized as a multi-tier process inextricably bound in processes of 
dematerialization. The central component of this theatricality is spectatorship; a spectator must 
be present who understands and views a circumscribed scene as theatrical, and the presence and 
cognitive action of this spectator can transform an otherwise unrelated set of sensory data into a 
theatrical scene. This transformational capacity takes on unique forms in The Awkward Age, in 
which such demands for understanding through sight and directness are entangled with various, 
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novelistically specific kinds of disappearance and inaccessibility.
85
 At the heart of this novel’s 
idiosyncratic narrativity, then, lies a dialectical relationship between theatricality and 
dematerialization, a relation that emerges in four distinct but overlapping ways: 1) the tendency 
of characters to become more immaterial as they are narrativized; 2) a proliferation of 
hypothetical “observers” or “spectators” in lieu of focalizing narration; 3) the collapse of the 
progressive time of realist character development into a condensed, dramatic temporality; and 4) 
the collapse of theatricality as a mode of direct relation practiced by characters in the novel into a 
form of narrative enclosure.  
Immaterial Pursuits 
While the most sizable debt incurred to the theatre in The Awkward Age is the 
predominance of dialogue, much of the narration also seems beholden to the aesthetic 
imperatives of the playscript. Though at times the narration begins to approximate the divulgent 
visuality of character descriptions in the realist novel, the expectation therein generated tends to 
be scuttled. These passages do not necessarily withhold detail; rather, they expatiate on liminal 
qualities that must be directly seen in order to be grasped, yet precisely cannot be imaginatively 
visualized by a reader. James’s opening description of Longdon, for instance, begins on solid 
enough ground, but quickly moves to establish the spectral terms in which the rest of the novel 
will traffic: 
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Mr. Longdon was slight and neat, delicate of body and both keen and kind of face, with 
black brows both finely marked and thick, smooth hair, in which the silver had deep 
shadows. He wore neither whisker nor moustache and seemed to carry in the flicker of 
his quick brown eyes and the positive sun-play of his smile even more than the equivalent 
of what might, superficially or stupidly, elsewhere be missed in him; which was mass, 
substance, presence – what is vulgarly called importance. He had indeed no presence, but 
he had somehow an effect. He might almost have been a priest, if priests, as it occurred to 
Vanderbank, were ever such dandies. He had at all events conclusively doubled the Cape 
of the years – he would never again see fifty-five: to the warning light of that bleak 
headland he presented a back sufficiently conscious. Yet, though, to Vanderbank, he 
could not look young, he came near – strikingly and amusingly – looking new: this, after 
a minute, appeared mainly perhaps indeed in the perfection of his evening dress…. (20) 
This portrait could itself be said to “flicker” between positive and negative attributes (that is, 
qualities Longdon possesses and those he lacks) while increasingly eroding our pictorial sense of 
the character. Even the literally desubstantializing description of his lack of “mass, substance, 
presence – what is vulgarly called importance” is subject to its own effacement: Longdon may 
lack substance, but he displays “even more than [its] equivalent,” albeit only through the 
“flicker” and “sun-play” that evade visualization while requiring the visual faculty in order to be 
duly appreciated in their subtlety. By the same token, if we understand an “effect” to be a 
phenomenon that should simply do its work and precisely obviate narrative insistence, the 
narrator’s need to insist that Longdon “had somehow an effect” bespeaks the impossibility of this 
effect’s being instantaneously conveyed to a reader of the novel as it is to Van. We are required 
to trust it will be imparted to us in cumulative fashion. Following upon the smoke curls of this 
description, the evocation of Longdon’s dandyism offers something comparatively concrete, 
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despite its syntactic subordination to an apparent non-sequitur: “He might almost have been a 
priest, if priests…were ever such dandies.” While minimized, the fact that Longdon is something 
of a dandy has a lingering resonance, providing in this passage a material and historical basis for 
description; Van, for instance, attributes Longdon’s seeming newness to “the perfection of his 
evening dress,” a stylistic quality that becomes the most forthcoming note in a passage that 
initially leads one to expect a more exacting account of a character’s physical profile. This 
sartorial counterpoint to a discomfiting immateriality appears elsewhere in James, in strikingly 
similar terms. In 1908’s “The Jolly Corner,” for instance, the protagonist comes upon his 
supernatural double—“Rigid and conscious, spectral yet human, a man of his own substance and 
stature”—and indulges in a prolonged, repulsed account of this double’s “queer actuality of 
evening-dress, of dangling double eye-glass, of gleaming silk lappet and white linen, of pearl 
button and gold watch-guard and polished shoe.”86 The uncanny horror of this alternative self’s 
“queer actuality of evening-dress” lies in the vivid and intransigent materiality of his stylistic 
accents, in the incongruity between the double’s otherworldliness and his mundane accession to 
fashionability. In Longdon’s case, the “perfection of his evening dress” strikes a quaintly comic 
note for Van; the incontrovertible because quotidian reality of an adherence to the demands of 
fashion allows a sense of “newness,” a temporal site-specificity, to prevail over Longdon’s 
otherwise insubstantial and untimely attributes.
87
 Lacking not only presence and mass, but the 
substance of which a supernatural double can boast, Longdon gets by in The Awkward Age 
alternately on the value of his effect and the effect of his value.  
 Like much else about Longdon, his appearance in the first few moments of the novel both 
sets him apart and sets a standard. While several other characters are later described in similarly 
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effacing terms, this opening description establishes a sense of the not-quite-there soon shown to 
be the pervading sensibility of a social world to which Longdon is meant to provide a 
counterpoint. Very soon after Van “heard his name pronounced from behind and, on turning, 
found himself joined” by an “apparently unassertive person,” he “became conscious of having 
proposed his own rooms as a wind-up to their drive” (4). Van’s friendly proposition occurs in a 
past perfect that buries even the non-tactile materiality of the voice—a notable interment in such 
a vocal novel.
88
 The temporal lag with which Van “became conscious of having proposed” his 
rooms is meant to indicate, on the surface, simply that he and Longdon are carried away by their 
little adventure, but the narrator accomplishes this tonal effect by coupling the temporal non-
linearity of Van’s belated awareness with the linear, telic movement of a drive that now has a 
destination. These counterweighted temporalities are, in turn, linked to a presiding consciousness 
that is somehow both prioritized over its object (Van’s utterance, of which he becomes 
conscious) and one step behind it—a temporal version of the movement by which the Jamesian 
narrator “goes behind” its objects. Longdon seems thus capable of prompting “both/and” 
moments—moments of contradictory simultaneity in which the desire for progress toward a 
terminus can be voiced only in time already past, and, as it were, without voice. 
Spectators and Observers 
 These unmoored temporalities and somatic effects are, arguably, par for the course in 
James’s later fiction. The Awkward Age, however, glides from one emphatic moment of 
decorporealization to the next, to the point where the high density of such moments threatens to 
overwhelm the narrative. Certainly the narrator appears to succumb to a form of repetition 
compulsion— that is, a recurrence of the gesture by which “deep consciousness,” signaled by 
free indirect discourse, is dematerialized from the novel. The going-behind that typically 
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distinguishes and anchors Jamesian narrative is supplanted by the frequent invocation of an 
imagined “observer” or “spectator,” a figure with special (but circumscribed) insight into the 
action: 
An observer disposed to interpret the scene might have fancied him a trifle put off by the 
girl’s familiarity, or even, as by a singular effect of her self-possession, stricken into 
deeper diffidence. (87) 
The ingenious observer just now suggested might even have detected in the still higher 
rise of this visitor’s spirits a want of mere inward ease. (88) 
He again became mute, and there was a pause between them of some length, accepted by 
Nanda with an anxious stillness that it might have touched a spectator to observe. (140) 
It is worth noting that James is rarely given to such rote troping. Those tropes that he does use 
with some regularity (“she held fire,” “he turned it over,” etc.) are mulched throughout the late 
novels, not compacted into a single work. And while the conceit of the hypothetical observer 
appears in other James works, it seldom does with such frequency, or with the strong sense that it 
is interchangeable with “spectator.”89 The implications of this apparent interchangeability and 
the different valences and generic codes magnetized by each of these terms will be discussed 
further below. There has been no paucity of critical observations regarding this 
spectator/observer and the corresponding grammatical repetition of the conditional tense.
90
 To 
nominate this serial troping as a form of dematerialization may seem counterintuitive. Access to 
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consciousness, that which is obviated by the spectator/observer trope, is itself already one of the 
Jamesian novel’s foremost immaterial effects, as well as its central ideologeme; and the very 
proliferation of The Awkward Age’s spectral figures might be said to bespeak an additive 
impulse, or certainly a crowding effect, rather than contributing to an attenuation of corporeal 
matter. Yet in contrast to both the theatre’s given quantum of materiality and the psychological 
novel’s ideology of an interiority whose penetration by a narrator sidesteps questions of 
embodiment, The Awkward Age’s tropology simultaneously conjures and vitiates the ontological 
status of embodied individuals. It raises the spectre of materiality through the same gesture by 
which it erases it; it also, by registering these bodies’ effects in the absence of the bodies 
themselves, implicitly impugns the very ontological primacy of the theatrical materiality toward 
which this novel aspires. That the narrator so often concerns himself with what this 
spectator/observer “might have” seen accounts for much of this complication. The figure’s 
hypothetical status compounds the temporal disorientation of the more oft-used Jamesian past 
perfect that dematerializes action and dialogue into an unavailable past (as in the scene of Van’s 
introduction to Longdon). More distinctively, this “might have”-status also marks moments 
where this novel’s allegiance to dramatic “objectivity” butts up against a narrative impulse to 
conduct us “behind” the surface of action. In the three examples given above, the figure of the 
spectator/observer provides a site wherein the spectatorial labor of sensory registration and the 
readerly labor of interpretation, detection, and affective response can be both held apart as 
distinct moments and significantly coupled. 
These tropes and stylizations are to be found, as I have mentioned, across James’s 
oeuvre—if never quite in this configuration, never in a paradigmatically different manner either. 
Compare The Awkward Age’s use of the conditional with Lambert Strether’s writerly reverie in 
 44 
 
The Ambassadors (1903) upon catching sight of an as-yet unrecognized Madame de Vionnet in 
Notre Dame Cathedral:  
She reminded our friend—since it was the way of nine-tenths of his current impressions 
to act as recalls of things imagined—of some fine firm concentrated heroine of an old 
story, something he had heard, read, something that, had he had a hand for drama, he 
might himself have written, renewing her courage, renewing her clearness, in splendidly 
protected meditation.
91
 
While the sentence’s hypertrophied recursivity does not quite terminate with “might himself 
have written,” it is in this conditional phrase that the reflexive logic of Strether’s thinking is 
consummated; his consciousness marks both the origin (something he might have written) and 
the endpoint (being reminded by Mme. de Vionnet) of his impression. Sharon Cameron theorizes 
a Jamesian form of mastery that “lies in transforming the objects of consciousness” from “what 
is there into what is desired.”92 Similarly, The Ambassadors’ free indirect invocation of 
“something that, had he had a hand for drama, he might himself have written” represents a 
particularly self-effacing use of the conditional tense. It conjures, only to nullify, the idea of 
Strether as a dramatist, camouflaging the extent to which the scene is scripted by Strether. Yet 
the Jamesian device of free indirect discourse does not permit of quite so closed or succint a 
speculative circuit as, say, “This reminds me of something I might have written!” For the third-
person perspective precludes a complete erasure of difference between narrator and focalized 
character; the exquisite composition of the scene is precisely not transparent to Strether’s speech 
or thought—is not written by him (as the voice is also that of the narrator), even as it is written 
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by him (since it is in his consciousness that the drama is enacted).
93
 The complex dualities within 
consciousness and dramaturgy are here condensed into an exceptionally cogent “might have.” I 
would continue to contend, then, that even in The Ambassadors, James’s “going behind” does 
not take place far beneath interiority’s turbid waters, but rather falls on a continuum with the 
more starkly objectifying dramatic methods of The Awkward Age. Compare, on the other hand, 
the hypothetical status of The Awkward Age’s spectator/observers with an ostensibly similar 
construct in What Maisie Knew (1897): “What was clear to any spectator was that the only link 
binding her to either parent was this lamentable fact of her being a ready vessel for bitterness, a 
deep little porcelain cup in which biting acids could be mixed.”94 Whereas this nominative 
invocation of an extant spectator has the Faranges’ domestic conflict ramifying onto a wider 
sphere of public opinion (both the diegetic world and that of James’s readership), the 
conditionally proposed spectator/observers in The Awkward Age have the reverse effect of 
heightening this novel’s sense of dramatic enclosure.95 To the extent that the hypothesized 
spectator/observer implicates the reader, it does not inscribe The Awkward Age’s drama into this 
reader’s more spacious reality, but rather shoehorns a readerly proxy into the already airless 
architecture of the fiction.  
 Given the terms and characteristics already on the table, the form whose readership most 
closely approximates that desired and produced by this novel may be, as Nick Salvato has 
asserted, that of closet drama.
96
 Referring to “what James elsewhere calls ‘the ghostly ordeal’ of 
reading a play,” David Kurnick argues that by “referring readers to some necessary but 
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unavailable performative space, The Awkward Age makes us hunger for the embodied 
representation that its very status as a novel forswears.”97 Not properly drama but also forgoing 
the narrative strategies available to the realist novel, James’s awkward work, according to 
Kurnick, “issues a challenge to imagine life beyond the constraints of both forms as given, as 
well as beyond the psychosexual and relational logics they enforce.”98 Kurnick’s rich reparative 
reading is especially illuminating in its emphasis on the depsychologizing function of the novel’s 
theatricalizations. However, Kurnick accords the novel’s abjuration of depth and interiority a 
utopian vocation that I am hard pressed to corroborate. In place of the individual subjectivity 
endemic to the psychological novel we are to find, supposedly, a collective subjectivity that 
dissolves the bourgeois antinomies of self and other; in Kurnick’s reading, the tragedy of The 
Awkward Age lies in the untenability of this group subjectivity. To the extent that this reading 
fastens on the instability of The Awkward Age’s generic admixture, I find it highly canny. 
James’s prefatory remarks on the exhilaration to be found in an imposed difficulty such as the 
forfeiture of “going behind” point, on the one hand, to a piquant formal challenge and, on the 
other, to the aforementioned felicity between this awkward form and his subject matter. That 
subject matter is, of course, itself a problem of awkward forms and substance: how to maintain a 
high calibre of dialogue in the presence of a young woman, and how to fulfill the conventional 
narrative trajectory of a young woman’s life—marriage—once she has been exposed to such 
sophisticated talk.
99
 I would argue, however, that it behooves readers of The Awkward Age not to 
impose onto this novel an affirmative attitude, if not toward what a contemporary reviewer in 
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The Spectator called the novel’s “whispering-gallery of ignoble souls,” then at least toward the 
figure around whom its nimbus of conversational brilliance gathers: Mrs. Brook.
100
 For if, as 
Kurnick argues, the novel valorizes a model of group subjectivity over and above the demands of 
a depth psychology with whose development James is inextricably associated and largely 
credited, one would surely struggle to account for the sovereign authority with which Mrs. Brook 
both provides the social keystone of the group and ultimately tears the entire edifice down.  
The significance of The Awkward Age’s tendency toward depsychologization is apparent 
enough in the repeated narrative invocation of an observer or spectator. One such “observer” 
appears in the preface, in a passage where James muses over the origins of the novel’s donnée: 
“The seed sprouted in that vast nursery of sharp appeals and concrete images which calls itself, 
for blest convenience, London; it fell even into the order of the minor ‘social phenomena’ with 
which, as fruit for the observer, that mightiest of the trees of suggestion bristles” (AA 4). Here, 
prior to any mention of the role of dramatic principles in this novel’s construction, this 
“observer” is vaguely aligned with the novelist’s trade. In a later discussion of the merits of the 
theatre, James characterizes a patron of Henrik Ibsen as a “spectator or reader” (14). One can 
argue, then, that the strangely spectral, hypothetical spectator/observers in The Awkward Age 
limn the dual reception modes of novel and closet drama: private, individual reading and coterie 
performance. This spectator/observer acts as both 1) a compensatory mechanism for the 
relinquishment of free indirect discourse’s psychological insights and 2) a way of introducing 
some of the novel’s representational capaciousness into the closed circuit of the playscript, that 
is, of “escaping poverty even though the references in one’s action can only be, with intensity, to 
each other” (Ibid.). Far from casting his gaze upon the proceedings from behind a fourth wall, 
James’s spectator/observer seems to inhabit the same airless space as the characters, and is often 
                                                 
100
 Quoted in Kurnick, Empty Houses, 111.   
 48 
 
accorded an initiated status, though it is unclear if his hypothetical initiatedness is 1) of an 
impersonal, patronly variety, comprising a share of knowledge limited to the events that have 
taken place in the story (to which any attentive audience member would have the same access), 
or 2) a diegetic attribute, comprising an insider’s savviness about these characters’ assignations 
and inclinations. Is the spectator/observer a member of the audience or a member of the group? 
This slippage occurs at various moments:  
That in itself, for an observer deeply versed in this lady, was delightful and beguiling. 
(31) 
The recurrence of opportunity to observe them together would have taught a spectator 
that—on Mrs Brook’s side, doubtless, more particularly—their relation was governed by 
two or three remarkably established and, as might have been said, refined laws…. (188) 
At other times, the slippage becomes a collapse and the theatrical mode of the characters’ 
relationships is literalized, locating the (at times hypothetical, at times not) observer or spectator 
in their midst:  
The smoking-room at Mertle was not unworthy of the general nobleness, and the 
fastidious spectator had clearly been reckoned on in the great leather-covered lounge…. 
(156) 
An observer at all initiated would, at the juncture, fairly have hung on his lips, and there 
was in fact on Vanderbank’s part quite the look of the man—though it lasted but just 
while we seize it—in suspense about himself. The most initiated observer of all would 
have been poor Mr Longdon…. (202) 
This interchange, to which circumstances somehow gave a high effect of suddenness and 
strangeness, was listened to by the others in a quick silence that was like the sense of a 
blast of cold air, though with the difference between the spectators that Vanderbank 
attached his eyes…. (242) 
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This spectator/observer makes novelistic moments not only scenic in the Jamesian sense 
of being organized around a particular point of view, but theatrical—that is, organized in 
response to the reality of a certain kind of viewing. This figure, as the passages above show, 
presents us with a social world that is already theatrical, spectacular, and under sustained and 
informed scrutiny as a matter of internal law. It is a world in which the “fastidious spectator” is 
always already “reckoned on”—in other words, already having an effect whether actually present 
or not—a communal topography more accurately described in terms of surveillance than as 
modeling, even provisionally, what Kurnick ultimately characterizes as a utopian social 
landscape, one in which consciousness is supposedly diffused across a community rather than 
concentrated in focalizing individuals.
101
 Here the narrator’s vacillations between “observer” and 
“spectator” take on a mildly unsettling cast. Once one takes up a position of ocular advantage 
over a scene, one necessarily becomes not only a spectator, a game patron of the theatre, but a 
methodical and evaluative “observer.” Those visual signs—the expression on a character’s face, 
for instance—that an audience member precisely need not read but can simply see are made 
explicit, in this strange novel-as-closet-drama, as objects of a less than benign attention. The 
hypothetical observer is a quasi-physical presence in these scenes, but enacts the role of a close 
reader, highlighting through his readerliness—his interpretive acuity—that these sights and 
sounds are not meant to be briskly taken in by an “audience.” In lieu of either the audience 
member’s instantaneous registration of perceptual detail or the penetrative elaborations of free 
indirect discourse, James’s spectator/observer behaves like both a surrogate reader and a theatre-
goer, signaling a dual investment in the insight-generating practice of the private novel-reader 
and the coterie-theatricality of the characters’ world. James thereby weaves narrativity out of 
enactments of the theatrical and the spectral. His spectator/observer’s spectrality, his status as a 
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hypothetical figure, has ramifications for both form and subject matter: formally, it allows a 
novelistic function to behave like a theatrical construct; in the fiction itself, it shows a social 
world arranged according to the laws of theatricality, but governed on the sly by the less clement 
conventions of Jamesian narration. So while the individual instances of the trope invoke either a 
spectator or an observer with subtle differences in the disposition of the respective figure’s 
action, the figure is best understood as a “spectator/observer”; the cumulative effect—the 
achieved sense that these two terms are interchangeable—indexes for the reader the tonal effect 
of uneasy sliding from spectatorship to observation that is internal to the fictional world. This 
effect additionally marks a unique internal limit for close reading on the part of James’s reader; 
the primary mode of meaning-making and characterization shifts here from sinuous narrative 
protraction to discrete tropic repetition, and our reading practice shifts with it.  
 James’s spectral spectator/observer brings us back to the similarly spectral Longdon, 
whose observational faculties are explicitly remarked upon both by the narrator and in dialogue. 
Mitchy, another member of Mrs. Brook’s circle, happens upon the unfamiliar Longdon for the 
first time at Van’s home (sans Van), and interrogates Longdon about his relationship with 
Nanda: 
“Have you come up to London, wondering, as you must, about what’s happening—for 
Vanderbank mentioned, I think, that you have come up—in pursuit of her?” 
“Ah,” laughed the subject of Vanderbank’s information, “I’m afraid ‘pursuit,’ with me, is 
over.” 
“Why, you’re at the age,” Mitchy returned, “of the most exquisite form of it. 
Observation.” 
“Yet it’s a form, I seem to see, that you’ve not waited for my age to cultivate.” This was 
followed by a decisive headshake. “I’m not an observer. I’m a hater.”  (83) 
 51 
 
Although we are acquainted with “the subject of Vanderbank’s information,” that is, Longdon, 
the scene is narrated, albeit scantily, from the less initiated Mitchy’s point of view; yet while it is 
Mitchy who is excluded from the information that the reader possesses, his status as outsider to 
this friendship ironically enables the narrator to regard Longdon as the outside element. Hence, 
throughout the scene, Longdon is variably called “his fellow-visitor,” “his interlocutor,” “the 
stranger,” “Old Van’s possible confidant,” and “the speaker”—every appellation but the one we 
know to be his. This is not in itself a remarkable instance of focalization or even irony, except 
that it gestures toward the raft of perspectival awkwardnesses that Longdon introduces into the 
novel and into the social set at its center. As a quasi-anachronism (a superannuated dandy who 
still looks “new” at the turn of the century); a former Londoner who is now a stranger to the 
city’s transformed social landscape; and an initiate into a social circle in which he is clearly not 
at home, Longdon is both an outsider and an insider in multiple registers. He even arguably falls 
both inside and outside of the main field of action designated by the generic conventions of 
nineteenth-century marriage narratives. Though Longdon is matured beyond the imperative to 
pursue a felicitous marriage, his attachment to Nanda’s grandmother, whom Nanda closely 
resembles, casts his sponsorship of the young woman in the long shadow of that first, failed 
pursuit. Mitchy, as a kindness to the older man, nominates observation as a form of pursuit 
apposite to his age, and in doing so links the spectral, closet-dramatic practice of observation 
with the conventional marriage plot that ostensibly drives the novel.  
Given this ability on the part of Longdon and the novel to braid contradictory elements, it 
is worth noting here the syntactic errancy of Mitchy’s question to the older man: “Have you 
come up to London, wondering, as you must, about what’s happening—for Vanderbank 
mentioned, I think, that you have come up—in pursuit of her?” The sentence could be parsed in 
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two ways, and it is an ambiguity that turns out to be endemic to the mixed form of the closet 
drama/novel. On the page, the dashes are a strong enough notation that one would tend toward 
the reading that allows them to keep their integrity, even given the awkwardness of the exfoliated 
phrase, “what’s happening…in pursuit of her.” Yet Mitchy’s fellow-visitor chooses to interpret 
the intercluded clause, “for Vanderbank mentioned, I think, that you have come up,” as part of 
the main body of the sentence rather than as a removable conversational nicety—that is, as 
though he has heard the sentence rather than, like the reader and like characters in most novels, 
as though he had access to an authoritative written text.
102
 Longdon therefore formulates a 
response to “Have you come up wondering about what’s happening? You have come up in 
pursuit of her?”, rather than to “Have you come up wondering about what’s happening in pursuit 
of her?” The second question holds observation and pursuit apart, but Longdon’s response 
assumes their concentricity even before Mitchy kindly argues for it. In the wake of this 
legerdemain, Longdon’s claim, “I’m not an observer. I’m a hater,” can only fail to establish 
separate domains for dispassionate observation and the acts of repudiation or desire that might 
result from affectively surcharged value judgments. Near the novel’s end, Mrs. Brook, in 
spectacularly public fashion, routs her daughter’s marriage prospects with Van by revealing her 
corruption by a French novel. This dramatic collision of the scenes of public spectacle and 
private reading at last forces Longdon to relinquish his post as observer and become a 
spectator—one among many, crucially—and, as his aggrieved departure from the scene 
indicates, a hater. 
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What Ever Happened to Little Aggie? 
 Longdon continually shows himself to be both/and—an observer and a hater; a hoary 
insider with deep knowledge and intuitive sympathy, and an outsider, an arriviste baffled by the 
new lingua franca. A measured voice amid the novel’s persistent badinage, his is nonetheless the 
first voice to sound—Van “heard his name pronounced from behind”—and it is then 
significantly a voice used in pursuit of another character, as well as a voice “heard” without 
having been reported as used. Adding to this thickly significant moment is the behindness of 
Longdon’s voice and self—a spatial position (and one indeed both of observation, as in James’s 
“going behind,” and of pursuit) that metonymizes a temporal one (an antiquated genteelness that 
both evaluates and desires to act upon the inhabitants of the present).  
The spatio-temporal consolidation of behindness is made explicit when, later in the 
evening, Longdon and Van discuss another member of Mrs. Brook’s circle, the Duchess, a 
woman with a “Neapolitan past” and high aspirations for her young niece Aggie’s future: “she 
lives not in what is behind her, but in what is before—she lives in her precious little Aggie” (AA 
26). As a minor character, Aggie’s attenuated treatment enables the novel to effect a dramatic 
collapse of the realist time of character development. Her trajectory, in brief, consists of being at 
first a vigilantly sheltered “innocent,” marrying, and turning instantly into a fatuous coquette. If 
Longdon is behind, that is, a revenant embodiment of what has passed, then little Aggie might be 
said to represent the entirely before—a sped-up version or parody of the teleological trajectory of 
the developmental narrative; she is wholly underdeveloped at first, and then wholly 
overdeveloped. On being shown a photograph of this physiologically mature “seventeen or 
eighteen”-year-old early in the novel, Longdon flatly rejects Van’s characterization of her as a 
“little girl”—a summary assessment whose faintly brutal directness suffuses the tone of a later 
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scene that takes place at a gathering in Mrs. Brook’s drawing room.103 Aggie, having just been 
brought in by her aunt at the exact moment that her marriage prospects are being discussed by 
Mrs. Brook and Mitchy, is indeed described as suddenly and spectacularly “before” the entire 
party. The “before” of mercantile display here becomes indissociable from the “before” of 
prematurity, of an innocence whose meticulous manufacture is subjected by the narrator to a 
decidedly camp bit of fantasizing that can only be quoted at length: 
That young lady, in this relation, was certainly a figure to have offered a foundation for 
the highest hopes. As slight and white, as delicately lovely, as a gathered garden lily, her 
admirable training appeared to hold her out to them all as with precautionary finger-tips. 
She presumed, however, so little on any introduction that, shyly and submissively, 
waiting for the word of direction, she stopped short in the centre of the general 
friendliness till Mrs Brookenham fairly became, to meet her, also a shy little girl – put out 
a timid hand with wonder-struck, innocent eyes that hesitated whether a kiss of greeting 
might be dared. “Why, you dear, good, strange ‘ickle’ thing, you haven’t been here for 
ages, but it is a joy to see you, and I do hope you’ve brought your doll!” – such might 
have been the sense of our friend’s fond murmur while, looking at her up and down with 
pure pleasure, she drew the rare creature to a sofa. Little Aggie presented, up and down, 
an arrangement of dress exactly in the key of her age, her complexion, her emphasized 
virginity. She might have been prepared for her visit by a cluster of doting nuns, 
cloistered daughters of ancient houses and educators of similar products, whose taste, 
hereditarily good, had grown, out of the world and most delightfully, so queer as to leave 
on everything they touched a particular shade of distinction. (68) 
If the proliferation of the language of design—“gathered,” “training,” “direction,” “presented,” 
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“arrangement,” “prepared,” “products”—did not gesture emphatically enough toward Aggie’s 
exquisite artificiality, Mrs. Brook’s exaggerated greeting would suffice to set this artifice 
“exactly in the key of” a theatrical performance. Here again, characterization occurs not through 
elaboration, but through a temporal collapse. Though Aggie is assigned the actorly task of 
“waiting for the word of direction,” it is the paradigmatically theatrical Mrs. Brook who slips 
into the role of the “innocent” “little girl”; for that matter, we are only indirectly (yet highly 
efficiently) told that Aggie is a little girl by being told that Mrs. Brook “became, to meet her, 
also a shy little girl.” What is strange about these descriptors is not only that their real object—
Aggie—is only indicated through a specular sleight of hand. It is that Longdon’s derogation of 
the truth value of the phrase “little girl” in the novel’s opening pages is so effortlessly overcome 
by Mrs. Brook’s performative reflection of this truth—so effortlessly and seamlessly, in fact, that 
the narrator simply reports, without reference to the phrase’s history in this text, on Mrs. Brook’s 
becoming “also a shy little girl.” In short, the photographic representation in which Longdon 
grounds his judgment can only prompt an assessment based on generally accepted metrics of 
maturation and development; it takes an elaborate coterie performance to produce the communal, 
relational, and multiply artificial truth of this “little girl” and her so readily replicated—nigh 
parodied—“innocence.” The force of recognition this performance generates is such as to render 
Longdon’s erstwhile authoritative judgment not only irrelevant, but effectively and narratively 
forgotten—a collapse not only of the narrative time required to report on Aggie’s being a “little 
girl,” but of the narrative history that would undercut the truth-value of this report. James’s 
narrator thereby reinforces his narrative authority through this theatrical elision of a moment that 
simultaneously threatens it. 
 This collusion between theatre and novel occurs alongside another, more recognizably 
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Jamesian bit of narrative smoke-and-mirrors—the positing of dialogue that might not be or 
definitely is not spoken in the diegetic world of the novel: “‘Why, you dear, good, strange 
“ickle” thing, you haven’t been here for ages, but it is a joy to see you, and I do hope you’ve 
brought your doll!’—such might have been the sense of our friend’s fond murmur while, looking 
at her up and down with pure pleasure, she drew the rare creature to a sofa.” A device that serves 
varying purposes across James’s works, this positing often augments a sense of unreality or 
immateriality, as in The Sacred Fount, where the first-person narrator is conventionally read as 
delusionally projecting “evidence” for a conspiracy—a premise that makes available the legal 
sense of the word “immaterial.”104 In the above passage from The Awkward Age, the ambiguous 
status of Mrs. Brook’s speech heightens the novelistic quality of a paragraph notable for its 
staginess. Rather than simply report that Mrs. Brook rattles off a bit of claptrap, the novel 
chooses this highly theatrical moment to emphasize that it can do what a theatrical performance 
cannot: it can not only provide a notation for dialogue or action that does not actually happen—
as, of course, a novel always does—it can reliably provide the sense of a speech whose 
particulars are, for some reason, elusive.
105
 In this passage, the coterie audience of closet drama 
and the novelistic narrator collide: the narrator is positioned simultaneously as 1) a quasi-
embodied, initiated party within the scene (hence Mrs. Brook is “our friend”) who falls out of 
earshot as Mrs. Brook leads Aggie away from the “centre of the general friendliness” and can 
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thus only guess at the content of her “fond murmur,” and as 2) the sole repository of novelistic 
authority capable of imparting an effectively adequate account of a scene to the reader. The 
device of hypothetical dialogue here divests the narrator of occasional authority by positioning 
him as a spectral “observer” with physical limitations, but ultimately enhances his intrinsic 
authority as a novelistic function by permitting his approximation of Mrs. Brook’s “sense” to 
stand in for the version of reality the reader must accept. Embodiment, that quality by which the 
more familiar kind of Jamesian narrator who is free to “go behind” characters is supposedly not 
hamstrung, here proves to pose no threat to narratorial authority after all—even in a scene 
wherein the narrator all but confesses to the limits of his access.     
 In addition to this deft melding of narratorial roles, this passage effects a highly 
condensed and camouflaged sketch of the kind of narration the character Aggie will require. The 
vestal imagery at the end of the excerpt makes a gorgeous skein out of the passage’s—and many 
of the novel’s—thick contradictions:  
She might have been prepared for her visit by a cluster of doting nuns, cloistered 
daughters of ancient houses and educators of similar products, whose taste, hereditarily 
good, had grown, out of the world and most delightfully, so queer as to leave on 
everything they touched a particular shade of distinction.  
Not merely a self-allusive nod to the good sisters who deposit Pansy Osmond with her father in 
The Portrait of a Lady or the more forbidding Carmelites of The American, this imagery casts 
the closet drama of self-making and subjectification as cloister drama. It is a delicately 
counterpoised figure that allows the intense insideness of enclosure to mean being “out of the 
world”; allows “taste,” “distinction,” and “products” to signify the sacral, recherché, and 
“queer”; and allows the progressive narrative time of Bildung—of being “prepared” by 
“educators”—to collapse into the mysticism of a single, all-conferring touch. This final temporal 
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paradox proves to be the most salient one for Aggie, whose character (in both senses of the 
word) transforms dramatically (also in both senses of the word) upon her marriage to Mitchy, 
from ignorant innocent to frivolous flirt. If the narrative strategies of The Awkward Age go a long 
way toward disabling the depth psychology so often attributed to James’s work, the minor 
character of Aggie could be said to occupy the vanishing point of this tendency’s logic.  
James’s account of constructing the character of Isabel Archer in the Preface to Portrait 
provides a vivid counterpoint. While the obvious idiosyncrasy of The Awkward Age is the 
absence not only of a centering consciousness but of any sustained consciousness at all, James’s 
scant words on the “contributive” role of his “heroine’s satellites” in Portrait urge one to ask 
what physical laws govern the representation and trajectory of a minor character like Aggie. 
Aggie’s “development” is not a question of a painstaking weaving of consciousness out of the 
linguistic fabric of the text, but of an abrupt shift in a character’s behavior and a corresponding 
shift in James’s method of representation. Earlier passages such as that of Aggie’s arrival at Mrs. 
Brook’s gathering position the “innocent” Aggie as a salable object, approached through 
comparatively long narrative interludes dilating upon her character. Take, for instance, a rare 
moment of free indirect discourse,
106
 focalizing, significantly, Longdon: 
Since to create a particular little rounded and tinted innocence had been aimed at, the fruit 
had been grown to the perfection of a peach on a sheltered wall, and this quality of the 
object resulting from a process might well make him feel himself in contact with 
something wholly new. Little Aggie differed from any young person he had ever met in 
that she had been deliberately prepared for consumption and in that furthermore the 
gentleness of her spirit had immensely helped the preparation. (145) 
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This paradoxical experience of “something wholly new” makes a fetish object out of what is 
actually the “fruit” of assiduous labor, but it also aligns Aggie’s effect on her observer with that 
of Longdon, whose natty attire impresses Van with a sense of his “looking new.” Longdon, 
however, maintains essentially the same relationship to the novel’s narrative strategies 
throughout, practicing observation as pursuit right up until he closes the novel by spiriting Nanda 
away with him to his estate at Beccles. Aggie, once her marriage to Mitchy is consummated, is 
abandoned by the loving gaze of the narrator/observer/spectator and becomes solely an object—
and, for the reader, an effect—of the other characters’ talk. While the earlier passages dealing 
with her character make her emphatically into a fetish through a theatricalized piece of narration, 
the later scenes reverse this approach, dematerializing Aggie by presenting her almost solely 
through dramatic dialogue between other characters that can only take place in her absence—that 
is, through gossip. In lieu of lengthy description and metaphor, we perceive Aggie through a 
series of alternately arch and earnest exchanges whose object is now not only off-center, but off-
stage: 
‘She has hidden a book, and he’s trying to find it.’ 
‘Hide and seek? Why, isn’t it innocent, Mitch!’ Mrs Brook exclaimed. 
Mitchy, speaking for the first time, faced her with extravagant gloom. ‘Do you really 
think so?’ 
‘That’s her innocence!’ the Duchess laughed. (246) 
‘Doesn’t he feel by this time – so awfully clever as he is – the extraordinary way she has 
come out?’ 
‘By this time?’ Harold echoed. ‘Dearest mummy, you’re too sweet. It’s only about ten 
weeks—isn’t it, Mitch? You don’t mind my saying that, I hope,’ he solicitously added. 
(247) 
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Even Nanda’s well-intentioned reassurances to Mitchy require the condition of his wife’s 
conspicuous absence from a private tête-à-tête of somewhat questionable intimacy: 
‘I had my idea about Aggie.’ 
‘Oh, don’t I know you had? And how you were positive about the sort of person-’ 
‘That she didn’t even suspect herself,’ Nanda broke in, ‘to be? I’m equally positive now. 
It’s quite what I believed, only there’s ever so much more of it. More has come—and 
more will yet. You see, when there has been nothing before, it all has to come with a 
rush. So that, if even I am surprised, of course she is.’.... 
‘You admit then,’ he continued, ‘that you are surprised?’ 
Nanda just hesitated. ‘At the mere scale of it. I think it’s splendid.’ (302) 
We are denied access to the process of Aggie’s transformation, and while the characters in the 
novel are pruriently intent on fixing the exact duration of the change, the change for the reader is 
even more abrupt, and seems to precipitate a concomitant formal shift. If The Portrait of a Lady 
follows a gravitational model of satellite consciousnesses revolving around a sun, Aggie’s 
trajectory across The Awkward Age could be said to enact this novel’s aesthetics of 
dematerialization writ small. Aggie is initially a highly spectacularized fetish object and is 
recognized as such narratively; the closely choreographed loss of her closely managed 
“innocence” results in her becoming an invisible object of dialogue. Once again, it is worth 
noting that in neither of these moments is deep subjectivity the prevailing model of 
characterization; rather, the character’s move from a vacuous innocence to an empty sexual 
knowingness has a parallel narrative movement, from a highly spectacularized object of 
narration to an immaterial projection of dramatic dialogue. The inenarrable and depth-defying 
suddenness of Aggie’s transformation is perhaps best captured by Nanda’s offhanded revision of 
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the “receptacle”107 metaphor for Jamesian subjectivity—notably, here, shorn of the physical 
receptacle: “You see, when there has been nothing before, it all has to come with a rush.” 
Nanda’s reparative reading, in which Aggie is “only trying to find out…what sort of person she 
is,” ultimately represents a failed internal attempt on the novel’s part at rendering this character 
intelligible through the language of continuous subjectivity and psychological realism, as Nanda 
herself all but admits at novel’s end (302). The failure is all the more ironic in that Nanda’s 
conversation with Mitchy itself demonstrates that there is no representational technique available 
for the dematerialized Aggie to “find out” anything of the sort about herself—instead, it is for 
other characters to elaborate her in her absence through conversation.  
Repetition, Pursuit, & Theatrical Attention 
 The abruptness of this minor character’s transformation is mirrored by the similar celerity 
with which the novel’s marriage plot and the social circle at its center are undone. As Van puts it 
to Mrs. Brook, the author of the destruction, “Five minutes did it” (253). Directly after Aggie 
emerges from the room in which she has been engaged in an unseemly tussle with another 
member of the circle over a dirty French novel, Mrs. Brook publicly outs her daughter Nanda as 
having been corrupted by this same book and thus as unsuitable for marriage to Van.
108
 Van’s 
account of Mrs. Brook’s cataclysmic act frames it specifically as a theatre piece, but one in 
which the spectators double as actors: 
It was a wonderful performance. You pulled us down—just closing with each of the great 
columns in its turn—as Samson pulled down the temple. I was at the time more or less 
bruised and buried, and I didn’t in the agitation and confusion fully understand what had 
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happened. But I understand now. (Ibid.) 
David Kurnick argues that “Milton’s Samson pulls down the temple in a heroic gesture of 
antitheatricalism, whereas the collapse of the temple in James’s novel registers as a genuine 
loss.”109 It is undeniable that the violent collapse of Mrs. Brook’s set is described in traumatic 
terms by Van and, as I will discuss shortly, precipitates a scenic form of repetition compulsion at 
the novel’s end that parallels the narrator’s repetitious invocation of a spectator/observer 
throughout. However, to argue for a sense of “genuine loss” at the destruction of the “group 
consciousness” and of the place of theatricality in this novel necessarily assumes that this group 
consciousness actually existed and was positively valenced. It also assumes that theatricality 
does in fact exit the stage—a paradoxically theatrical metaphor that should hint at the complex 
irony of Van’s allusion. Because while Mrs. Brook’s violence to the integrity of the social set is 
indeed figured as the destruction of a theater, Kurnick skims over the theatricality of this act of 
antitheatricalism. In aligning Samson’s defensive assault on his Philistine audience with the 
“inward gaze of the psychological novel,” Kurnick overlooks the imperative every closet drama 
imposes on its reader—to visualize, to imagine a performance. Milton may have taken pains to 
screen his Samson from the “gawking crowds of Gaza” and to do so in a literary form that was 
patently sympathetic to “the regime that closed the theaters,” but the irony remains that his 
detheatricalizing play impels readers to adopt the inimical stance of the spectator. Samson 
Agonistes may ultimately direct its reader’s gaze inward, but even thus inverted, it alights on an 
image.  
 Mrs. Brook’s actions shine a light on a similar contradiction within the interlineation of 
spectatorship and theatricality. Her performance requires her social set to become a situational 
audience in order to be nullified as actors generally. In witnessing Mrs. Brook’s exposure of 
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Nanda, the friends become guarantors both of Nanda’s disqualification from the marriage market 
and of the explosion of the structural integrity of their group; this particular act of spectatorship 
dissolves the social group that forms the basis for observation and, in Nanda and Van’s case, for 
(marital) pursuit. What Van’s allusion articulates, then, is not the banishment of theatricality, but 
a final cleaving of the Janus-faced figure at the center of James’s novel-as-closet-drama—the 
spectator/observer. A fissure in this dual figure is visible in Van’s deferred understanding of Mrs. 
Brook’s act, a temporal lag that may be the only possible response to a scene of theatre that not 
only elementally affects and effects spectators, but will permit of no internal or symbolic process 
of sense-making observation. No susurrus of gossip or reflection attends the scene; the only 
reaction that registers is Longdon’s departure from the theatre/stage. To call the delay of Van’s 
understanding a “deferral” may ultimately be downright optimistic, as Van concludes his 
postmortem discussion with Mrs. Brook in the next chapter in a state of even greater 
incomprehension: “Vanderbank, who appeared to have been timing himself, put up his watch. 
‘I’m bound to say then that, with separations so established, I understand less than ever your 
unforgettable explosion’” (256). This conclusion accords purely spectatorial theatricality—
theatricality unmitigated by observation—an explosive puissance, in the wake of whose 
demonstration we find the closet-novelistic enterprise in a state of shell shock. At the same time, 
a moment of theatre has effectively dissolved theatricality qua social norm for nearly the 
remainder of the novel. The performing coterie at the novel’s center is disbanded; rather than 
governing characters’ ways of relating, theatricality becomes a structural and narrative principle, 
relegated to organizing scenes and inflecting the narration—up until Longdon’s attempt, at 
novel’s end, to reconstitute it as a relational model for himself and Nanda.  
 The Awkward Age’s three-part denouement consists of three consecutive conversations 
 64 
 
taking place in Nanda’s former schoolroom, now converted into an independent receiving room. 
Each scene emphasizes the manner in which Nanda’s visitors enter and exit, as well as on the 
mutually unsettling transactions between these characters and the objects in the room. The 
opening sentence of the section contains a pronoun used often in the novel, but never before by 
the narrator: “Nanda Brookenham, for a fortnight after Mr Longdon’s return, had found much to 
think of; but the bustle of business became, visibly for us, particularly great with her on a certain 
Friday afternoon in June” (281). The question of where the stress falls in the phrase “visibly for 
us” both determines and confuses much in this scene. If on visibly, the distinction being made is 
between the visual relay of information and—what other receptive mode? And why apportion 
space on the page to specifying a kind of experience that should literally be apparent on its face? 
If, on the other hand, the stress is on us, the narrator would seem to be expropriating the 
privileged first person plural from the “us” of Mrs. Brook’s social circle and possibly of the 
spectator/observers hypothesized throughout the novel. Yet why is the “us” of the narrative voice 
boasting of exclusive access to the visual domain at the only self-conscious moment of the 
novelistic narrator? Kevin Ohi writes of “seemingly conventional” uses of the narrative “we” in 
Jamesian texts otherwise dominated by the free indirect style of narration: “just as the bond 
uniting characters and narrator is subject to sudden abrogation by the narrator, so, too, is that of 
the reader with the narrator, which threatens, in turn, not only a puncturing of intimacy but an 
exposure of presumption.”110 Certainly in the case before us now, the narrator’s self-constitution 
in terms of visual acuity and felicitous emplacement excludes the reader altogether from this 
narrative “us,” and drives home the extent to which the surrogation of 
readers/spectators/observers throughout the novel has ironically enacted a mode of narrative 
appraisal that always unambiguously excludes the reader. If this moment implicates anyone in a 
                                                 
110
 Ohi, Henry James and the Queerness of Style, 86, 89.  
 65 
 
“presumption,” it is the narrator himself whose sudden consolidation of the novel’s narrative 
function in a tidy us must invite skepticism. The only other use of the narrative “us” in The 
Awkward Age appears later in the same paragraph, in reference to Van’s visit: “Kindness 
therefore becomes for us, by a quick turn of the glass that reflects the whole scene, the high pitch 
of the concert” (281). (One recalls here James urging Stevenson toward the “kindness” of 
granting his reader sight.) Our narrator is again individuated as a novelistic function, but his 
newly arrogated position of privilege over the “scene” is visual, mediated, and physically 
bounded and flattened by the reflective surface of the mirror; indeed, as an “us” rather than a 
“we,” the narrator is himself objectified by this particular scene’s staging and staginess.111 The 
relationship between theatricality and narrativity having shifted after Mrs. Brook’s devastating 
performance, the narrator in these final scenes seems to resemble a more conventional Jamesian 
narrator—a shift that nonetheless can only be accomplished through theatrical means. 
Meanwhile, the narrative structure itself becomes the primary locus of theatricality after the 
collapse of the characters’ theatrical relations.   
 James’s scenic composition is rarely as baldly theatrical and spatially oriented as in the 
three visits to Nanda that close this novel. It is also the moment in which the immateriality of the 
imagined environment and the spectrality of characters become most pronounced in their 
difficult co-presence with theatricality. Marvin Carlson has discussed at length the theatre’s 
“ghostliness, its sense of return, the uncanny but inescapable impression imposed upon its 
spectators that ‘we are seeing what we saw before,’” explicitly rendering theatrical repetition in 
the language of spectrality: “Everything in the theatre, the bodies, the materials utilized, the 
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language, the space itself, is now and has always been haunted.”112 Van, Mitchy, and Longdon’s 
scenes with Nanda are spectral versions of one another—repetitions in terms of social form, 
spatial demarcation, and the behavior of the visitors, and unique even among James’s “scenic” 
novels for this structural echolalia.
113
 In a supreme display of awkwardness, Van, no longer 
among Nanda’s potential suitors, barrels his way through his visit with a torrent of talk and 
distracted attention to the objects decorating Nanda’s room—two strategies that are at times 
indistinguishable: “He continued to talk; he took things up and put them down”; “his almost 
aggressive friendly optimism clung so to references of short range” (283, 285). Of Mitchy’s visit, 
the narrator notes with a final deployment of the familiar device:  
There would have been for a continuous spectator of these episodes an odd resemblance 
between the manner and all the movements that had followed his entrance and those that 
had accompanied the installation of his predecessor. He laid his hat, as Vanderbank had 
done, in three places in succession and appeared to have very much the same various 
views about the security of his stick and the retention in his hand of his gloves. He 
postponed the final selection of a seat and he looked at the objects about him while he 
spoke of other matters. Quite in the same fashion indeed at last these objects impressed 
him. “How charmingly you’ve made your room and what a lot of nice things you’ve 
got!” (294) 
If the stiffness of Mitchy’s remark portends the onset of social lignification, the sudden hyper-
presence of the material world does not necessarily inject a feeling of reassuring solidity into the 
novel. The objects matter only insofar as they themselves do not matter; it is in the empty 
citationality of these gestures (both as a recognizable social tic and as a dramatic repetition 
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across two consecutive scenes) that the poignancy of these moments, their ability to register loss, 
inheres. Were “we” in fact endowed with the visual faculty touted by the narrator, we would be a 
properly theatrical audience with a clear view of the objects in question, and so paradoxically 
hindered from receiving the full force of the insignificance of the physical world that is here 
inextricable from the affective eloquence of theatrical repetition. 
 It is Longdon, of course, who provides the difference: “Mr Longdon had kept his eyes on 
her, but at this he turned away; not, however, as an alternative, embracing her material situation 
with the embarrassed optimism of Vanderbank or the mitigated gloom of Mitchy” (304). Unlike 
the earlier scenes between Nanda and her visitors in which theatricality remains a structural or 
narrative principle, Longdon’s visit moves toward an ideal Jamesian “marriage” of form and 
substance, enabling Nanda and himself to inhabit a theatrical relation with regard to one another. 
Confessing to the comic protraction of his previous hour spent anxiously waiting to set out for 
Nanda’s, Longdon paints a picture of dilatory re-routing, loitering, and repeated returns to his 
club: 
 “I don’t want any tea, thank you. I found myself, after five, in such a fidget that I went 
three times in the course of the hour to my club, where I have the impression that I each 
time had it. I dare say it wasn’t there, though, that I did have it,” he after an instant 
pursued, “for I’ve somehow a confused image of a shop in Oxford Street – or was it 
rather in Regent? – into which I gloomily wandered to beguile the moments with a liquid 
that if I strike you as upset I beg you to set it all down to. Do you know in fact what I’ve 
been doing for the last ten minutes? Roaming hither and thither in your beautiful Crescent 
till I could venture to come in.” (304) 
Though the point of Longdon’s story is circuitousness and suspended progress toward a 
destination, the narrator makes his own point of interrupting Longdon in order to report that 
 68 
 
Longdon “after an instant pursued” his tale. As I have discussed above, Longdon’s trajectory 
across the novel is characterized by various double logics. If earlier the aggressivity of pursuit is 
sublimated into the comparative remove of observation, here a coil is loosened in pursuit’s 
purposiveness, the word now denoting (while delaying) the telling of a story about delayed 
purpose whose telling is in itself a discursive delay of the difficult scene that is to follow 
between Longdon and Nanda. Observation and observers have absconded from the novel 
altogether, leaving in their wake a demand for direct sight:  
‘Kindly give me some light then on the condition into which he has plunged you.’ 
She hovered before him with her obscure smile. ‘You see it for yourself.’ 
He shook his head with decision. ‘I don’t see anything for myself, and I beg you to 
understand that it’s not what I’ve come here today to do. Anything I may yet see which I 
don’t already see will be only, I warn you, so far as you shall make it very clear.’…. 
Mr Longdon, without a movement, kept his posture. ‘….So you may dance, if you like, 
on the absolutely passive thing you’ve made of me.’ (Ibid.) 
The scene is punctuated by several chagrined attempts on Longdon’s part to vacate his seat like a 
difficult audience member and by subsequent appeals to his patience by Nanda. Longdon’s 
interrogative directness, contrasted with the symptomaticity of Van’s volubility and Mitchy’s 
stiltedness, is atypical for this novel; it permits a character openly to request a performance and 
to pursue a position of spectatorial receptivity rather than simply to inhabit a social structure in 
which constant and implied spectatorship/observation continuously generates performances that 
become fodder for character studies. In his prefatory remarks, James offers a highly suggestive 
rebuttal to a false consciousness theory of taste in which audiences can be relied upon to swallow 
dreck—or what James considers second-shelf Ibsen—because their palates know no better:  
If John Gabriel Borkman is but a pennyworth of effect as to a character we can imagine 
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much more amply presented, and if Hedda Gabler makes an appeal enfeebled by 
remarkable vagueness, there is by the nature of the case no catching the convinced, or 
call him the deluded, spectator or reader in the act of a mistake. He is to be caught at the 
worst in the act of attention, of the very greatest attention, and that is all, as a precious 
preliminary at least, that the playwright asks of him, besides being all the very divinest 
poet can get. (14) 
James casts the “convinced” “spectator or reader” as the subject of a productive attention that 
enables tolerant enjoyment. This transvaluation reveals a dimension of James’s attitude toward 
the satisfied theatrical audience that might surprise those familiar only with his denigrations of 
the theatre-going public in the wake of the disastrous première of Guy Domville.
114
 With regard 
to the world of The Awkward Age, this “very greatest attention” could subtend a positive type of 
spectatorship that is also a kind of reading, a spectatorship with the ability to build relations 
rather than merely monitor or destroy them.
115
 In an 1893 letter to Edward Compton, whom he 
had sent a draft of the first act of Guy Domville, James writes: “I only expected—what you have 
given me—a voice, on the question of whether or no you liked the act—as a spectator, an 
irresponsible outsider in your stall—thought it interesting as a beginning, the first chapter of a 
story etc.”116 Note that James refers to 1) an act as a chapter, 2) written feedback as a voice, 3) a 
reader as a spectator, and 4) a spectator as “an irresponsible outsider.” Spectatorship would 
eventually be the receptive mode of those attending a production of Guy Domville, but James’s 
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friendly enjoinder to read from the imagined position of a spectator, to inhabit that of an 
irresponsible outsider, somewhat startlingly puts a premium on the facile, unpenetrating 
“like/dislike” response of the casual theatre-goer he elsewhere so contemns.117 This kind of 
reactivity seems similar to the mode of attention held up in James’s remarks on Ibsen—not a 
close attention, perhaps an irresponsible one, but one conducive to enjoyment and interest, and 
adaptable to multiple forms. In forgoing observation in the novel’s final scene in favor of an 
ideal of receptive attention through spectatorship, Longdon steps into the empty dramatic space 
left by the dissolution of Mrs. Brook’s performing coterie. He seems poised, in his request, to 
offer a receptive (if, given that life with him spells the foreclosure of Nanda’s marriage 
prospects, lovingly irresponsible) alternative to the catastrophic spectatorship devised by Mrs. 
Brook. Longdon may also be able to sublate the abortive “pursuit” of a felicitous marriage (and 
marriage plot) into “pursuit” as a type of theatrical repetition and deferral, pursuit of the kind of 
“marriage” James speaks of in the Preface—one between form and substance. With regard to this 
last development, James’s remarks on the relative boundedness of a play’s mode of reference 
introduce a suggestive tension:  
[The] novel, as largely practised in English, is the perfect paradise of the loose end. The 
play consents to the logic of but one way, mathematically right…. We are shut up wholly 
to cross-relations, relations all within the action itself; no part of which is related to 
anything but some other part – save of course by the relation of the total to life. (AA 14) 
While “the logic of but one way” primarily means the logic of the only way, that is, the 
“mathematically right” way, the phrase also suggests the single-mindedness of a unidirectional 
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route, combined somewhat paradoxically with the gridded enclosure of auto-referential “cross-
relations.” In Longdon’s speech quoted above, pursuit, severed from both observation and plot 
machination, is similarly folded into a staggered dramatic rhythm of action and deferral, a mixed 
temporality also evident in Longdon’s qualified decisiveness in taking Nanda to Beccles: 
‘Come!’ he then very firmly said—quite indeed as if it were a question of their moving 
on the spot. 
….‘Today?’ she more seriously asked. 
He looked at his watch. ‘Tomorrow.’ (310) 
And in his departure from the scene, the concluding lines of the novel: 
They had gained the door, where Mr Longdon again met her eyes. ‘And then Mitchy—’ 
But she checked him with a quick gesture. ‘No—not even then!’ 
So again before he went they were for a minute confronted. ‘Are you anxious about 
Mitchy?’ 
She faltered, but at last brought it out. ‘Yes. Do you see? There I am.’ 
‘I see. There we are. Well,’ said Mr Longdon—‘tomorrow.’ (311) 
Pursuit functions here as both a one-way street and a referential crosshatching. Mr. Longdon, no 
longer “behind,” seems to have become a revenant in reverse, unable to progress from the 
present into the future toward which he repeatedly gestures. He manages only a proleptic exit 
from the scene and from the novel, his last words a necrotic series of revisions and repetitions, 
including the confirmation: “I see.” The language of visual receptivity prevails, but in a phatic 
capacity. This final repetition of “tomorrow” (or, more precisely, “Well, tomorrow”) recasts 
what was initially a promissory note, even a spur to action, as exactly what tomorrow ought to 
promise a movement away from—a temporal hitch that prevents movement both forward in time 
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and out of the scenic enclosure of Nanda’s room.118 Theatricality reemerges as both a mode of 
relation between characters and an aesthetic, and in both these capacities proves irresponsible, 
tolerant, and enclosed. What necessarily remains immaterial is no longer time already past, but a 
tomorrow that evades dramatic representation.  
 James places the ostensibly opposed generic functions of theatricality and 
dematerialization in dialectical relation, offering experimental versions of characterization, the 
narrative function, and time in the novel. The Awkward Age’s conclusion then goes a step further 
in theatricalizing theatricality itself; if the spectacular scene that disperses the actor-spectators of 
Mrs. Brook’s circle demonstrates the ability of a theatrical performance to dissolve theatricality 
as a given social norm, the novel’s denouement presents the obverse—a moment in which a 
theatrical scene is pursued in the interest of producing and sustaining a theatrical social relation. 
Yet this pursuit remains as immaterial an enterprise as was the voiceless utterance with which 
Longdon pursues Van in the novel’s opening scene. The “dramatic objectivity” of Longdon’s 
voluntary spectatorship in these closing moments in fact precludes what would be the dramatic 
objectivity of a resolution: Longdon and Nanda’s departure from the receiving room, the 
physical site of stasis and recurring deferrals. That the two forge tomorrow through theatrical 
means only ensures the terms of tomorrow’s dematerialization. The “marriage” of form and 
substance pursued by James throughout The Awkward Age is indexed by just such uneasy 
generic couplings as we see in this denouement: theatrical directness with novelistic 
immateriality; spectatorship with antitheatricalism; the drama and spectacle of pursuit with 
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course, not rendered in “pure” form—this would be categorically impossible in a novel—but does, arguably, appear 
in a private setting and without the supporting column of readerly observation. This perhaps contributes to the 
“museal,” following Féral’s argument, quality of these final scenes.  
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readerly observation and delinearizing discursivity; and the protracted time of narrative and 
character development with a condensed dramatic temporality. These formal and generic 
experiments would leave their trace in James’s theorization of that narrative technique to which 
this experimentation ostensibly provided an alternative: the going-behind of Jamesian free 
indirect discourse.  
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“Something ‘Turned On’”: Desiring Oneself, Being an Other 
 
For a hundred years, (literary) madness has been thought to consist in Rimbaud’s 
‘Je est un autre’: madness is an experience of depersonalization. For me as an 
amorous subject, it is quite the contrary: it is becoming a subject, being unable to 
keep myself from doing so, which drives me mad. I am not someone else: that is 
what I realize with horror. … I am indefectibly myself, and it is in this that I am 
mad: I am mad because I consist. 
 
— ROLAND BARTHES, A LOVER’S DISCOURSE 
 
 
 “Tomorrow” threatens to become a dead letter at the end of The Awkward Age; in The 
Sense of the Past (1917), the future can arouse desire only when it attains the condition of a 
corpse, when it is dramatized as a “stopped pulse” mirroring that of the past. Counter to the 
spectrality of The Awkward Age’s hypothetical spectator/observers—and counter to the total 
perspicuity of the objects of their spectatorship—James’s unfinished time-travel novel moves 
toward the epistemological principles of the late style by positing consciousnesses and objects of 
consciousness that are thickly objective, and therefore always only partially formulated or visible 
to spectators who are equally objectively placed. The Sense of the Past theatricalizes its 
ostensibly most internal novelistic moments—for instance, when a character is thinking his 
thoughts—by fixing otherwise inchoate or spectral things in time and space, transforming them 
into delimited objects. Not only do things like a painting, the past, a woman, or one’s own 
consciousness have material objectivity; they are conceived as being more available to 
experience the more thing-like they are, the more their surfaces can be rotated and displayed 
without subcutaneous disruptions. This phenomenality presents a problem for the novel’s 
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protagonist, Ralph Pendrel, who can conceive of the objects of his desire only as aesthetic 
objects tout court, but is unable to conceive of himself as anything but a subject or of his present 
as a desirable object. Even when he describes himself in aestheticizing terms—as a “beautiful 
bookworm,” for instance—his phrasing reflects what he imagines to be his beloved’s perception 
of him. His self-objectification, then, is in fact objectification of another consciousness. James’s 
fantastic plot device anticipates and literalizes the phenomenal work of his later stylistic 
intricacies by placing another man’s consciousness in the protagonist’s mind. Ralph travels back 
in time to become another man, but he never merely and finally is this man; rather, the narration 
bears witness to his experience of enacting this man’s consciousness from moment to moment. 
As Ralph becomes increasingly cognizant of a gap between the objective material of the past 
Ralph’s consciousness and his spectatorship of his own performance of it, his unease takes the 
form of a desire to see this gap closed through his return to the future. The novel is left 
unfinished at this point, with Ralph entertaining a fantasy of psychological coherence and of a 
return to his own heretofore unloved historical present.  
It would be difficult to characterize The Sense of the Past without recourse to the 
category of fantasy. James began writing the novel in 1900, set it aside to begin writing The 
Ambassadors, took it up again on the eve of the First World War, and finally abandoned it. The 
Sense of the Past would seem to offer critics a tidy hermeneutic dovetailing, a nostalgic fantasy 
of restoration fulfilled both aesthetically and biographically—as a narrative representation of a 
twentieth-century protagonist transported to the early nineteenth century, and as an apotropaic 
gesture on the part of James, a steward of Old World forms devastated by the passing of his 
adopted social order. The conceit that James returned to The Sense of the Past in an attempt to 
escape the horrors of war and ineluctable modernization offers a parallelism seductive enough to 
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have spurred at least a few critics into speculative biographical readings.
119
 And not without 
reason; the novel often seems to reflect on its own generic or phenomenal framework and, more 
uniquely within James’s oeuvre, traffics in moments of sly autoreferentiality (to be discussed 
further below). If The Sense of the Past offers an escapist plot, however, the escape it furnishes 
its protagonist necessarily fails to satisfy. The novel’s problematic defines desire as the uneasy 
choreography surrounding the gap between spectator and object of spectatorship; consciousness, 
modeled on this phantasmatic relation, is constituted around a gap between the objectified self 
that performs and the self that bears witness.  
The Sense of the Past, then, is idiosyncratic in a few ways: it is a time-travel narrative 
with a nested transatlantic journey, and, in an inversion of Kevin Ohi’s claim that the style of the 
James novel “is its plot,”120 the fantasy plot of The Sense of the Past seems seductively to 
literalize the theatrical operations of consciousness—the “happening of consciousness,”121 in 
David Beams’s phrase—that Jamesian style more tortuously enacts. Consciousness here is not 
only depsychologized and flattened; its discontinuity is spectacularly staged and is experienced 
by the conscious individual with a giddiness that shades into intense unease. In more widely read 
late novels like The Golden Bowl and The Wings of the Dove, consciousness operates not as an 
abyssal depth but as a theatre, with the individual acting as a spectator of his or her own sensate 
experience, cognition, and affect. This theatrically objectified experience transpires, then, at a 
slender remove from the spectator who responds to it. The protagonist in The Sense of the Past 
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 Griffin remarks that “The Sense of the Past has traditionally been seen as an escape to the past. Many critics, 
following Percy Lubbock’s early lead, view the unfinished novel as marking James’s withdrawal from contemporary 
life. Others have argued that, while James is not fleeing the problems of the present in the novel, his protagonist is” 
(48). See, for instance, Marshall’s claim that “James’s inability or unwillingness to complete The Sense of the Past 
can be interpreted either as a retreat from a bold, strangely literal attempt to erase the distinction between life and 
art, or as a renewed discovery of the uneasy truce between creator and created” (197). Waters, while dissenting from 
the reading of escapism, concedes that “Escape may well have been [James’s] intent” (181).  
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 Ohi, Henry James and the Queerness of Style, 34.  
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 Beams, 164. 
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has a problem with objects and gaps. Ralph Pendrel, a fusty American intellectual and self-
described “slow-crawling library beetle” (SP 12), is obsessively fixated on the past—not the past 
as narratable history or even as an object of nostalgia, the “sense of the past” for Ralph is a 
phantasmatic phenomenality that transmutes inert objects into the form of subjective 
experience.
122
 
 This chapter will argue that The Sense of the Past stages the unraveling of a fantasy of 
psychological coherency through this fantasy’s own internal contradictions. The novel’s 
protagonist, who initially aspires to an ever more fluid and masterful subjectivity, is made to 
endure self-objectification through an intense theatricalization of consciousness. Ralph travels 
back in time and incorporates the consciousness of his long-dead relative into his own 
consciousness, but rather than find satisfaction in his absorption into the dead past he has always 
desired, he becomes increasingly aware of a theatrical split within himself. Tripping continually 
over the gap between his performance of the dead man’s consciousness and his own 
spectatorship thereof, Ralph finds himself panicked at the impossibility of what he most desires: 
that the two Ralphs should melt into each other and form a coherent self. The unfinished novel 
roughly divides into four sections or books, each of which, I will show, enacts a differently 
articulated relation between desire and consciousness. In the first book, Ralph’s rejection by 
Aurora Coyne, the woman to whom he proposes marriage, introduces the phenomenal terms in 
which desire will be formulated. Ralph sees his objects of desire as aesthetic objects, and 
imagines that the woman who rejects him must also perceive him as such—but as the wrong 
aesthetic type, a bookworm instead of a man of action. In fact, she rejects him out of a belief that 
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 It is worth noting that when Ralph does travel back in time, he travels less than a century. While others have 
noted that 1820 constitutes what James would call a “visitable past” (The Art of the Novel, 164), the historical 
difference seems to me notional rather than materially specific, it being the shortest amount of time that will indicate 
an experiential difference, just as England is perhaps the least “foreign” place that will still qualify as “abroad.” 
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his forthcoming trip to England will nullify his desire for all other objects (herself included) by 
suturing his subjectivity totally to his beloved “dead past.” Their conversation establishes the 
forthcoming time-travel plot as a fantasy, a “dream” of self-coherency that, once entered, would 
ostensibly never be relinquished. In the following book, Ralph’s obsession with a strange portrait 
in the London house he has inherited integrates these incompatible desires for a beloved and for 
the “sense of the past,” an inaccessible subject and a dead object. The young male subject of the 
painting presents his back to the viewer, combining the apparently conscious subject position 
(and act of rejection) of Aurora Coyne with the stately objectivity of a frozen past. When the 
figure in the painting comes to life, Ralph’s discovery that the man looks—in a sense, is—
identical to himself extends the dialectic of objectivity and subjectivity to his relation with 
himself. The following book consists of a strange conversation between Ralph and the American 
Ambassador in which Ralph attempts to recount the events of the previous book. It is a scene of 
failed seduction (of Ralph by the Ambassador) in which Ralph shows himself unable to conceive 
that spectatorship (for instance, the Ambassador’s role as recruited audience to Ralph’s 
incredible story) could converge with participatory action (in the form of the Ambassador’s quite 
blatant overtures to Ralph). Ralph’s rigid conception of what an object can be precludes a self-
understanding as an object of desire; because he inhabits a purely perspectival subjectivity, the 
only objectivity he can imagine himself attaining to is that of an aesthetic object for others. Once 
Ralph travels back to 1820 in the form of his dead other self, these distinctions begin to break 
apart. Ralph finds that by delighting in the sensation of self-continuity that comes with becoming 
the dead man, he has in fact become a spectator of his own consciousness. In a state of abject 
fear and panic over this theatrical gap, Ralph’s previous desire for and to be the other man is not 
fulfilled, but rather intensified by this apparent making-continuous of their consciousnesses. 
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Consciousness is shown to be ineluctably theatrical, and becomes all the more uncomfortably so 
the more one pursues a fantasy of self-coherency.  
Because It’s Just in Dreams—! 
 The Sense of the Past is, in many ways, a book about objects—about whether and when it 
is possible for an object to be only one thing, an isolated quantum demarcated from its others, 
and about what these attempts at objectification make possible. Left unfinished in 1914 and 
generally read alongside James’s extensive notes detailing possible narrative trajectories, the 
incomplete Sense itself makes for a contested critical object, one whose paratexts bear a nearly 
prosthetic burden of coherency. The novel dramatizes the phenomenal question of what makes 
for an object in its highly abstract and abstracting opening sentence: “They occurred very much 
at the same hour and together, the two main things that—exclusive of the death of his mother, 
recently and deeply felt by him—had yet befallen Ralph Pendrel, who, at thirty, had known 
fewer turns of fortune than many men of his age” (1). Unity and separateness lap against each 
other in the first clause, threatening a collapse of what should be their own separate vocabularies. 
The “two main things” occur not only simultaneously, but in concert—the two things are one 
thing, “They,” before anything else transpires. This emphatic simultaneity draws (“very much”) 
attention to its own contrivance; we are made to attend to the correspondence between these two 
as-yet unnamed events because it cannot otherwise be taken for granted, particularly given the 
excluded and syntactically isolated third “thing”: “the death of his mother.” That the two 
syntactically privileged events are significant and significantly linked is thereby made 
undeniable and suspect in one move.
123
 We can infer that their they-ness and their grammatical 
priority in the sentence—the word “main” announces how much their position in the main clause 
                                                 
123
 See also my discussion of extraposition in the opening lines of The Wings of the Dove in chapter three. While 
there the use of this grammatical idiosyncrasy produces doubleness in a subject who is ostensibly one, here it 
enhances the sentence’s delicate shading between the language of singularity and that of plurality.  
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contributes to the artifice—perform a specific aesthetic function: they enable a narrative that will 
be about these two things to unfold, a narrative that, on the subject of its protagonist’s most 
“deeply felt” and singular loss, has time only to dispense hastily with it. These first lines force us 
to recognize the novel’s, narrator’s, or individual’s privileged ability to recognize and tell stories 
about certain objects and to decline to elaborate others, even those understood to be most “deeply 
felt.”  
 Objects multiply in this novel, then, and with them these objects’ parameters and relative 
significance. The unseemliness of this proliferation will eventually, as Isobel Waters remarks, 
“leave the reader wondering just who is/are the true object(s) of [Ralph’s] affection.”124 In the 
novel’s first lines alone, we are given “two main things” that seem one thing, and that are shown 
to be on emotionally subordinate footing to a grammatically subordinate thing. Most subordinate 
of all in these lines is Ralph himself—object to the things. Things befall him; death is felt by 
him. The only action ascribed to Ralph places him under covert governance: described as having 
“known fewer turns of fortune than many men of his age,” Ralph is Fortuna’s manipulated object 
even when he is the knowing subject. A human pendulum notable for his movements back and 
forth across time, Ralph Pendrel also evokes a spandrel—an architectural by-product, a proper 
object only by dint of its visible negativity. The unusual autoreferentiality of this James novel 
also complicates the status of things and characters as objects in their own right. Ralph, for 
instance, instantly recalls Ralph Touchett of The Portrait of a Lady. “Jacobean,” Ralph’s notably 
incorrect descriptor for the house he inherits, unusually recalls James himself—“the later James,” 
as Ralph emends. The novel’s narration, then, gives the impression of an especial knowingness, 
and seems immediately to stage this knowingness by making a catalog of objects out of the 
novel’s protagonist, himself characterized by his knowledgeability as an historian and his 
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passion for inert objects. Ralph’s problem, then, is enacted in these very first lines: while he 
habitually understands other people as aesthetic objects, his experience of his subjectivity always 
seems at loggerheads with his own inevitable objectification—here by the free-indirect narration 
that ostensibly positions him as the subject of consciousness, and later by the objects of his own 
desire. The problem of understanding oneself as a subject alone is demonstrated in a passage 
describing Ralph’s obsession with the dead past: 
He was by the turn of his spirit oddly indifferent to the actual and the possible; his 
interest was all in the spent and the displaced, in what had been determined and 
composed roundabout him, what had been presented as a subject and a picture, by 
ceasing—so far as things ever cease—to bustle or even to be. It was when life was 
framed in death that the picture was really hung up. If his idea in fine was to recover the 
lost moment, to feel the stopped pulse, it was to do so as experience, in order to be again 
consciously the creature that had been, to breathe as he had breathed and feel the pressure 
that he had felt. (48) 
Ralph’s indifference to the temporal present belies his fetishistic investment in a fantasy of total 
presence—the past for him is a fully aestheticized object that he would nonetheless have 
coextensive at all points with subjectivity, experienced as experience. The erotic charge of this 
passage is polarized across these equally impossible positions: to desire something that’s only an 
object, and to be something that’s only a subject. The third-person pronoun “he” in the last 
sentence condenses the problem with this dual proposition: even as the object of the fantasy 
switches from being the object Ralph desires (the spent, the displaced) to the conscious subject 
that Ralph wishes to be (“he”), the grammar of the sentence insists on a gap between Ralph and 
this would-be “he,” a particular gap in consciousness that might be glossed as desire. Like so 
much in James, this understanding is not explicitly proposed, but diffused across the surface of 
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style. As the fantastic plot of the novel proceeds, however, it begins to stage these fundamental 
terms of Jamesian consciousness: desire constitutes the unstable gap between oneself and an 
other, and when this other is oneself, desire names the theatrical composition of consciousness. 
  In the novel’s first book, Ralph unsuccessfully courts the imperious widow Aurora 
Coyne, one of James’s sphinx-like women who, as the ostensible object of Ralph’s desire, poses 
a particular phenomenal problem to his aestheticizing impulse: he describes her as a cinque-
cento painting signed by Titian or Veronese, but, as her name might portend, she evades 
collection by continually rotating and revolving out of view—both in the conversation that takes 
up the first book of the novel and in her frequent sojourns “abroad.” James designates this first 
book in his 1914 notebook entries the “Introduction to the introduction.” Elsewhere in the notes, 
James confesses to having forgotten Aurora’s name. These notes go a long way toward 
literalizing the metaphor of the “margin” that recurs in The Wings of the Dove: text becomes 
paratext, character becomes introductory material, just as, in the later novel, the vivid, initial 
subject-object of consciousness—Kate Croy—drops from view. Yet, in another consonance with 
The Wings of the Dove, Aurora’s unplacedness as both phenomenal object and desiring subject is 
not only established at the moment of her introduction; it is identified as the site and source of 
desire:  
Her departures, absence, returns, returns as for the purpose of intensifying fresh 
disappearances, these things were what had somehow caused her to glare at him, to 
dazzle and almost to blind him, as by a wider initiation. He had seen her thus only at 
certain points of her sustained revolution; had been ignorant of many things with which 
the cup of her own knowledge overflowed; had been in short indebted for the extent of 
his privilege to the mere drops and lapses in the general time, as he termed it, that she so 
insolently kept. Sharing continuously as a child, and then as a growing girl, the life led by 
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her parents in other countries, she had had behind her, at their first meeting, on their 
twentieth birthday—for in respect of age they marched well enough together—if not fifty 
years of Europe at least something that already caused him to view his untravelled state 
as a cycle of Cathay. (4) 
Jamesian dramaterialization, which I will describe at greater length in my next chapter, involves 
the contradictory process of a responsive materiality being simultaneously staged and closeted, 
laid out before us and swallowed up whole. In the above passage, James hitches desire itself to 
the quality of dramateriality. In what may be called a narrative rendering of Walter Benjamin’s 
dialectical image, the indefinite cyclicality of Aurora’s “departures, absences, returns,” and 
“fresh disappearances” is objectified into a focus-beam, an object of vision with its own uncanny 
capacity for sight; indeed, if Aurora’s revolutions cause her to “glare” at Ralph, what dazzles and 
blinds is the glare of both an unbearable radiance and an intolerable gaze. Aurora Coyne’s name 
itself condenses and concatenates a host of irresolvable dualities: scene and object (dawn’s slow 
diffusions and a coin’s portability); linear and recursive (the inexorable break of day and the 
“sustained revolution” of a spinning disk); material and figural (the sensate experience of sunrise 
and the mythological embodiment of Aurora, the ontic particularity of the clinking coin and the 
totalizing semiotics of currency).
125
  
The dual signification of glare alone limns the central anxiety of the novel: being an 
object for those who are your objects—more specifically, the erotic terror of being the object of 
desire of the object of your desire. The remainder of the passage narrativizes this problem in the 
concrete spatial and temporal terms of abroadness. In his notes, James reports having intended, 
in The Sense of the Past, to recreate The Turn of the Screw through the international theme; the 
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result could be said to be the internationalization of dramateriality. Ralph’s fantastic identity 
swap is ballasted by the literal recontextualizations attending transatlanticism and time travel. 
The passage ends with a revision of the Tennyson lines, “Better fifty years of Europe than a 
cycle of Cathay.” Bookish Ralph Pendrel’s reference to “Locksley Hall”—a poem remarkable 
for, among other things, its irruptions of libidinous bile—inflects what might otherwise pass for a 
rather courtly moment of self-diminishment with an idea of sexual relation as scarification.  
 Sexual relation, in the novel’s dialogic first book, consists of the kind of disjunctions and 
misreadings that will become familiar in late Jamesian conversational style. Ralph assails Aurora 
with derisive representations of what he takes to be her desires, ostensibly in the hopes of 
“making her care enough to contradict him” and thereby “a little diminish his defeat” (10). Yet 
the rhythm of the conversation has the newly returned Aurora still revolving in and out of 
Ralph’s presence. Her responses come only after a delay—“yet not as if to show she had taken 
one’s words in, for his were never directly met” (11). While Aurora continues to speak “as if she 
had not heard him” (12), Ralph persists in excoriating her for preferring the “buccaneer,” the 
“desperado,” the “ruffian” over himself, a “beautiful worm” and “slow-crawling library beetle” 
(11). When the conversation turns to his scholarly book, however, the typological polarities 
begin to shift: 
“I hope you’ll write many more.” 
“‘Many more!’” he laughed out. “Charming,” he scoffed without seeing where he went, 
“charming the way you appear to imagine one throws such things off! The ideas people 
have of ‘books’—!” He had gone too far before he saw it—had gone so far that the next 
instant, at the sight of something in her face, there was nothing but to pull up. She really 
cared, and he had been calling her “people,” had been grotesquely tilting before her at a 
shapeless object stuck up by himself, and stuck up crooked. She really cared, yes; yet 
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what was it withal she cared for? (14) 
Ralph opposes himself to the “men of action” to whom he imagines Aurora’s tastes run; yet this 
imaginative interpretation of Aurora enacts the very quixotic violence of which he believes 
himself constitutionally incapable. It enacts it, moreover, through a drama of misrecognition that 
out-Quixotes Quixote. In describing himself as “grotesquely tilting before her at a shapeless 
object stuck up by himself, and stuck up crooked,” Ralph casts his defense of cloistered 
scholasticism in terms not only spectacular, but grotesque—indicating a mode of spectacle that, 
like a glare, both draws and repels the gaze. Yet if Ralph makes a spectacle of himself, he does 
so precisely by mistaking his interlocutor for a spectator; more specifically, or rather more 
generally, he addresses her as that uncomprehending mass audience or readership whose name 
here metonymizes the theatrum mundi trope: “people.” 
 Yet Ralph’s recognition of his prior misrecognition only clears the way for a further 
contradiction. Aurora has just completed one of her “revolutions,” and tells Ralph in no uncertain 
terms that she will never leave America again. She frames her refusal of his marriage proposal as 
a kindness: he must go abroad to the Old World to get what he really wants and find what he 
really is; as she intones: “The sense of the past is your sense.” Aurora then leaves him with a 
slim hope that is also an impossibility: she will accept him if he goes to Europe, then returns to 
her “with desire.” This demand sounds like a banality, but Aurora sees in it a contradiction so 
insoluble that she can imagine it resolved only in dreams: 
“What it comes to then is that you’ll never dream of me.”  
“By no means; because it’s just in dreams—!” But she pulled herself up. “I mean that 
their strangeness is their law. They, when they’re happy, arrange everything to perfection. 
With you or without you at any rate,” she pursued, “mine will go on. They’ll be as 
fantastic as you please—that is as much about the poor product.” (27) 
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What Aurora implicitly predicts is merely what Ralph himself appears to want: a total collapse of 
object (“the past,” Europe”) and subject (Ralph), spectacle and spectator, that renders a 
subjectivity without fissures and without desire. Aurora’s condition is impossible not because 
Ralph’s encounter with the “sense of the past” would supersede his desire for her, but because it 
would dissolve desire as such. In aligning her condition with the logic of “dreams” and the 
“fantastic,” Aurora synopsizes a donnée of late Jamesian fiction: to narrativize the fulfillment of 
desire is to appeal to a non-realist style or, here, non-realist modes of characterization and world-
making.  
Turning and Turning On 
 When the plot turns explicitly to the fantastic, Ralph’s determination to fix a revolving 
figure in space and in relation with himself becomes literalized. As he begins to explore the 
London house he has inherited, he discovers among the portraiture of previous inhabitants a 
painting of a young man who “appeared to have sought to ignore our friend’s appeal by turning 
away his face” (73), presenting only his back to the viewer. What little the painting depicts is 
described in loving detail: the “close compact dark curls,” “long straight neck,” “the fall of his 
shoulder and the cut of his dark-green sleeve,” “the way his handsome left hand, folding easily 
over a pair of grey gloves, rested its knuckles on his hip.” The subject’s unusual pose gives him a 
“conscious air…. The gentleman here had turned his back, and for all the world as if he had 
turned it within the picture.” Ralph, believing that the figure has “repeatedly” turned its face 
within the painting to conceal itself from its potential audience, begins to see in these revolutions 
a “snub” to himself and a reflection of the undesirability of his historical present. It is worth 
noting at this point that James’s trope of the gracefully revolving figure tends to describe 
characters who not only never become centers of consciousness, but are in decidedly queer 
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relation to objectivity and objectification. Aside from the exquisitely revolving Aurora Coyne 
and the elusive young man in the painting, James once used the phrase to describe Jocelyn 
Persse, a young “man about town” with whom he maintained an intensely affectionate epistolary 
relationship. James comments in one letter on the “magnificent ease with which you circulate 
and revolve—spinning round like a brightly-painted top that emits, as it goes, only the most 
musical hum. You don’t creak.”126 Another example is the conclusion of the early tale “Rose-
Agathe” (1978), in which the first-person narrator, a hairdresser, discovers that a Parisian 
collector who frequently stares through his salon window does not desire, as he has thought for 
the duration of the story, the narrator’s own wife, but one of the wax manikins that sat in the 
window. This climactic discovery is narrated in language strikingly similar to that used in the 
letter to Persse, and seems to anticipate in literal terms the phenomenality of Aurora Coyne and 
the young man in the painting: 
Sanguinetti led me through two or three rooms, and then stopped near a window, close to 
which, half hidden by the curtain, stood a lady, with her head turned away from us, 
looking out. In spite of our approach she stood motionless until my friend went up to her 
and with a gallant, affectionate movement placed his arm round her waist. Hereupon she 
slowly turned and gazed at me with a beautiful brilliant face and large quiet eyes. 
 “It is a pity she creaks,” said my companion as I was making my bow. And then, 
as I made it, I perceived with amazement – and amusement – the cause of her creaking. 
She existed only from the waist upward, and the skirt of her dress was a very near 
pedestal covered with red velvet. Sanguinetti gave another loving twist, and she slowly 
revolved again, making a little gentle squeal.
127
 
In the spatiality of Jamesian narration, free indirect discourse is figured as the narrator’s “going 
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behind” a character. The prospect of going behind a person who is constantly revolving poses a 
(perhaps amusing) challenge, though this difficulty also gives point to the Jamesian phenomenon 
that the narrative technique best known for conferring the illusion of intimacy with a character’s 
subjectivity is understood in decidedly objectifying terms. Free indirect discourse in James 
always involves a dialectic of objectification and subjectification, and even the foreclosed 
possibility of “going behind” a revolving person forces us to note the strange physicality of 
Jamesian free indirect discourse. When the person who revolves is revealed in fact to be a thing, 
as in “Rose-Agathe,” the borders between objectivity and subjectivity are drawn somewhat more 
starkly.
128
 The later work The Sense of the Past threads the two terms together, leaving Aurora 
Coyne’s and the young man’s status as both subject and object continually under revision and a 
continual source of discomfort to the man who desires them both.  
 The erotic charge of Ralph’s encounter with the painting and the narrative impetus of 
Ralph’s desire are clear, but the precise object of his desire resists consolidation just as the young 
man’s face eludes Ralph’s gaze. Indeed, the very terms in which desire is typically understood 
are here proposed and negated with equal certitude. The narrator notes of the portrait with 
pointed confidence that “it was enough to say for these few indications that they provoked to 
irritation the desire for others” (77), then remarks that “It was not that there was less of him than 
one wanted, but rather that there was too inordinately much and that there would be more and 
more of the measure to come” (78). The fantastic trajectory of the living portrait plot demands 
increasing liveliness and more areas of contact and relation between the painted figure and the 
                                                 
128
 As Otten acutely remarks, “The plot of ‘Rose-Agathe’ is shaped by this equivocation between body and object as 
the narrator’s perception shifts from thinking that a person is being treated as a thing (both because her beauty is 
assessed with a connoisseur’s eye and because she is purchased) to realizing that a thing is being treated as a person 
(not only because the friend half-jokingly ascribes emotions and desires to her but also because his desire for her, 
almost frankly sexual, displaces onto a surrogate the needs and emotional investments usually reserved for persons” 
(4). 
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viewer; here, however, the desire for more “indications” is seamlessly externalized, from the 
internal wish of an individual character to the teleology of a fantasy plot in which there 
inevitably “would be more and more…to come.” The desire of the protagonist becomes the 
engine of the story in a way that erases (or subjects to a remarkable amnesia) the original 
desire—much in the way Aurora Coyne suggests that dreams whose “strangeness is their law” 
can “arrange everything to perfection.” Here we see a pointedly allegorical version of the 
tendency in late James for feeling and desire to migrate across the provisional lines that 
demarcate individual psychologies from (and embed them within) the texture of Jamesian style. 
Not only does desire’s site of registration change; also revised is its origin.  
 Here a note on allegory and the usefulness of this term for late James may be necessary. 
Because The Sense of the Past is an explicitly fantastic fiction, its tropology can seem more 
cohesive and more pointedly indicated at the level of plot. The condensation of symbolic import 
into the figure of the portrait, for instance, seems unusual not in its discrete symbology (the 
golden bowl and The Wings of the Dove’s Bronzino are obvious later examples), but in the odd 
multiplication of contemporary or even self-reflexive literary references around this fantastic 
scene. Ralph’s briefly and mistakenly guessing the London house to be Jacobean is one example. 
After his encounter with the materialized young man, Ralph compares his shame at having 
participated in the scene to that of The Marble Faun’s Hilda, who witnesses a murder (more on 
this passage below). The unusual inflection of the narrative by material details from the world 
outside James’s novel would appear to disrupt the allegorical mode of the fantasy; at the same 
time, however, the inclusion of these intertextual details extends the central metaphor of 
consciousness as a theatre in which the spectator’s participation crucially co-constitutes the 
performance. The possibility of delimiting an aesthetic, erotic, or otherwise phenomenal object 
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without implicating a valuing, desiring, or thinking subject is foreclosed at the level of specific 
symbolic objects (the painting) and of narrative texture (the historical embeddedness of the 
novel’s referentiality). If modern fiction generally stakes out a space somewhere between 
allegory and realist particularity, the concrete historical or literary material in The Sense of the 
Past seems only to draw closer attention to the method by which it is interpolated, thereby 
rendering these apparently exogenous details internal to the allegory of theatrical consciousness.  
Even Ralph’s desire for the young man, legible as it has been to other readers, braids with 
the strange retroactive ability of spectatorship to transform the spectacle being witnessed:  
Just so his own [world] was in his tremendous “pull” and reach, the fact of his positively 
living enjoyment of some relation or other, not to say some cluster of relations, that 
during those very minutes determined his considering air, and even, of a sudden, invested 
him with something of that effect which poor Ralph, wondering about great Italian 
church pictures and ruefully conscious of knowing them but by hearsay, imputed to the 
beauty and sincerity of the portrayed, the attentive donatorio in the corner of the Venetian 
or other masterpiece. What was the presence of the pious magnifico, say, but our very 
Ralph Pendrel's presence, not a little mixed, as he supposed that of the old-time devotee 
represented in the act to be, with the immemorial smoke of altar candles ?—yet leaving 
the upper spaces, those where the sacred or the saintly image itself reigned, clear and 
sublime. The clearness, or call it even the sublimity, was here for all the world the same 
sort of thing: didn’t it place round the handsome uplifted head, as by the patina of the 
years, the soft rub of the finger of time, that ring of mystic light? In the Titian, the 
Tintoret or the Veronese such a melting of the tone, such a magic as grew and grew for 
Ralph as soon as he once had caught the fancy of it, would have expressed the 
supernatural even as the circling nimbus expresses. (79-80) 
The complexity of the Venetian painting metaphor is daunting. As a genre of painting, the 
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“church [picture]” depicts a scene paralleling the scene of Ralph’s spectatorship of the young 
man’s portrait. Yet, as Ralph has never in fact seen a piece by a Venetian master, this ekphrasis 
conjures a doubly absent picture (absent not only to the eye, but to memory) that is used to 
describe another object of compromised visibility (the oddly positioned young man in the real 
portrait). In a reversal similar to that which earlier rendered the portrait’s too “few indications” 
into “too inordinately much,” Ralph’s exclusion from the world into which the young man is 
looking here rotates into its obverse, as the young man’s “considering air” is seen to be not an 
immanent quality, but rather in the process of being imparted by Ralph’s presence as the “pious 
magnifico.” The passage grows stranger from there. Ralph, like the magnifico or donatorio 
supplicating the sacred image, mingles with the “smoke of altar candles” at the bottom of the 
depicted scene, leaving the “upper spaces” where the saintly visage dwells “clear and sublime.” 
While the young man’s “air” can be “imputed” or projected backward to Ralph, it is not Ralph’s 
presence alone, but his sequestration as a spectator within the scene, that produces the sublime 
effect on the depicted young man. Ralph thereby affects the painting only through his 
aesthetically formalized separation from it. And, as the narrator’s lapse from free indirect 
discourse at this moment suggests, “our very Ralph Pendrel’s presence” only has such generative 
power through the backward-projection of a spectator distinct from Ralph’s perspective who can 
bear witness to the scene of Ralph’s spectatorship. As the painting metaphor positions Ralph as a 
spectator depicted within the metaphorical painting, it requires similarly the narrator’s 
formalized separation from Ralph as spectator to Ralph’s spectatorship. The passage closes with 
a final reversal: the metaphorical Venetian painting that had figured the real scene containing the 
portrait becomes suffused in turn with this scene’s affect. The “patina of the years” that accrues 
to the depicted young man—a patina imparted, ironically, “of a sudden” by Ralph’s 
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spectatorship in the present—becomes a portable conceit, projecting back onto the abstract 
Venetian painting a “melting of the tone.” The migration of this trope adjusts the status of the 
“Titian, the Tintoret or the Veronese” from “ruefully” unseen artifact to an artwork in its own 
right capable of eliciting aesthetic assessment (“melting”) through comparison with a concrete, 
present scene. This making-intelligible through concretion is, of course, precisely what the 
Venetian metaphor initially did for the portrait scene itself. As the object of desire can produce 
the desiring subject, so a figure can confer meaning without or before possessing it. It is in this 
regard that the two Ralphs later in the novel can provide the sense of the past and of the future to 
each other without themselves having the benefit of what they give. The Venetian painting scene 
thereby unfolds a pronounced contradiction in Jamesian figuration that will later become merely 
intrinsic to the logic of Jamesian time travel.  
 The scene of desire, then, not only retroactively produces and revises desire’s objects; it 
generates a type of spectatorship in which spectators and performers are simultaneously 
objectified and effaced, and in which the locus of significance—the spotlight, so to speak—can 
shift unexpectedly to a “supporting” figure like the Venetian painting. The stage lighting 
metaphor might be especially apt in a novel in which the brackish “London light” makes the 
“objects about show for the time as in something ‘turned on’—something highly successful that 
he might have seen at the theatre. What was one to call the confounding impression but that of 
some stamp, some deposit again laid bare, of a conscious past, recognising no less than 
recognised?” (65).129 The Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for “turn on” in the sense of arousal 
cites as its earliest example a line from James’s The Ambassadors, the novel he wrote after 
setting aside the unfinished Sense. Arguably, the passage from The Sense of the Past constitutes 
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 In the 1890s, the decade in which James was writing The Sense of the Past, limelights in British theatres had 
generally been replaced by carbon arc lamps. Arc lamps emitted a brighter but harsher light, a suggestive context for 
a passage describing the theatricalizing quality of the murky London light.  
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an earlier instance. Objects illumined by the London light become theatrically framed and 
heightened. Like Ralph in the role of the pious magnifico, a conscious alluvium of the “[ages], 
generations, inventions, corruptions” that produced the London light transforms the objects of 
the present while remaining temporally distinct from them. A structure of dual recognition 
emerges; the conscious past, in leaving its “stamp” on these objects, leaves them also conscious 
and “turned on”—both enhanced in dramatic significance and provoked to desire for the past that 
glares at them. 
 This structure of recognition is dramatized in the scene of Ralph’s encounter with the 
materialized young man. One night, “he struck himself as catching at a distance the chance 
reflection of his candle-flame on some polished surface” (86). Ralph quickly realizes the 
reflected flame is in fact a second candle:  
It was like the miracle prayed for in the church—the figure in the picture had turned; but 
from the moment it had done so this tremendous action, this descent, this advance, an 
advance, and as for recognition, upon his solitary self, had almost the effect at first of 
crushing recognition, in other words of crushing presumption, by their immeasurable 
weight. The huge strangeness, that of a gentleman there, a gentleman from head to foot, 
to meet him and share his disconnection, stopped everything; yet it was in nothing 
stranger than in the association that they already, they unmistakably felt they had 
enjoyed. (86-7) 
As might be expected, the “young man revealed, responsible, conscious, quite shining out of the 
darkness, presented him the face he had prayed to reward his vigil; but the face—miracle of 
miracles, yes—confounded him as his own” (87-8). On the one hand, this epiphanic encounter 
(epiphanic even in the classical sense of a manifestation of the divine, an answer to Ralph’s 
prayer) could be said to literalize a certain truism: the object of desire and the object of 
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recognition are always a projection of oneself. Yet the fantastic temporality of simultaneous 
advance, cessation, and shared awareness of a relation already having been established muddies 
this neat allegory. The face that Ralph recognizes as his own could also be said to confound him 
as his own did; the young man might offer Ralph a melodramatic objectification of himself, but 
this other Ralph might not necessarily provide an external means of self-relation so much as 
“share his disconnection.”  
A Closed Back Room 
The narration abruptly cuts off at Ralph’s epiphany, and picks up with a strange scene in 
which Ralph pays a visit to the American Ambassador and explains to him that he and his double 
have switched identities: “‘I’m somebody else,’” says Ralph, to which the Ambassador replies, 
“‘And is the other person you?’” ““That’s what I count him.’” Just as Ralph has wanted the sense 
of the past, his double had wanted not the sense of the present, as the Ambassador incorrectly 
surmises, but the sense of the future (thus confirming that the recognition that one receives 
from—and gives to—the conscious past is always a misrecognition.) The entire third book 
comprises Ralph’s visit to the Ambassador, where he recounts the extraordinary events of the 
previous book, using his audience, who is only ever called “the Ambassador,” as a “moral 
receptacle” into which he deposits his burden of experience: 
He recalled the chapter in Hawthorne's fine novel in which the young woman from New 
England kneels, for the lightening of her woe, to the old priest at St. Peter's, and felt that 
he sounded as never before the depth of that passage. His case in truth was worse than 
Hilda's and his burden much greater, for she had been but a spectator of what weighed 
upon her, whereas he had been a close participant. It mattered little enough that his sense 
was not the sense of crime; it was the sense, in an extraordinary degree, of something 
done in passion, and of an experience far stranger than a mere glimpse, or than, if it came 
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to that, a positive perpetration, of murder. He wondered that a knowledge of anything less 
than murder could be able to constitute in one's soul such a closed back room; but what 
was of course now most present to him was that he had hitherto grasped of life a sadly 
insignificant shred. (89-90) 
In invoking Hawthorne, the novel appears initially to hold up a distinction between spectatorship 
and participation, only to shift from the language of moral probity (“worse,” “burden,” “crime”) 
to a more nebulous, arguably queer, understanding of the experience (“done in passion,” 
“stranger,” “closed back room”), by which standard Ralph’s participation in the foregoing scene 
eclipses even the act of murder. Introduced to us as a man to whom very little has happened, 
Ralph appears to lack not only experience in the sense of the worldliness radiated by Aurora 
Coyne and of which he possessed a “sadly insignificant shred,” but also experiences as discrete 
objects of knowledge taking up room (even a closed back one) in the otherwise unimpeded 
fluidity of his intelligence.
130
 Not incidentally, the emergence of his sense of mastery within the 
London house prior to the portrait scene stems from his unobstructed passage through the 
property; he displays “an excitement that marked simply his at last knowing himself, as not yet, 
in possession of what he had come in for,” and “revolved through the chambers above and 
amused himself, at successive windows, with the thought of the observation possibly incurred, 
out in the square”—observation that, as he happily speculates, might result in his being mistaken 
for a ghost (83, 85). These revolutions and the projection of an observer with a restricted 
perspective echo Ralph’s observation of Aurora Coyne’s spatial and discursive evasions, as well 
as the supernatural obduracy of the figure in the portrait. In aestheticizing both Aurora and the 
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 James’s famed account of experience in “The Art of Fiction” touches on both these senses: “Experience is never 
limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads 
suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every air-borne particle in its tissue” (52). While 
experience is a “sensibility” and the “very atmosphere of the mind,” it is an atmosphere composed of particulate 
matter.  
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young man as Venetian paintings, Ralph tries to force aesthetic fixity onto two conscious 
subjects that appear to him to “recognize” and negatively evaluate him (as the wrong character 
type, as an embodiment of an inferior historical era). His experience with the young man, in 
constituting a “closed back room” in his soul, spatializes his consciousness, rendering it not 
merely a perspective informed by intelligence, but, like a house, both a cognitive process of 
engagement with the world of objects and a materially limited object in itself. The comparison 
with The Marble Faun is revealing in its anxious disavowal of a possibly simultaneous 
spectatorship and performance, which would position Ralph as both acting subject and his own 
objectifying spectator. That the young man’s face is Ralph’s own redoubles the specularity of 
this structure of consciousness.  
The long scene that follows is an odd one in that it seems, even for James, unnecessarily 
to stagger the pace of the narrative and to introduce some awkward logistical problems; without 
this book, the novel would cut, more effectively one might say, from the moment of Ralph’s 
spectacular encounter with his double to the moment when he is magically transported back to 
1820 as the other man. Further, Ralph’s declaration that he has become the other man makes 
little sense at this point, as he still appears to speak and think through his own consciousness. 
What work, then, does this section do? The Ambassador scene may recall moments in other 
James fiction from this period: a hysterical-seeming protagonist buttonholes an increasingly 
concerned or bewildered listener with an incredible tale, the other party humors him but is 
demonstrably unpersuaded, and at some point this listener’s response, whether arch or solicitous, 
seems to resemble desire. Similar scenarios appear in The Sacred Fount and to an extent in The 
Turn of the Screw, both fictions that could also be said to dramatize the problem of unobjectified 
subjectivity—and in those works, the problem is embodied and amplified by first-person 
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narration. As my epigraph from Barthes’s A Lover’s Discourse might attest, these narrators so 
often seem insane to readers and other characters alike precisely because they are “not someone 
else”; they “consist.” The protracted pursuit of a first-person perspective that does not harden 
along the somewhat more neatly allegorical tracks of the shorter tales was, according to James, 
“foredoomed to looseness” and to a “terrible fluidity of self-revelation” (Preface to The 
Ambassadors). These technical problems with first-person narration seem in The Sense of the 
Past to become internalized as phenomenal problems with Ralph’s character. Over-identified 
with his own subjectivity, Ralph cannot conceive of himself as a live object of desire. Others’ 
desire is therefore invisible to him, even in the comically salacious terms in which the 
Ambassador solicits Ralph’s story: 
The Ambassador, from his deep chair, in his “own” room on the ground floor, where 
books and papers were many and colours brown and sounds soft, smiled across the old 
Turkey rug through his beard and his fumes. “Is it very, very good?” 
“For credibility no. But for everything else,” said poor Ralph, “lovely.” 
“And very, very long?” 
“Only as long—beyond the prime fact or two—as your Excellency himself may make it. 
It hasn't for me somehow at all that sort of dimension. I don't know at least how long it is. 
I wish I did!” 
“Do you mean,” the Ambassador asked, “that it's only broad? Why don't you, with your 
cleverness,” he pursued before his visitor could answer, “put it on paper?” 
Ralph does not put the story on paper because he does not wish to augment the gap in his 
consciousness by acting as a spectator of his own experience, by being the one to give it 
objective form. The Ambassador supplies him with one “single instance to impart his 
knowledge. He desired, he chose, that one other person, anxiously selected, should share his 
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charge of it. One person would do—in fact more than one would spoil everything.” And as 
Ralph’s eager audience, the Ambassador performs above and beyond the call of duty; his sly 
querying of the dimensions of Ralph’s experience transmutes it, even before its narrativization, 
into an object of conspicuous unwieldiness and prurient interest. If this and similar moments 
elsewhere in James seem to solicit readings of queer desire, it is for good reason—with the 
Ambassador as the spectator that Ralph refuses to be for himself, this staging of consciousness 
prises open a gap that is dually articulated as spectatorship and desire. This is not to try to dispel 
any of the Ambassador’s undeniable sauciness or the mood of seduction that colors the scene, 
but to say that these elements particularize the formal and phenomenal structure of desire by 
providing erotic content, and that an externally theatricalized consciousness (theatricalized 
through the Ambassador’s spectatorship rather than within Ralph’s consciousness itself) can only 
materialize through external gestures of desire.  
 Ralph’s comic misinterpretation of the Ambassador’s solicitousness, his inability to see 
his desire, extends two of Ralph’s characteristics: 1) an aversion to the present—both the 
historical present and what is phenomenally present and unrevolving, and 2) a resistance to the 
concept of the spectator who simultaneously participates in the spectacle. As one who wants the 
sense of the past, Ralph pursues an impossible structure of desire: he desires the young man from 
the past and he wishes to be him, while the young man desires the sense of the future. In later 
sections of the novel, this disparity between the young man as object of desire and subject of a 
desirable perspective will reemerge when Ralph travels back in time as the young man—but with 
an ever widening gap between the process of cognition on the one hand, and on the other, the 
consciousness of the young man that Ralph is uneasily aware of as a distinct object. This 
discomfort at the theatrical structure of consciousness amounts, in the Ambassador scene, to an 
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incognizance of the Ambassador’s dual role as conscripted spectator to Ralph’s experience and 
participating performer in a presently unfolding drama of seduction. The Ambassador, as an 
unlikely ficelle, brings into view what is always fraught in ficelle characters like Maria Gostrey, 
Susan Stringham, and Fanny Assingham: that their libidinal investment in the lives of other 
characters, or in the characters themselves, exceeds their intended narratological function. Here 
that function is imputed by Ralph himself when he attempts to reduce the Ambassador to a 
trousseau containing his experience, extending his presumption of the incompatibility of 
spectatorship and participation into the narrative. And again, momentary lapses from free 
indirect discourse in this scene suggest the need for a separate spectator (the narrative voice) to a 
performance for which Ralph is not an adequately comprehending audience: when, for instance, 
the Ambassador insists on escorting Ralph out to his cab (eventually accompanying him back to 
Ralph’s house),  
Ralph offered so little objection to this…that they had within a couple of minutes more 
descended together to the hall; where the servant in waiting, Ralph was afterwards to 
reflect, must at once have attested his conviction that his master was not simply seeing to 
the door a visitor of no inscribed importance. His Excellency would therefore be going 
further—under some exceptional stress; and to this end would be placed without delay in 
possession of his hat, gloves and stick…. (109-10) 
Both the sudden demarcation of Ralph’s perspective from that of the narrator and the temporal 
disjunction between Ralph’s reflection and the present moment ring highly ironic. Ralph sees a 
clairvoyant Jeeves, whereas an observer with less reflexive faith in intellection might discern a 
servant accustomed to expediting his master’s excursions with male companions. When the 
Ambassador takes the step of riding home with Ralph in his cab and, on arrival, steps out with 
Ralph and dismisses the cab, Ralph again retrospectively hypothesizes a justification for the 
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Ambassador’s protracted presence. When Ralph asks the Ambassador whether he will retain the 
cab, the Ambassador 
stepped straight out by way of answer. “Oh my dear man, I’ll walk,” he seemed to be 
saying; “I don’t in the least mind your knowing that you have given me the fidgets or that 
I shall extremely need to think you over: which indulgence the use of my legs will 
healthily stimulate.” 
 Something of that sort Ralph was much later on, as I say, to recover the 
appearance of his having found words for; just as he was to piece together the 
presumption that, the cabman paid, magnificently paid, and getting again into motion, he 
and his protector—for hadn’t they after all rather exquisitely agreed to leave it at this?—
stood face to face a little, under the prolongation of a hand-clasp; followed then by the 
mutual release that left his Excellency standing there with the graver face of the two, he 
at least little doubted. (114) 
Although hypothetical dialogue appears to odd effect throughout James’s work, the ontological 
status of the speech loosely attributed to the Ambassador becomes only more ambiguous over the 
course of this passage. Initially, the dialogue appears to constitute Ralph’s interpretation of the 
Ambassador’s following him out of the cab. The reinstatement of the distinct narrative “I” and 
the temporal leap, however, contribute to the impression that this dialogue—or something 
approximating it—actually occurred and could only be reconstructed by Ralph at a “much later” 
date. The difference between these two contiguously posited accounts is significant. In one 
scenario, the Ambassador silently steps out of the cab expecting to follow Ralph into the house 
but, in doing so, is misconstrued by Ralph as innocuously setting off on a long walk back to his 
office; in the other, the Ambassador verbalizes his intent to return to his office by foot, but 
Ralph, distracted by his own thoughts, only later recalls some version of this speech. Both 
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possibilities are strange, their co-presence surpassingly so. If the earlier encounter between Ralph 
and the young man dramatizes a shared disconnection mediated by a felt association, this tête-à-
tête seems to inverse the terms of that meeting. “[Confounded]” earlier by the duplication of his 
own visage, here Ralph “little [doubts]” the difference visible in the Ambassador’s face. Nothing 
appears to be felt in common by Ralph and the Ambassador, not even a disconnection so 
thoroughgoing the narration incorporates two versions of the same moment. Ralph’s certainty 
regarding the contours of his own person as distinct from the other man’s seems to wax as the 
epistemological stability of the represented scene of desire wanes. The operations of his 
individual consciousness appear to be withdrawing from the texture of narrative reality in this 
section. This impression is corroborated by Ralph’s sense, as he steps across the threshold into 
the house and is transported back to 1820 at the end of the above paragraph, of having finally 
been placed “on the right side and the whole world as he had known it on the wrong” (115).  
His Fear Just of Theirs 
 Ralph’s rightness and the whole world’s wrongness are brought home by the lag in 
comprehension we experience in the first sentence of the following section, when Ralph arrives 
at the front door in 1820: “He was so far prepared as that, on the footman’s saying, after he had 
asked who was at home, ‘I think Miss Midmore is, sir,’ he had not been unduly agitated; though 
the effect was of making him at the same time wonder if he oughtn’t, more decently, to have had 
his approach heralded in the course of the morning by the bearer of a note” (116). Up until the 
semicolon, we are misdirected to believe that 1910-Ralph’s consciousness has traveled with him 
back to 1820, but the second half of the sentence reveals that Ralph’s consciousness has been 
supplanted by—or at least now incorporates—that of the other Ralph Pendrel, his 19th-century 
counterpart. Ralph feels himself “prepared,” then, not for the disorientations of time travel, but 
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for transatlantic difference—though whether one of these kinds of unease figures the other or 
merely is mistaken for the other by Ralph remains ambiguous. Also ambiguous initially is 
whether 1910-Ralph’s personality is subsumed into 1820-Ralph’s, or whether it is swapped out 
altogether:  
The danger was flagrant and consisted of the number of things to be known and reckoned 
with in England as compared to the few that had so sufficiently served him at home. He 
but wanted to know, though he would rather have liked to learn secretly; which for that 
matter he was now, he conceived, catching a little the trick of—and this in spite of his 
wonted way, from far back, on receipt of a new impression or apprehension of a new fact, 
and under correction, in particular, of a wrong premise; which was to lose himself quite 
candidly and flagrantly in the world of meaning so conveyed. (117) 
Ralph’s fear of a failure of manners gives social particularity to the problem that seems to 
undergird this passage—that of failed or inadequate psychological continuity and coherence. For 
James, beautiful manners indeed show as a kind of metaphysical aureole; a character in The 
Awkward Age describes the Apollonian Vandenbrook as one of those who possess the “sacred 
terror”: “There are people like that—great cases of privilege. …They go through life, somehow, 
guaranteed. They can’t help pleasing. …They hold, they keep every one” (279). The language of 
capture is not incidental; it is only in absorbing and becoming the “dead past,” by having the 
experience of knowing without “[losing] himself” in the object of knowledge—that is, by 
experiencing his consciousness as integrated into the texture of this object—that Ralph feels the 
exhilaration of possessing what James would call the sacred terror.
131
 This moment in Ralph’s 
visit sees Aurora’s dream fulfilled; the sense of the past is Ralph’s sense in that his subjectivity 
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 James also uses this phrase in recalling being introduced to the works of Prosper Mérimée; he found himself 
“fluttering deliciously—quite as if with a sacred terror—at the touch of ‘La Venus d’Ille’” (qtd. in Edel, 54). Here, 
as with The Awkward Age’s Apollo-like Vandenbrook (and perhaps, too, with Aurora Coyne), the sacred terror has 
Olympian resonances. 
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has become coextensive with the objectivity of the past Ralph’s consciousness. The contradiction 
in this affective circuit is that the ecstatic sense of mastery that attends Ralph’s appearance of 
effortless knowingness necessarily also registers a gap in this knowledge—if only for himself 
and not yet for an audience. He can only exult in his seamless inhabitation of his consciousness if 
this consciousness is not in fact seamless, but rather an object that his feeling of excitement can 
be about—a performance that he is watching. As Ralph’s experience of his consciousness 
becomes more fantastic and more ostensibly coherent during his visit with the Midmores, this 
contradiction becomes amplified and his exhilaration shifts to an intense unease. 
 This cognitive sequence is staged in pointedly melodramatic language in the scene of 
Ralph’s meeting with Molly Midmore, the English cousin with whom he (the past Ralph) has 
been pursuing an epistolary courtship: 
That light of her knowing all about him doubtless helped to flood his own mind with the 
assurance immediately needed: he felt at this stage, in the most wonderful way, that 
things came to him, everything a right carriage required for the closer personal relation, 
in the very nick of being wanted, and wore thus, even under the gasp of a slight danger 
escaped, a certain charm and cheer of suddenness. (121) 
The repeated trope of a “danger” averted in the “nick” of time takes on a slightly more fantastic 
referent at each deployment. Whereas the earlier danger of appearing ignorant of so much of 
English life, while “flagrant,” is erased along with the visible process of learning, this new 
“slight danger escaped” seems to require actual magic, in that “things” previously out of reach 
now inexplicably “came to him.” These “things” are still only a matter of deportment, and Ralph 
attributes his sudden apprehension of them to the confidence imparted by Molly’s “knowing all 
about him.” Her recognition seems to vouchsafe and lubricate the arrival of the right “things” in 
their discourse. Yet the facility of this discourse leads Ralph, ironically, to worry over the 
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unfamiliar cognitive and conversational rhythm: “Was it going to be enough simply to do the 
thing, whatever it might be, for it to ‘come’ right, as they said, and for him above all to like it, as 
who should also say, after the fact?” (122). Ralph says the right thing or authors a beautiful 
gesture with autonomic ease, then “[likes] it.” The phrase “after the fact” is particularly 
suggestive here, as Ralph reflects upon the novel experience of emotional assessment occurring 
after a circumscribed “thing” or “fact” enacts itself within the conversation. The stark contours 
of these “things” of consciousness are made possible by a legible and recursive temporality—
first the enactment of the thing, then the positive emotion that registers that the thing has 
happened and thereby recognizes and understands it as an object, a fact. This temporality belies 
the linearity and limpidity of the fluvial subjectivity Ralph celebrates in this scene.  
Eventually, factual details regarding Ralph and Molly’s shared family history begin to be 
deposited into Ralph’s consciousness and speech with the same hair-trigger timing:  “He was in 
actual free use of the whole succession of events, and only wanted these pages, page after page, 
turned for him: much as if he had been seated at the harpsichord and following out a score while 
the girl beside him stirred the air to his very cheek as she guided him leaf by leaf” (126). Again, 
the novel’s (or Ralph’s) insistence on the possibility of a simultaneous acquisition and 
deployment of knowledge is undermined, in part by the deferral of meaning within the very 
metaphor for this simultaneity. At first apparently a metaphor of passive reception or 
spectatorship in which Ralph reads through the pages of his own consciousness, the figure 
transforms to position Ralph as the virtuoso performer of this consciousness as well. The girl 
“[stirring] the air to his very cheek” appears oddly superfluous to the figure, and might be 
another instance of a Jamesian metaphor generating extradiegetic desires and conflicts through 
the pursuit of its own figural logic. In her vaguely uxorial complementarity, this anonymous 
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helpmeet seems to invoke Molly Midmore, though the metaphor more arguably raises this 
possibility without finally claiming this ground for its figure. The source of Ralph’s knowledge 
remains unnameable, but its partial personification as “the girl beside him” introduces a thin 
erotic current into the drama of consciousness. The delayed unfolding of the metaphor from one 
of reception to one that combines reception and performance makes a point of the metaphor’s 
duality, with Ralph’s earlier discomfort at the confluence of these theatrical positions sublated 
into the titillation of the mildly disturbed air at the player’s cheek.  
Ralph’s delight at his own facile charm and its effect on Molly can only tip over into its 
negative image, a trajectory that begins with Molly’s registration of Ralph’s “uncanny” (in 
James’s words) demeanor:132 “he had at the end of another minute so mastered it that he would 
have liked to catch her mistaken in order to put her right. Her face, for that matter, glowed with 
the pleasure, wasn’t it? of his assurance thus made positive” (127). The narrative voice’s ironic 
distance from Ralph’s misinterpretation of Molly’s affect here indirectly marks the start of 
Ralph’s own burgeoning awareness, what James in his notes calls Ralph’s “double 
consciousness”:133  
The slow growth on the part of the others of their fear of Ralph, even in the midst of their 
making much of him, as abnormal, as uncanny, as not like those they know of their own 
kind etc., etc.; and his fear just of theirs, with his double consciousness, alas, his being 
almost as right as possible for the “period,” and yet so intimately and secretly wrong; 
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 Beams has observed that Ralph “actually becomes his ghost” (159). 
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 James almost certainly borrows this term from Du Bois, whose essay on race and double-consciousness appeared 
in The Atlantic the year before James began writing The Sense of the Past. While I would disagree that James’s 
novel can be credibly read as an account of race consciousness (see, for instance, Hawkins), it seems clear that Du 
Bois’s theorization of a racialized double-consciousness provided a cogent philosophical language for James’s 
aesthetic and phenomenal concerns: “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious 
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self” (“The Strivings of the Negro People, 1897). 
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with his desire to mitigate so far as he can the malaise that he feels himself, do what he 
will, more and more produce. (295) 
Ralph’s “desire to mitigate” the Midmores’ unease constitutes a desire for self-coherence, for an 
erasure of the gap between his performance and his own spectatorship thereof. Molly’s blush on 
Ralph’s behalf betrays an embarrassment that, were Ralph capable of experiencing it for himself, 
might avert what ultimately irrupts into his thoroughgoing panic at the discontinuity of his self-
performance. It is worth taking a moment to sort through these different emotive forms of 
embarrassment and fear, how they articulate or respond to an acute sense of incoherent self-
performativity or “double consciousness,” and why Ralph experiences one and not the other. 
Nick Salvato defines embarrassment as a feeling resulting from an “exposure of the performative 
self…in a social or relational situation…as undesirably or nonideally multiple and divided, and 
which is often…manifested in such paradigmatic physical or gestural signs as the blush and the 
cringe.”134 Ralph’s gradual “exposure” to the Midmores and to himself as “so intimately and 
secretly wrong” shares certain structural components with embarrassment, down to the physical 
sign reflected in Molly’s blush. Yet the emotional register of Ralph’s growing unease seems 
quite distinct from the equally situational, performance-oriented feeling of embarrassment. 
Salvato, for instance, helpfully traces a potentially salutary trajectory for embarrassment’s 
exposures, which might allow that an “individual be both of two selves or more—
simultaneously.”135 This potentiality, however, seems foreclosed in The Sense of the Past, where 
even embarrassment cannot be experienced subjectively. If embarrassment says, in Salvato’s 
cogent formulation, “‘I feel my self’s otherness as it announces itself to others,’ or, more 
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radically, ‘I feel my self’s otherness as others announce my selves to me,’”136 The Sense of the 
Past proposes a further degree of removal in leaving it unclear who is doing the feeling. Ralph’s 
exposure might be embarrassing, but it is pointedly an other who wears Ralph’s embarrassment 
for him, just as it is not as an epiphany but only through an emotive relay among Ralph(s), the 
Midmores, and the narrator that the uncanniness of Ralph’s behavior begins to come home to 
him.
 137
 Emotions noted in his spectators become imperceptibly turned back on Ralph, reflected 
as his own. When Molly’s brother Perry, for instance, reacts to Ralph with “an extraordinary 
diffidence, almost a chill of fear, in the face of the unusual,” this fear provokes in Ralph a 
prevision of his probable failure to keep himself unperturbed, in the right proportion, by 
the mistrust it was open to him, on a certain side, or at least in certain quarters, to inspire. 
Why should he, why should he? he was able to say to himself, though indeed after much 
else had happened, that he had then inwardly and rather sickishly begun to inquire; for in 
the least degree to determined wonderments that should be beyond answering was the last 
thing he had dreamed of, and we may in fact all but feel his heart even now stand still for 
half a second under that noted first breath of a fear. That he wanted but to please and 
soothe and satisfy him, that he was ready to sacrifice to so doing all but the blood of his 
veins, this came over him to the point of bringing out sweat-drops on his brow while he 
met his kinsman’s bulging eyes with the grace of reassurance we have just imputed to his 
own. (152-3) 
 The “first breath of a fear” may be an explicit reference to Perry’s fearful reaction to Ralph, but 
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 As James describes this process: “He knows his way so much and so far, knows it wonderfully, finds his identity, 
the one he wears for the occasion, extraordinarily easy considering the miracle of it all; but the very beauty of the 
subject is in the fact of his at the same time watching himself, watching his success, criticizing his failure, being 
both the other man and not the other man, being just sufficiently the other, his prior, his own, self, not to be able to 
help living in that a bit too. Isn’t it a part of what I call the beauty that this concomitant, this watchful and critical, 
living in his “own” self inevitably grows and grows from a certain moment on?—and isn’t it for instance quite 
magnificent that one sees this growth of it as inevitably promoted more and more by his sense of what I have noted 
as the malaise on the part of the others?” (SP 300) 
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one could just as credibly argue that it is Ralph—“[sickish],” sweat-beaded Ralph—to whom the 
passage’s language seems to be attributing the emotion. This queasy ambiguation between 
Perry’s fear of Ralph and Ralph’s fear of Perry’s fear limns precisely the interlineation of desire 
and identification in this section of the novel.
138
 The narrator performs another moment of self-
nomination in suggesting that “we may in fact all but feel his heart even now stand still for half a 
second”; bizarrely simultaneous here are the first-person narrator’s momentary distinction from 
Ralph, this narrator’s emotive collusion with the reader, and this first-person narrator’s claim to 
“feel,” of all things, the activities of Ralph’s heart. If the style of this sentence could be said to 
pose an argument, it would be that being a different person is precisely what permits one to feel 
another’s feeling, even at the level of affective concretion suggested by the skipped heartbeat. 
The theatricality of feeling here can only be described as radical. We have seen that Ralph 
partially is himself, but also both desires and desires to be himself; it is equally clear in this 
passage that Ralph’s emotions not only are intensely his own, but are his own perhaps because 
they are someone else’s. This latter version of theatricality similarly collapses desire and 
identification. The emotions the passage describes are clearly being theatrically transmitted, so 
that it is inconsequential whether the fear is objectively Perry’s or is Ralph’s subjective response 
to Perry; Ralph’s identification with Perry’s emotion makes the emotion both his own and not. 
Yet the relationship staged here is also a potently erotic one.  If Ralph “[wants] but to please and 
soothe and satisfy him” and is “ready to sacrifice to so doing all but the blood of his veins,” this 
intense desire to please Perry particularizes the structure of Ralph’s desire as such; both refer to 
the painfully evident gap between Ralph’s performing self and his spectatorship thereof. The 
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 As Fuss writes in Identification Papers, “identity is continually compromised, imperiled, one might even say 
embarrassed by identification” (10). Fuss’s reading, contra Freud, of convergences of identification and desire is 
particularly apposite to the strange braiding of these two psychic structures in James’s novel. Desire, as Fuss argues, 
might be “precisely a desire to be a subject” (12). 
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diametric opposition between Perry’s “bulging eyes” and the “grace of reassurance” in Ralph’s 
own measures the same distance as is maintained between Ralph’s performative “reassurance” 
and the tell-tale “sweat-drops on his brow.” That is, the phenomenal distance between Ralph and 
another character is homologous to the distance between Ralph and himself. 
Readers who interpret Ralph’s journey as an escape from the fractured nature of James’s 
modernity have cause to think so, as the effortless surface-presentation of the early 19
th
-century 
Midmores, their sprezzatura, stands in as the historically inflected form of self-coherence tout 
court. Molly’s sister Nan, the only other character who seems to share Ralph’s sense of double 
consciousness, lives in 1820 but is described in her alienation as “modern.” The particular 
historical content does not appear to matter to Ralph so much as his phenomenal relation to it. 
When the gap in his consciousness becomes unbearable, Ralph’s wish to see this gap closed, to 
inhabit his own consciousness as a continuous and unobjectified perspective, transposes the 
fantasy of self-coherence back onto the future world of 1910. This fantasy necessarily remains 
impossible since, as we see in 1820, the object of Ralph’s desire—the affective experience of 
psychological coherence—propels coherence ineluctably to its disintegration. The impossibility 
of the fantasy is literal to a degree, as James abandoned the story at a point when Ralph is still 
trapped in the past. Arguably, the project James began after first leaving this one aside, The 
Ambassadors, could be read as a retooling of the drama of consciousness ultimately staged in 
The Sense of the Past: an American man who has missed out on life, on experience, travels to 
Europe and finds himself inhabiting not only the living past, but his own enhanced consciousness 
as such. Ultimately the protagonist recognizes that neither this richer mode of experience nor the 
etiolated life he left behind is permanently tenable, but the novel ends without his having left the 
Old World he must eventually forfeit.   
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Yet it is fair to say that The Sense of the Past has a very different emotive palette from 
The Ambassadors, that it in fact altogether lacks what the later masterpiece has in abundance: 
tone. This absence might be attributed to the comparatively mundane setting, but I tend to find 
that the activity of feeling here, like the drama of consciousness, is consolidated in and 
somewhat contained by this fantasy novel’s subject matter—its tracing of feeling’s phantasmatic 
trajectory between novelistic subjects. If the novel does not elicit strong feeling, it may be 
because it is devoted in part to staging how feeling works. And in the same way that Ralph 
cannot be said to feel embarrassed despite the text’s registration of embarrassment, Ralph 
certainly does not inspire pity in the way that Lambert Strether so undeniably does, despite the 
novel’s fairly hitting us over the head with the fact of Ralph’s isolation. Susan M. Griffin has 
noted of Ralph that “Knowing the self means knowing what the self lacks: the presence of 
another.”139 Ralph’s dilemma, however, is not that he lacks others. Stalking through the London 
house on nightly vigils prior to his encounter with the “other man,” Ralph imagines himself 
either alone or permitted to feel and act as though he were by his obliging household staff: 
“Practically, in any case, he was beyond all observation and if self-effaced agents but worked to 
make him feel so, that only assured the freedom” (80). In this early section, Ralph’s keenest 
awareness of “freedom” presupposes an expertly occluded audience. What Ralph lacks, 
therefore, is not others, but the ability to be an other for himself. To be an object differs crucially 
in this novel from being an aesthetic object. Because he can understand people only as aesthetic 
objects, Ralph cannot imagine erotic fulfillment except as acquisition or as a fantasy of becoming 
the dead artwork. In literally becoming the dead past, however, Ralph sees his initially 
streamlike experience of the other Ralph’s consciousness instantly begin to break against his 
spectatorship of it. His performance of this consciousness becomes an object for him—not a 
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finished and framed art object, but a fixed point in time and space marking an uneasy distance to 
be closed by a yearning spectator; an object of desire.  
Contrary, then, to the tendency in James criticism to characterize all objectification as 
aestheticization, The Sense of the Past turns on the necessity of experiencing oneself in objective 
and performative but non-aesthetic terms. If transforming people into artworks leaves 
“life…framed in death,” inhabiting one’s consciousness as an unobstructed and “terrible fluidity” 
poses as grave a peril. In an 1883 letter to Grace Norton, an old friend then suffering a serious 
depression, James urges his friend not to “melt into the universe, but [to] be as solid and dense 
and fixed as you can. …You will do all sorts of things yet, and I will help you. The only thing is 
not to melt in the meanwhile. I insist upon the necessity of a sort of mechanical condensation” 
(SL 191-2). While Grace Norton’s self-debouching may threaten a different sort of death by 
water from Ralph Pendrel’s self-engulfment, the same danger ultimately looms: not to live, not 
to “do all sorts of things.”140 Ralph’s mere performance in the fantastic scene with his double 
does not suffice as experience; he is unwilling or unable to act as spectator to his own 
experience, to objectify it as experience, and this phenomenal intransigence propels him into 
another scene of libidinal disjunction with the Ambassador. Far from exhibiting the dangers of 
fossilizing the world, The Sense of the Past shows that in order to be lively, one must first be an 
object. The novel opens with the avowed elision of that which is “deeply felt” from the scope of 
the narrative. Feeling finally emerges, albeit in the form of a foundational dread and panic, only 
at the point in the novel when a “mechanical condensation” of consciousness takes hold, when 
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 In its grammatical ambiguity, the “melting of the tone” in the Venetian painting passage in The Sense of the Past 
could be said to perform both James’s prescribed “mechanical condensation” and the perilous fluidity this 
condensation would militate against. The “melting of the tone” could refer to the tone itself’s succumbing to melting 
or, if read genitively, to a tone of meltingness. The co-presence of these two interpretive possibilities registers 
precisely the difficulty and danger involved in positing a solidity resistant to deliquescence, particularly when the 
solidity is a literary effect like tone.  
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Ralph’s own spectatorship of his performance converges with others’ and fixes him inescapably 
to himself.  
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 “So as Not to Arrive”: The Object-Theatre of Late Jamesian Consciousness 
 
A person taking up his residence in a foreign city is apt, I think, to become 
something of a play-goer. In the first place, he is usually more or less isolated, and 
in the absence of complex social ties the theatres help him to pass his evenings. 
But more than this, they offer him a good deal of interesting evidence upon the 
manners and customs of the people among whom he has come to dwell. … If this 
exotic spectator to whom I allude is a person of a really attentive observation, he 
may extract such evidence in very large quantities. It is furnished not by the stage 
alone, but by the theatre in a larger sense of the word: by the audience, the 
attendants, the arrangements, the very process of getting to the playhouse. 
—HENRY JAMES, “THE LONDON THEATRES” (1877) 
 
 
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist 
is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they 
shall happily appear to do so. 
—HENRY JAMES, PREFACE TO THE NEW YORK EDITION OF RODERICK HUDSON (1907) 
 
  To indulge for a moment in a thought experiment, let us read this chapter’s two 
epigraphs contiguously—side by side rather than, more responsibly, with due attention to the 
gulf of thirty years and distinct critical occasions that separate them—and describe the cognitive 
sequence that results. Unsurprisingly, these two remarks by Henry James seem to contain 
incompatible impulses. The mature Master famously advocates for a narrow compass, while the 
fledgling novelist of 1877 defines the theatre with dilative zest, concluding with a potentially 
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endlessly widening sphere: “the very process of getting to the playhouse.”141 In this moment of 
semantic expansion, progress toward the theatre itself becomes theatre; one’s engagement with 
the ostensibly closed semiotic field of theatre-as-stage ultimately alters and enhances the terms 
of the original semiology to world-as-theatre. Shifting the parameters of theatre to include the 
pullulations that form theatre’s mass social context, 1877-James’s definitional move disrupts the 
dramatic coherence of the English stage by fixing it within and in relation to a larger, more 
mobile human scene. Both sets of terms are thereby altered: if the ungainly presence of a social 
world with its own claim to theatricality forces the theatre to relinquish the appearance of 
aesthetic autonomy, the rubric of theatricality imparts to the audience, the set, and the journey to 
the playhouse a common condition of legibility. By this light, we might revisit the oft-quoted 
1907 enjoinder that would have the novelist draw a delimiting “circle” within a ponderous 
infinitude of relations. Taken at face value, the older James says: The art of the novel is 
circumscription. But his dictum may endorse a less austere novelistic measure than its many 
subsequent citations in volumes on narrative theory would suggest; after all, the younger James’s 
narrative “geometry” included the process of getting to the circle.  
Reading back and forth between these two critical moments thereby produces a particular 
phenomenal pattern, a rhythm of expansion and contraction or, more precisely, of expansive 
dynamism and shapely fixity. James’s aestheticizing gesture opens back onto a larger human 
scene, only to recede again into marmoreal stillness, and so on. Herein lies the value of our 
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disastrous premiere of Guy Domville in 1895, Ackerman argues, James adjusts his attitude toward drama, preferring 
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thought experiment: the pattern artificially produced by our collapsed diachrony also emerges on 
the level of the sentence in James’s writings of the early 1900s, and becomes the script by which 
consciousness is constructed. Both the famed House of Fiction metaphor and The Golden Bowl 
(1904) prominently feature a process I will call dramaterialization, in which a character’s 
consciousness, metaphorized by an object, eventually becomes metaphorized by the scene of the 
character’s interaction with that object. This account, however, is deceptively linear: the process 
neither occurs in a two-step sequence, nor introduces a phenomenally stable object with which a 
similarly stable character engages as such. Rather, these passages tend to enact a continuous 
dialectical tension between object and scene, materialization and dematerialization. This chapter 
will focus for the most part on three moments in the late works that bear out the pattern of 
dramaterialization modeled in the above discussion of my epigraphs: 1) the House of Fiction 
metaphor, 2) the pagoda metaphor in The Golden Bowl, and 3) The Golden Bowl’s concluding 
scene. Each of these passages posits consciousness by locating and dislocating it, generating an 
intense, disembodied unease out of the dialectical shifting between consciousness’s 
objectification and its staging in a scene. The emotive intensity of these moments holds a 
repellant fascination in that it cannot be traced to either a psychologically or ontologically 
coherent character or a dramatic effect (“what is happening” in the plot, for instance). These 
moments in James’s late works make for such discomfiting reading precisely because what is 
soliciting the reader’s emotional “engagement” is neither character nor plot but the complex 
interaction between 1) the continual exposure of realist sites of readerly investment such as 
character as mere literary effects, and 2) the texts’ insistence on nonetheless conferring on these 
effects the minimal objectivity—the quality of being a real thing—required to function within 
their own narratives. Feeling in late James thus registers the imperilment of the realist 
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psychological subject for whom our feeling is ostensibly reserved.  
It is not incidental that James’s exhortation to an aesthetic broadening should involve a 
broader application of theatricality in particular. Theatricality proves central to many such 
unexpected dynamisms in James—to moments, for instance, in which a character’s progress 
toward a figure for consciousness becomes itself a figure for consciousness. This dialectical 
relation between staid objectivity and elusive dynamism tends to engender an unsettled aesthetic 
in the late novels, a contradictory sensibility to which James had elsewhere proved alert: “‘Read 
it,’ Mr. James advised Mrs. Hugh Bell, ‘for its strange mixture of pointless flatness and 
convincing life. Also of desolate untheatricality and dramatic ingenuity.’”142 At the time of this 
assessment of Hedda Gabler, James was still more than a decade away from writing The Golden 
Bowl; yet it is safe to say that the mixed allure he found in Ibsen would eventually characterize 
his own late masterpiece. Even by the standard of the late novels, The Golden Bowl seems static, 
chilly, weighted. A casual reader of The Golden Bowl might be forgiven a glib recollection of the 
novel as a series of hieratic symmetries and hard, heavy objects. Kevin Ohi, too, finds this novel 
to induce a kind of selective memory, which he attributes to a disjunction between the style in 
which it is written and the events it reports: “That we remember The Golden Bowl as reserved 
suggests not only that its volubility about the unspeakable has its effects, but also that what we 
remember about the novel is not its plot but its style: its reticence is a stylistic effect and not a 
thematic one.”143 Ohi’s remarks might help to clarify our own readerly tendency toward 
mnemonic condensation: the sense of a narrative landscape overrun with objects—real, figural, 
and otherwise—originates largely in these objects’ necessariness to narrativizing the workings of 
consciousness. Far from suspending or merely supplementing the narrative, objects in The 
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Golden Bowl animate moments of narrative intensification, moments when consciousness is 
most explicitly dramatized, emplotted, and set in tense relation with the rest of the fictional 
world. In a similar vein, Edith Wharton’s baffled interrogation of her friend, cited earlier—
“What was your idea in suspending the four principal characters in The Golden Bowl in the void? 
What sort of life did they lead when they were not watching each other, and fencing with each 
other? Why have you stripped them of all the human fringes we necessarily trail after us through 
life?”144—perceives as a kind of inhuman sterility the novel’s uncoupling of feeling from realist 
expatiation.  To invert James’s description of Ibsen, a desolate theatricality emerges as The 
Golden Bowl’s primary narrative and conceptual principle: not only do people in this novel treat 
and figure each other as objects, but consciousness must be externalized, thrown from the 
conscious subject, and dramatized as an object before it can behave as consciousness. 
Objectification predicates self-relation. Yet while it hinges on these initial objectifications, 
James’s theatre of consciousness bears out the mobilizing, expansionary impulse in his remarks 
on the English stage: the objects tasked with the figural and narrative labor of enacting 
consciousness continually forfeit this labor to the larger scene in which they are involved, 
dislocating both consciousness itself and the locus of feeling within the scene.  
Fictive Houses 
 Before moving into an analysis of consciousness’s migration between object and scene in 
The Golden Bowl, I would like to examine a well-known Jamesian house that metaphorizes 
authorial consciousness, a house that James constructs as both object and scene. That the 
privileged objects figuring consciousness are often houses seems only appropriate. A play of 
interior and exterior, of subjective inscribability and objective materiality, attends Jamesian 
narrativizations of houses and human subjects alike. Critics have often noted the prevalence of 
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“significant buildings” in James, in particular of Gothic structures that are “creaturely, 
sympathetic, and able to shape the emotions and judgments of their inhabitants.”145 
Compounding the number of works whose central conflicts radiate from or magnetize around 
their eponymous properties—such as “The Jolly Corner,” The Other House, The Spoils of 
Poynton, and the unfinished novel The Ivory Tower—are countless moments where houses stand 
as the significant form of crucial narrative and affective complexes: the Venetian Palazzo that 
vertically emplaces Milly Theale and her travel companions; the Palladian estates that would 
entomb Isabel Archer; and, in The Princess Casamassima, the monument to inscrutable, idle 
wealth that besots a would-be revolutionary. Comparable structures are there for the finding in 
James—which is not to overlook the significance of those Jamesian houses that precisely cannot 
be found, that function as settings and dramatically determinant spaces, but never become 
available to the senses as materially accoutred places. Nearly the entirety of The Sacred Fount, 
for instance, takes place at the country estate Newmarch—“a place of a charm so special as to 
create rather a bond among its guests” and of an immateriality so thoroughgoing as to suggest a 
rebuke to the visual faculty (indeed, the novel’s narrator-protagonist singles out for disdain the 
déclassé ocularity of “the detective and the keyhole”) (SF 17, 57). Newmarch registers almost 
exclusively as a spatialization of elevated tone (“charm”), to the point where the “human 
furniture” seems to be the only kind installed in the place (17). 
 More prevalent still than these radically immaterial houses are moments when materiality 
is revealed to have been imperiled from the moment of its positing. This slippery phenomenality 
animates a figure whose resistant corporeality seems unquestionable—the House of Fiction: 
Here we get exactly the high price of the novel as a literary form—its power not only, 
while preserving that form with closeness, to range through all the differences of the 
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individual relation to its general subject-matter, all the varieties of outlook on life, of 
disposition to reflect and project, created by conditions that are never the same from man 
to man (or, so far as that goes, from man to woman), but positively to appear more true to 
its character in proportion as it strains, or tends to burst, with a latent extravagance, its 
mould.  
The house of fiction has in short not one window, but a million—a number of 
possible windows not to be reckoned, rather; every one of which has been pierced, or is 
still pierceable, in its vast front, by the need of the individual vision and by the pressure 
of the individual will. These apertures, of dissimilar shape and size, hang so, all together, 
over the human scene that we might have expected of them a greater sameness of report 
than we find. They are but windows at the best, mere holes in a dead wall, disconnected, 
perched aloft; they are not hinged doors opening straight upon life. But they have this 
mark of their own that at each of them stands a figure with a pair of eyes, or at least with 
a field-glass, which forms, again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring 
to the person making use of it an impression distinct from every other. He and his 
neighbours are watching the same show, but one seeing more where the other sees less, 
one seeing black where the other sees white, one seeing big where the other sees small, 
one seeing coarse where the other sees fine. And so on, and so on; there is fortunately no 
saying on what, for the particular pair of eyes, the window may not open; ‘fortunately’ by 
reason, precisely, of this incalculability of range. The spreading field, the human scene, is 
the ‘choice of subject’; the pierced aperture, either broad or balconied or slit-like and 
low-browed, is the ‘literary form’; but they are, singly or together, as nothing without the 
posted presence of the watcher—without, in other words, the consciousness of the artist. 
Tell me what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has been conscious. Thereby I 
shall express to you at once his boundless freedom and his ‘moral’ reference.  
All this is a long way round, however, for my word about my dim first move 
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toward ‘The Portrait,’ which was exactly my grasp of a single character—an acquisition I 
had made, moreover, after a fashion not here to be retraced.
146
  
I excerpt here not only the proper House of Fiction metaphor, but portions of the surrounding 
paragraphs as well. Given the canonicity of the metaphor itself, one risks redundancy in 
observing that the paragraph containing it is typically quoted in isolation, plucked from its 
context in the Preface to the New York Edition of The Portrait of a Lady (1908). Ironically, this 
citational practice often attends formalist treatments of the metaphor in question, even as such 
excerpting effectively shears the opening proposition—“The house of fiction has in short not one 
window, but a million”—of its monstrous abruptness, of the sense of an architectural enormity 
being conjured out of thin air and absent any preliminary groundwork (James’s “in short” 
notwithstanding). The foregoing paragraph, in fact, offers a variegated and somewhat 
contradictory set of figures for the novel as a literary form, depicting at times a creature of 
cognition that “ranges through” human experience, at others a kind of unstable raw material that 
“tends to burst…its mould.” These humble if odd figures are resoundingly flattened by the 
rhetorical force of the materialized House.  
Given the extreme difficulty of trying to provide a “straight” synopsis of the House of 
Fiction metaphor, it is perhaps no wonder the James of the late style, as exhibited here, became a 
darling of the New Critics. The passage’s unsettling tone and imagery scuttle efforts to read it 
along the grain, indeed, to discern in which direction its grain runs. If it is meant to be an ode to 
the diversity of authorial consciousness, it seems to consist entirely of minor notes. To offer as 
broad a paraphrase as I can: James argues against instituting rigid strictures for the novel, whose 
form necessarily will be determined by the idiosyncratic perspective inhabited by the individual 
novelist. With the crucial difference of the elaborately staged architectural metaphor, the central 
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prescription here is not too far removed from the position James stakes out in his earlier essay 
“The Art of Fiction” (1884), in which he proposes that the “form” of the novel “be appreciated 
after the fact,” not preemptively legislated.147 The figure of the House itself, however, has come 
in for a great deal of scrutiny, its tortured visuality in particular eliciting a range of Foucauldian 
and historicist readings of power and spectacularity. Diana Fuss, for instance, cites the metaphor 
as an exemplary modern convergence of the “cultural ascendancy of interiority” and the 
“narrative turn toward solipsism.”148 In a passage that concatenates nearly all the interiorizing 
readings of the House that I will aim to invert below, Fuss writes: 
James’s densely populated “house of fiction,” with each interior observer peering through 
the window of his own consciousness, quite nearly obliterates the exterior altogether, 
identifying the human scene outside the domain of art “as nothing without the posted 
presence of the watcher.” Himself a privileged occupant of the house of fiction, James 
focuses self-reflexively on the human agent of perception, placing “individual vision” 
and “individual will” center stage in a theater of introspection where the main actor is the 
spectator, and the real drama takes place inside the mind of the observer.
149
 
I will argue that the House of Fiction in fact eradicates the interior; that James is positioned not 
as a “privileged occupant” but as an excluded reader/spectator; and that the theatrical position of 
the posted watcher is that of both spectator and spectacle.  
To be certain, the disturbing nature of the House’s physicality merits the attention of 
critics, for some of whom its grotesque aspect bespeaks a panoptical instrumentality;
150
 by these 
accounts, James has given us a vision of the novelist as “profoundly disengaged…from the 
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human scene itself,”151 a figure whose “withdrawal from experience”152 is the very condition of 
artistic consciousness. Victoria Coulson describes the House as a “nightmare of punitive 
individuation, a model of harsh polarities in which each ‘posted presence,’ separated 
irremediably from every other, figures both as sentinel and as victim of a solitary 
confinement.”153 Yet the place of the metaphor within the critical fiction of James’s Preface has 
gone mostly unremarked. The tendency of James critics to elide the Preface’s progress toward 
and away from the House of Fiction metaphor mirrors the reifying trajectory of the passage 
itself; in a rhetorical move inimical to the pluralist tropology that precedes it, the House of 
Fiction announces itself “in short” to have always already been the master-trope that underwrites 
all previous figural gestures—a summation, apotheosis, and telos that undoes its own narrative 
history. As an instance of strategic amnesia that privileges a demarcated object-metaphor over 
the more unruly metaphoricity it supplants, the House of Fiction passage has proven to be a 
spectacularly, self-consciously useful moment for James studies and for theories of narrative. As 
in my paired epigraphs, we are given a figure that claims to name the precise contours of 
aesthetic experience, when in fact what makes this precision possible is the figure’s concealment 
of the less tidy process of getting to it. The paragraph that follows supports the passage’s 
aspirations to portability, with James’s sheepish admission that “All this is a long way round, 
however, for my word about my dim first move toward ‘The Portrait.’” If the House of Fiction 
lies along a sidetrack, it is nonetheless the only location that, as James’s segue implies, justifies a 
cessation of narrative progress. 
 As a critical artifact, then, the House of Fiction proves to be not so much an object as a 
process that regards and presents itself as an object. As a prose performance, the House of 
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Fiction passage may also be more dynamic than the critical record would indicate, its model of 
visuality more complex, and more complexly valenced, than its apparent aesthetics of 
surveillance might suggest. Ellen Eve Frank describes the artist at the window as “strangely 
disembodied, reduced from a ‘figure’ rather abstract to begin with, to a ‘pair of eyes,’”154 and 
Sheila Teahan has noted the “strangeness” of James’s outfitting the figure “with a pair of eyes, 
or at least with a field-glass”155 (emphasis mine), as though the field-glass could prove to any 
advantage without a pair of eyes behind them. At the risk of appearing to wish to dispel any of 
this metaphor’s storied strangeness, I would suggest that the overlooked component in these 
readings is a specularity of vision—someone within the “human scene” the artist watches, 
watching in turn. Touted by James (and accepted by critics) as a static object-metaphor, the 
House of Fiction may be better described as a theatrical metaphor; far from being a piece of 
objective reportage, the passage partakes of James’s dramatic method, endowing us with the 
vantage point of a dematerialized spectator who figures the reader. This spectator can be spotted 
in the interstices of the passage, implicitly positioned to detect at the window not a fully 
embodied artist, but “a pair of eyes” or “at least…a field-glass.” The seemingly eccentric 
alternativity of this formulation can be explained, then, as the effect of an onlooker’s limited 
perspective; they are “eyes” or “a field glass” that are seen rather than seeing. Frank’s canny 
account of the house itself as a “fantastical façade with no structure behind it”156 speaks to the 
overwhelming sense it evinces of a flat surface—a “dead wall”—rather than an inhabited space, 
each window “pierced” or “still pierceable” by an individual “need” that is not itself penetrated 
by a spectator’s gaze. Thus, Coulson’s claim that there is “literally no place for a reader” but for 
one that is “equally imprisoned within the disciplinary circuits of the text, oscillating between 
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agent and victim of the novel’s panoptical power,” is only partly accurate. The reader is indeed 
an implied presence, but rather than being the artist’s identical counterpart, a subject-object of 
power “equally imprisoned” and, by “uncanny homology,” inhabiting the same seat of access as 
the artist (as though peering through his eyes), this reader remains doubly dematerialized: first 
from the surface of the text of the Preface, as Coulson observes, then from the absent interior of 
the House of Fiction, whose surface machinations—the effects of authorial consciousness—are 
all the reader can hope to glean. The narrative voice inhabits the spatial perspective not of the 
simultaneously privileged and imprisoned authorial consciousness, but of the excluded and 
dematerialized readerly consciousness. The perspective of the passage itself, then, is a nearly 
fetishistically restricted one—a perspective that abolishes the possibility of both an interior to the 
House and an embodied world outside this architectural metaphor. Critical attempts to 
domesticate the House of Fiction—to claim, for instance, that it “emblematizes James’s access to 
the cultural space of women’s writing”157—seem erroneous on two counts: first, the metaphor is 
predominantly one of the reader’s exclusion rather than of the author’s access; second, the 
“house” itself is not a domestic space, but strongly suggests, as I have shown, in its implied 
phenomenality, a theatrical one—a playhouse of fiction.158 I would suggest that the intense 
unease with which the metaphor affects so many readers stems precisely from this impossible 
theatricality, which 1) forces the reader to occupy a limited spectatorial perspective, but to do so 
in the absence of any explicit material embodiment, and 2) in fact sees the narrative voice 
occupying this abjected position as well—gazing upon the spectacle of authorial consciousness 
along with the disembodied reader—when a more summary gloss of the passage might assume 
an identification between the narrative voice and the “privileged” position of the posted watcher. 
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Feeling emerges from this critical disjunction between the position of voyeuristic empowerment 
that the passage seems to claim for its author and the actually enacted position of dematerialized 
and constricted spectatorship.  
The cluster of terms at work here—reader, spectator, outsider—recurs several times in 
varying configurations over the course of James’s career, each instance underpinned by a 
poignant impossibility. James closes his introduction to a 1907 edition of The Tempest by 
bemoaning the paucity of information about the “effect on [Shakespeare] of being able to write 
Lear and Othello”159—a formulation of the author’s consciousness (and the limits of a reader’s 
access to it) strikingly consistent with that offered in the House of Fiction metaphor: “Tell me 
what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has been conscious.” Elsewhere, James’s vision 
of the “great spectacle of English life” is likewise a portrait of exclusion, wherein Englishmen’s 
“unconsciousness” of the alienating effect their country might have on a foreigner  
makes a huge blank surface, a mighty national wall, against which the perceptive, the 
critical effort of the presumptuous stranger wastes itself, until, after a little, he espies, in 
the measureless spaces, a little aperture, a window which is suddenly thrown open, and at 
which a friendly and intelligent face is presented, the harbinger of a voice of greeting. 
With this agreeable apparition he communes—the voice is delightful, it has a hundred 
tones and modulations; and as he stands there the great dead screen seems to vibrate and 
grow transparent.
160
 
That the figure metonymized by this “face”—or “voice,” or “apparition”—is Matthew Arnold is 
perhaps less consequential than the highly outré results of his congress with the newcomer. Mr. 
Arnold’s salutations do not amount to an invitation to step behind the wall, but instead cause the 
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“great dead screen” to “vibrate and grow transparent”—no doubt a phenomenon of lively 
interest, but one of dubious value for the inquisitive stranger whose entrance would still be 
blocked. Once again, vision and access are distinctly unidentical. If the House of Fiction gives 
the reader no quarter, one might observe that there are no quarters in the house, and, for that 
matter, no embodied reader capable of inhabiting them. In the Matthew Arnold piece, the 
“spectacle of English life” that resides behind the “mighty national wall” remains impenetrable 
and certainly uninhabitable; the result of Mr. Arnold’s benediction is that the spectacle becomes 
visible, and does so through an event that itself constitutes a spectacle. In this earlier iteration of 
the trope, James does not even offer the pretense of interiority—the wall is only ever a wall, not, 
as in its later manifestation, a house whose registration in the world begins and ends, strangely, 
at its façade. Yet the tortuousness of the metaphor—that the wall should “vibrate and grow 
transparent” in defiance of, among other things, the conventions of realism—signals what will 
become an ever more arcane relation between reader and novel, consciousness and world, 
spectator and spectacle. That Matthew Arnold stands at the “national wall” of “unconsciousness” 
without being of it marks a crucial difference from the House of Fiction, whose inhabitants are 
wholly constituted by their architectural emplacement. Whereas Mr. Arnold’s wall corporealizes 
a national trait, the House of Fiction aims to function primarily as an organizing principle for the 
consciousnesses who peer out through its façade—a utility ultimately belied by the haunting 
dislocation the House metaphor performs. 
The Long Way Round 
As both a minutely sculpted prose performance and a widely circulated critical and 
theoretical artifact (whose citationality James worries and enacts within the Preface), the House 
of Fiction makes a dual demand on our understanding. It requires 1) an initial, provisional 
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account of the House figure as a static, solid, and stable object and 2) a counter-reading that sets 
the figure in motion, recognizing it as the nodal point of a set of perspectival, material, and 
narrative dynamisms. These two accounts should be seen in dialectical, not sequential, relation. 
Far from canceling out or correcting the first reading, the second relies for its effect on the 
intransigence of a felt concretion that resists the dereifying ministrations of formal analysis. The 
emotive intensity of this ostensibly staid object-metaphor emerges from this dialectical tension. 
The Golden Bowl, similarly, opens with a deceptively direct truth-claim whose deceptiveness is 
precisely its truth: “The Prince had always liked his London, when it had come to him . . . .”161 
With all the ease and aplomb of a royal decree, this statement seems to start us off on secure 
enough footing: we know the Prince will be a character in the novel, someone separate from the 
thing he likes—a thing that is nonetheless “his,” “his London”—and we know the temporal 
scope and condition of his liking (he had “always” liked it, “when it had come to him”). Yet the 
lightly worn assumption of semantic transparency is already compromised. What does it mean 
for a city to “come” to one? This axiologically neutral verb—well-paired with the attenuated 
libidinality of “liked”—seems preemptively to distinguish itself from the more thickly charged 
“idea of pursuit” that, later in the same passage, is notable for not occurring to the Prince. 
London comes, but it need not pursue. Does this coming, then, describe an event in the Prince’s 
consciousness—for instance, it “came to him with a flash”—and thereby link knowing with 
having? And would it still have been “his London,” as James’s sentence structure allows us to 
suppose, even on those occasions when it did not “come to him”? What does it mean, then, for 
this London to be “his” if the fact of his possession precedes any meaningful interaction with 
what is possessed? In his reading of the famous opening clause of The Waste Land—“April is the 
cruellest month”—Christopher Ricks points to the line’s powerful merging of “unmistakable 
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directness” with “lurking possibilities of mistaking its direction.”162 Aptly for Eliot’s modernist 
precursor, James, too, opens his masterpiece on what appears to be a note of languid certitude 
with regard to time, possession, predilection, and action. What is actually on offer, however, is 
only the tone of truth-giving: certainty—as the Princess-to-be, who will have quite a bit to do 
with knowing and having, might say—with “a hole in it” (456).163 The rest of the novel’s first 
sentence gives the game away: “he was one of the modern Romans who find by the Thames a 
more convincing image of the truth of the ancient state than any they have left by the Tiber” (3). 
The Prince’s celebration of dissemblance here adumbrates a more painful truth about his 
imminent marriage to which we will soon become privy. That the opening lines deceive in their 
directness (and in their direction) is their truth.  
 Following the Prince’s unbudging leisure in these lines is a peripatetic first paragraph, 
one whose outward wending inverts the trajectory and, importantly, lacks the motive force of the 
Princess’s deliberate centripetality in the opening of Book II. There, as we shall see, in the 
famous pagoda passage, Maggie closes in on the object-metaphor for her own developing 
consciousness at the same time that the passage’s language expands outward to incorporate her 
into the hypertrophying figure. Here, the novel’s first line accords Amerigo a stillness with 
impossible powers of magnetism, such that this high tone cannot help but be undone by the 
inevitable narrative (and physical) movements to follow. In the novel’s first pages, the Prince 
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exhibits “no consistency of attention” and little more than a velleity—a “predilection… 
sufficiently vague” or an “undirected thought”—toward his current activity of threading through 
the London streets. These itineracies recall the House of Fiction passage, that “long way round” 
to James’s “dim first move toward ‘The Portrait,’ which was exactly my grasp of a single 
character—an acquisition I had made, moreover, after a fashion not here to be retraced.” In that 
Preface, having traced all the inlaid and desultory movements in these lines, we bristle to find 
that the prized “dim first move” is, at day’s end, “not here to be retraced.” How James first 
“[grasped]” Isabel Archer ultimately eludes narrativization, leaving the reader of the Preface 
with, on the one hand, an empty space where Isabel’s origin should be, and, on the other, the 
resistant body of the “encountered” figure of Isabel where we expect to be treated to the 
denaturalizing effects of authorial historiography.
164
 The Prince, similarly, seems continually to 
gravitate toward repositories of solidity that may or may not be adequate to the assuredness of 
the novel’s opening lines. Like James’s protracted “move” toward Isabel Archer, the Prince’s 
walk is punctuated by an occasional pause—before a window display of “objects massive and 
lumpish, in silver and gold,” or before the partially obscured faces of female passers-by. This 
latter item gestures obliquely at the cause for the Prince’s lassitude: he has recently finalized his 
engagement to Maggie Verver, daughter of American millionaire Adam Verver, and is now 
succumbing to the deflated momentum that follows achievement. This revelation tempts us 
retroactively to favor a particular fall of the accent in the novel’s opening lines: it is not 
necessarily the case that, on the arbitrary occasions when London had come to him, the Prince 
had liked it; rather, the Prince, in a state of consummated pursuit, registers a coy preference—
London might do well to come to him.  
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Several pages into the novel, then, the tone of the opening line continues to call for 
recalibration. As luxuriant a pace as this already seems, another half of the novel will go by 
before we come upon an object that provides a sufficient counterweight to this opening. If 
Amerigo has tone, his wife Maggie has consciousness—and her eventual domination of her 
husband, father, and stepmother Charlotte through the action of this superior consciousness may 
in part account for its figuration through the spectacular figure of the pagoda.  Maggie’s pagoda 
sits at the literal center of The Golden Bowl; the opening of the pagoda passage also opens Book 
II, marking the point where the narrator begins to “go behind” the Princess rather than the 
Prince.
165
 It is worth noting that Maggie first becomes a focalizing consciousness at the moment 
when the question of her consciousness emerges as a problem within the plot: Amerigo and 
Charlotte’s extended stay at a country house disturbs her previous complacency about the 
arrangement that confers on this pair so much unseemly latitude. The first action performed by 
this newly accessible consciousness, then, is to make itself an object. It appears initially as a 
hushed internality that in no wise prepares us for the outsize spectacle of the pagoda: “It was not 
till many days had passed that the Princess began to accept the idea of having done, a little, 
something she was not always doing, or indeed that of having listened to any inward voice that 
spoke in a new tone” (299). The interment of voices through belated aural apprehension is a 
familiar Jamesian effect. When Vandenbrook of The Awkward Age, for instance, “[becomes] 
conscious of having proposed his own rooms as a wind-up to [a] drive” (4), his speech is 
objectified by his present consciousness without ever having materialized in its own present. In 
the pagoda passage, the effect seems redoubled by the inwardness of the voice to which Maggie 
finally realizes she has listened. Vandenbrook’s voice is dematerialized from the narrative 
through retroplacement, and simultaneously materialized as an object of consciousness; for 
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Maggie, it is consciousness that is simultaneously dematerialized and objectified through its 
figuration as a voice (and a voice with the specific materiality of tone).
166
 
In many ways, the “inward voice” is a fairly standard trope. As a stand-in for a 
burgeoning cognizance, this figure presents consciousness as a mode of self-discourse that 
requires the ability to register speech acts, as well as the acuity to discern “a new tone”—the 
speaker’s stance toward her own utterances. Given the mostly unremarkable terms of this 
interiorizing account of consciousness, the inversion that it shortly thereafter undergoes in the 
figure of the pagoda seems as formidable in its abrupt immensity as the “wonderful, beautiful, 
but outlandish” structure itself: 
Yet these instinctive postponements of reflection were the fruit, positively, of 
recognitions and perceptions already active; of the sense, above all, that she had made, at 
a particular hour, made by the mere touch of her hand, a difference in the situation so 
long present to her as practically unattackable. This situation had been occupying, for 
months and months, the very centre of the garden of her life, but it had reared itself there 
like some strange, tall tower of ivory, perhaps rather some wonderful, beautiful, but 
outlandish pagoda, a structure plated with hard, bright porcelain, coloured and figured 
and adorned, at the overhanging eaves, with silver bells that tinkled, ever so charmingly, 
when stirred by chance airs. She had walked round and round it—that was what she felt; 
she had carried on her existence in the space left her for circulation, a space that 
sometimes seemed ample and sometimes narrow; looking up, all the while, at the fair 
structure that spread itself so amply and rose so high, but never quite making out, as yet, 
where she might have entered had she wished. She had not wished till now—such was 
the odd case; and what was doubtless equally odd, besides, was that, though her raised 
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eyes seemed to distinguish places that must serve, from within, and especially far aloft, as 
apertures and outlooks, no door appeared to give access from her convenient garden 
level. The great decorated surface had remained consistently impenetrable and 
inscrutable. At present, however, to her considering mind, it was as if she had ceased 
merely to circle and to scan the elevation, ceased so vaguely, so quite helplessly to stare 
and wonder; she had caught herself distinctly in the act of pausing, then in that of 
lingering, and finally in that of stepping unprecedentedly near. The thing might have 
been, by the distance at which it kept her, a Mahometan mosque, with which no base 
heretic could take a liberty; there so hung about it the vision of one’s putting off one’s 
shoes to enter, and even, verily, of one’s paying with one’s life if found there as an 
interloper. She had not, certainly, arrived at the conception of paying with her life for 
anything she might do; but it was nevertheless quite as if she had sounded with a tap or 
two one of the rare porcelain plates. (299-300) 
Let us bracket for a moment the obdurate, inexcerptable length of the passage; the phallicism of 
Maggie’s edifice of choice; the element of orientalist fantasy; the precious and apparently 
inconsequential details such as the “silver bells that tinkled ever so charmingly when stirred by 
chance airs”; and the sense, post-“inward voice,” of an infelicitous fit between figure and 
ground—all this aside, there is the size of the thing. It may go without saying that this structure is 
imposing not only because of what Maggie imagines to be the probates of stern Mahometanism, 
but precisely because it “spread itself so amply and rose so high.” The description of the image 
seems to impress upon us a materially resistant—and irresistible—presence: “She had knocked 
in short—though she could scarce have said whether for admission or for what; she had applied 
her hand to a cool smooth spot and had waited to see what would happen. Something had 
happened; it was as if a sound, at her touch, after a little, had come back to her from within; a 
sound sufficiently suggesting that her approach had been noted” (300). This moment confronts 
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us with the contradiction of a responsive materiality being simultaneously staged and elided, laid 
out before us and swallowed up whole. The quick shift from the subjunctive (“as if Maggie had 
sounded”) to the past perfect (“She had knocked”) consigns Maggie’s action not only to the 
realm of metaphor, but inaccessibly so; neither within nor between the two sentences that report 
her having sounded the structure is there a present moment of action in which Maggie makes 
contact. Unlike the straightforward suspension of temporality typically at work in a visual 
metaphor, the pagoda metaphor gestures toward duration and diachronic movement, only 
ultimately to relinquish progressive narrative time and the sensuous reality whose unfolding it 
accommodates. Sensate details like the “cool smooth spot” belie the process of dematerialization 
wrought in the grammar of the passage. The plangent affirmation that closes the pagoda 
passage—“Something had happened”—ultimately abrogates that which is necessary if anything 
is indeed to happen: an interval. Maggie “had waited to see what would happen,” and, in the 
following sentence, “Something had”; each of these moments occurs in the irrecoverable past 
perfect that undergirds the metaphor. 
The slight diffidence in Maggie’s insistence that “Something had happened” soon gives 
way to a certitude to rival that of the novel’s opening. What Amerigo’s tone accomplishes there 
is here effected through a continual reconfiguration of 1) consciousness as inhabited position and 
2) consciousness as object. We are told, prior to the lengthy description of the pagoda, that the 
structure that “had reared itself” in the “very centre of the garden of her life” metaphorizes the 
“situation so long present to her as practically unattackable.” The following paragraph then 
particularizes the terms of this metaphorization with an almost pedantic assuredness: “The 
pagoda in her blooming garden figured the arrangement—how otherwise was it to be named?—
by which, so strikingly, she had been able to marry without breaking, as she liked to put it, with 
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her past.” Readers of The Golden Bowl tend to take at face value this internal foreclosure of 
meaning-making, giving the narrator leave to assign the pagoda a fixed significatory trajectory—
this in contradistinction to the ever shifting sites of registration and signification of the golden 
bowl itself. Yet this tidy suturing of figure and ground should provoke skepticism. We might 
note, to begin with, that this paragraph marks an abrupt shift in narrative voice and, in a very 
physical sense, perspective: “If this image, however, may represent our young woman’s 
consciousness of a recent change in her life—a change now but a few days old—it must at the 
same time be observed that she both sought and found in renewed circulation, as I have called it, 
a measure of relief from the idea of having perhaps to answer for what she had done.” The 
narrator here performs a self-differentiation at once stark and muddled. Suddenly, there emerges 
a narrative “I” attending to “our young woman’s consciousness”—one watching at a stable 
remove wherein the circumnavigation of the pagoda will not engender corresponding 
circumruminations, an “I” immune to the sort of descriptive metastasis that characterizes 
Maggie’s focalizing narration. Maggie waxes on, the figure’s ground nowhere in sight, about the 
“structure plated with hard, bright porcelain, coloured and figured and adorned”; she claims at 
one point to discern “apertures and outlooks,” but subsequently finds the edifice “consistently 
impenetrable and inscrutable.” By the end of the passage, it has become a “Mahometan mosque, 
with which no base heretic could take a liberty”—tinkling bells notwithstanding. When the 
narrator interjects, he seems to be pulling her up short, streamlining her figural filigree by pairing 
the pagoda with a single referent: the “arrangement—how otherwise was it to be named?—” 
among Maggie, her husband, her father, and her stepmother. Yet the odd self-citation in the 
narrator’s remarks on Maggie’s “renewed circulation, as I have called it” forces us to recognize 
what this narrative “I” so labors to occlude—that the word in question, “circulation,” is initially 
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read, at least partially, as belonging to Maggie’s consciousness. (Fittingly, “circulation” here not 
only names Maggie’s movements around the pagoda, but also gestures toward the mobility of 
this word itself across distinct—if only liminally so—discursive perspectives.) This retrospective 
designation of a referent, then, like the sudden appearance of the House of Fiction, enacts a brief 
and crucial suspension of dramaterialization—a suspension both of the scenic method (free 
indirect discourse) through which James’s fictional world is typically presented, and of the 
flickering of materiality that renders Maggie’s pagoda elusive even as she has supposedly 
communed with its hard surface. During the narrativization of Maggie’s somewhat shambling 
initial consciousness, there is no reason to feel confident of what her pagoda looks like or of her 
affective orientation toward it, much less what it means; the meaning assigned to it by a narrator 
who momentarily steps out from behind must, however, be taken provisionally for granted in 
order for the remainder of the chapter to make sense. Through its very stabilization and 
concretization of a figure, this narratorial intercession reads, ironically, as a moment of 
discontinuity—a rupture into the sudden certitude of a narrative voice who discusses the pagoda 
metaphor in the manner of a detached exegete, rather than as a subject whose consciousness is 
being elaborated at the same time and in the same textual fabric as the metaphor itself.  
 The problems with this narrative certitude extend beyond tone. When Maggie describes 
the pagoda, the passage that results is not only a description of an object. It is the narration of an 
event in consciousness, which means it also registers, however covertly, feeling—in this case, 
Maggie’s unease about the “arrangement.” It is worth noting that the pagoda metaphor actually 
begins as a simile, and a second-choice simile, for that matter (“This situation…had reared itself 
there like some strange, tall tower of ivory, or perhaps rather some wonderful, beautiful, but 
outlandish pagoda”). It only attains the objectivity of metaphor when it is next reported that 
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Maggie “had walked round and round it—that was what she felt”—at which point the 
predication of action seems to shift. Now, rather than responding to Maggie’s preexisting 
emotion with a figural approximation, the figure and Maggie’s interactions with it seem to be 
causing emotions not existing prior to their figuration. The very aesthetic of the structure seems 
to metamorphose from the harmlessly, even playfully, exotic to the forbidding, as the pagoda 
takes on distinctly House of Fiction-like qualities, including “apertures” that permit no access 
from without, but potentially serve as “outlooks” or machicolations for those within. This 
mounting unease, in keeping with the “indirect and oblique view of my presented action” for 
which James praises himself in the Preface to the New York Edition, registers Maggie’s growing 
awareness of the adultery that the “arrangement” enables and camouflages. When the passage 
treats the pagoda as a figure, it is a figure for the arrangement or “situation” in Maggie’s life; 
when the figure expands to include Maggie so that she interacts with the pagoda, its field of 
signification broadens so that instead of figuring the arrangement, it enacts Maggie’s 
consciousness. When the narrator comes out from behind Maggie to make his supercilious 
pronouncement—“the pagoda in her blooming garden figured the arrangement”—he seems to be 
modeling the dangers of attempting a detheatricalizing summary of the “action” of James’s plot 
or even of events in affect, cognition, or figuration without accounting for the dramatic 
perspective of the centering consciousness. The narrator even pointedly uses Maggie’s language 
at this moment (“as she liked to put it”), but in a rebuke to those who would describe free 
indirect discourse solely in terms of the adoption of a character’s language, here the use of the 
character’s language alone does not suffice to grant access to her perspective. This perspective is 
precisely located in the passage’s enactment of a split between consciousness and feeling.167 
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 James Wood, in his excellent analysis of a passage in What Maisie Knew, frames James’s use of free indirect 
discourse thus: “Whose word is ‘embarrassingly’?” (16). 
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Something about Maggie’s emotional distress is performed by the passage, something that 
evades narrativization but can only be substantialized through the process of narration. Maggie’s 
focalizing narration dramatizes the disjunction between what she feels and what she consciously 
thinks; the narrator’s unfocalized synopsis takes for granted the perfect correspondence between 
Maggie’s experience and the language in which it is presented.  
 Maggie’s friend Fanny Assingham eventually offers a more satisfying formulation for 
Maggie’s cognitive relationship to the affair: “‘She irresistibly knows that there’s something 
between them. But she hasn’t “arrived” at it’” (395). Fanny’s figure operates through negation; if 
to “arrive” would be fully to inhabit her already extant knowledge of this reality, then “that’s 
exactly what she hasn’t done, what she so steadily and intensely refuses to do. She stands off and 
off, so as not to arrive.” As the novel’s ficelle, Fanny has access (or, one might say, is limited), in 
her oral narrativizations, to the ostensibly less ambiguous objectifications of direct speech. Yet 
even given the relative linearity of Fanny’s figuration, what it is that Maggie has not yet “arrived 
at” is far from clear. The obvious slipperiness of this “it” would indicate that it is Maggie’s own 
knowledge that remains remote to her; the “something between them” cannot be neatly separated 
from the knowledge of this “something” that Fanny imputes to Maggie. Yet, as sufficiently 
sinuous as this reading would already be, one might further note that it is not exactly 
“knowledge,” in the sense of an isolable and transmissible quantum of understanding, that 
Maggie has not “arrived at.”168 Reading the moment as anacoluthon—that is, taking Fanny’s 
breathless claim that “She irresistibly knows” as a grammatically infelicitous antecedent to her 
“it”—would allow us to see this knowledge set in motion, to posit “knowing” as a form of doing. 
To know is here an action that the actor cannot resist, but it also, by virtue of being an action, 
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 Cameron warns against critical suppositions that knowledge in The Golden Bowl is “inert,” pointing to 
characters’ strategic invocations of this kind of knowledge in attempts to “[deflect] attention from a more subversive 
question about the unstable placement of meaning: Who obfuscates or enforces it, and where?” (105). 
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seems a highly resistant location for the person performing it to be expected to “arrive at.” As in 
the House of Fiction and the pagoda metaphor, “it” poses a phenomenal problem and causes 
distress—affective and grammatical, in this case—by virtue of being both an object of 
consciousness and a process that consciousness undertakes.   
Fanny’s remarks on Maggie’s knowing condense the peregrinations of the pagoda 
passage to the space of a few lines, but the movement traced is identical: a provisional 
objectification of consciousness (as a pagoda, as an “it”) is compromised when a character’s 
progress toward and interaction with her objectified consciousness is then nominated as the 
actual metaphor for consciousness. The locus of figuration shifts from an object to a scene 
between this object and the character whose consciousness is being figured. This process does 
not play out linearly in the examples offered above; we never see consciousness figured as an 
object that is not already in the process of being dramaterialized into a scene involving the 
subject of consciousness. Yet to characterize the sense of objectivity initially evinced by these 
object-metaphors as merely chimerical, as a fetish to be unfurled through close analysis, would 
be to fetishize the process of unfurling. Dramaterialization does not dispel or dissolve—or 
disabuse the reader of an illusion of—materiality. The solid object-metaphor at once produces 
real effects (feeling, the sense of a stable realist character) on the surface of the Jamesian text, 
and is perpetually in the process of dissolving and dislocating these effects.  
Nothing But You 
 In the examples of the House of Fiction and the pagoda, affective intensity emerges from 
the dialectical relation between consciousness as a stable object that one sees and consciousness 
as a dynamic scene in which one participates. These strong feelings of unease follow from the 
contradictory sense, on the one hand, that consciousness is being made theatrically accessible 
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and circumscribed, and on the other, that it is unclear not only where this consciousness is in fact 
located, but whether, as a scene that is in progress, it can be located in any of the spectacular 
objects offered by the text at all. A foreclosure of this dual composition of consciousness as it is 
figured in The Golden Bowl accounts for the much-remarked froideur that steals through the 
novel’s ending. Having succeeded, through the power of her consciousness to act in the world, in 
having her rival rusticated and thereby securing not only her husband’s future fidelity but his 
sincere admiration and love, Maggie endures a final moment of uncertainty as to what she really 
possesses:  
Closer than she had ever been to the measure of her course and the full face of her act, 
she had an instant of the terror that, when there has been suspense, always precedes, on 
the part of the creature to be paid, the certification of the amount. Amerigo knew it, the 
amount; he still held it, and the delay in his return, making her heart beat too fast to go 
on, was like a sudden blinding light on a wild speculation. She had thrown the dice, but 
his hand was over her cast. (566) 
Amerigo “[knows] it, the amount,” because he is it. Early in the novel, the Prince bemusedly 
recognizes on the Ververs’ part a “large, bland, blank assumption” as to his inestimable worth—
“of merits almost beyond notation, of essential quality and value”; the ending brooks no such gap 
between the having of value and the knowing of it (18). These closing pages enact a complete 
identification between what Amerigo is and what he knows—between his value for Maggie as 
her possession and his knowing “it,” an identity neatly captured in the double resonance of 
“speculation” as a financial activity and a form of intellection. While the earlier “it” at which 
Maggie’s consciousness had not yet arrived was a moving target, Amerigo’s “it” represents a 
closed circuit. Maggie’s “it” was neither an object of knowledge nor the dramatized process of 
knowing but the impossible coincidence of the two; Amerigo’s “it” collapses a dynamic relation 
 140 
 
between the subject and the object of knowledge into an identity. Amerigo knows the “amount” 
that will redound to Maggie because he is this amount, but he can be this amount only because 
he knows that he is. This collapse at last effects the “assurance” that the novel’s first lines only 
affect: a release from “suspense” into (not catharsis, but) “certification.” Assured of a happiness 
“without a hole in it”—with no room left for doubt or much else—Maggie arrives at the horizon 
of theatricalized consciousness, an exfoliated theatricality born out in the closing scene between 
her and Amerigo: 
“Isn’t she [Charlotte] too splendid?” she simply said, offering it to explain and to finish. 
“Oh, splendid!” With which he came over to her.  
“That’s our help, you see,” she added—to point further her moral. 
It kept him before her therefore, taking in—or trying to—what she so wonderfully gave. 
He tried, too clearly, to please her—to meet her in her own way; but with the result only 
that, close to her, her face kept before him, his hands holding her shoulders, his whole act 
enclosing her, he presently echoed: “‘See’? I see nothing but you.” And the truth of it 
had, with this force, after a moment, so strangely lighted his eyes that, as for pity and 
dread of them, she buried her own in his breast. (567) 
Amerigo’s seeing nothing but Maggie introduces one final it—“the truth of it”—whose visibility 
not only guarantees but constitutes its own truth-value. The Awkward Age, which also ends with 
a scene of enclosure and an echoic claim to “see,” never approaches the explicit abjection 
animating this moment of “pity and dread.” In an inversion of the opening lines’ languid 
beckoning after a London that might “come to him,” this scene outfits both desire and possession 
with a unidirectional automaticity: “With which he came over to her.” When Maggie expresses 
admiration for her routed rival, she points beyond the current scene of connubial accord toward 
its condition of possibility: Charlotte’s high tone and maintained pretense of wishing to sever 
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herself and her husband from the quartet. Maggie’s expansionary gesture limns the process of 
getting to this concluding scene, a process that includes her stepmother. Yet Amerigo will have 
none of it; with Maggie “enclosed” in his “act,” she becomes not only the sole object in his field 
of vision, but the object of vision that obviates all other spectatorship. And with her own eyes 
“buried” in horror in her husband’s breast, Maggie becomes an objectified consciousness par 
excellence—a consciousness all seen without seeing, flush with certainty and voided of desire. 
What might sound, in a bad summary, like a moment of beatifying recognition in fact abjects 
both Maggie and Amerigo. Shorn of the indefinitely expanding scene that allows her 
consciousness to act, Maggie’s consciousness can only be an object, while Amerigo, able to “see 
nothing but you” and thereby incapable of recognizing the co-constitution of Maggie’s 
consciousness and the scene surrounding it, appears to have become a kind of philosophical 
zombie.
169
 The ambient unease that elsewhere characterizes the dialectical shifting of sites of 
consciousness heightens here into a melodramatic horror—complete with eyes buried in the 
(un)dead lover’s breast—at consciousness become too objective, stable, and localized within the 
bodied contours of an individual character. If in the pagoda and House of Fiction metaphors, 
consciousness is dialectical—consisting in part in an expansionary process that continually 
undermines internal attempts at objectification and narrative streamlining (by the narrator, by 
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 The “philosophical zombie” is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind: How can we know that someone who 
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subjects” (156).  
 142 
 
James himself)—these final moments of The Golden Bowl see all trace of process harrowingly 
evicted. In its place emerges a closed correspondence between spectator and object: a desolate 
theatricality, to be certain.  
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Conclusion: Siding with Kate Croy 
What are James novels about?  To raise the question at this juncture might seem coyly 
naïve. Yet if the foregoing pages have appeared more concerned with how the late style works 
than with what the late fiction is about, it seems equally apparent that a prominent strand of 
James criticism has been keen to claim an identity between what and how. The late novels’ 
formal and stylistic behavior has, to varying degrees, been taken as one with their object-
intention by critics who ask, for instance, What does Jamesian style want? and What does a 
James novel know?
170
 In their sapient fetishism, such questions revisit Laurence Holland’s claim 
that these works “do not simply unfold from given premises or simply present the certain 
findings of earlier experiments of the imagination which are then recorded and demonstrated in 
the novel; they make the original experiments themselves, undergo the task, and share at least in 
creating the results or hypothecating them in a world of perilous promise facing an uncertain 
future.”171 This approach, in asking what the late fiction does, places theatricalizing action at the 
center of the late Jamesian project. The novels stage a desire or a knowledge without a stably 
desiring or knowing subject, yet a fetishized subject (“style,” “the novel”) is nonetheless taken to 
act and to magnetize the diegetic material of the novelistic world into a choreography of effects. 
Our interpellation of “the novel” as itself an actor redoubles the process by which characters 
within the novels are unavoidably fixed as loci of action, meaning, and emotive response despite 
the near-explicit ways in which their ontic contingency is put on display. Jamesian style, then, 
behaves theatrically, but so, too, do we in our dual comportment toward the novels. We register 
at once their emotive inspissation and their “staggering thinness of meaning.”172 We feel about 
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the novels by feeling about characters who are constantly being shown up as the effect of a 
stylistic performance. In this sense, the late novels are about—or, to put it another way, they 
compel us to experience the conundrum of—not only what it means to feel, but what it means 
and how it is possible to feel about.  
If the three novels I have discussed can be said to be about something to the extent that 
they tether emotive intensity to an object, that object names the site of a certain subjective 
desolation theatrically rendered. This desolate theatricality prevails as the form of consciousness 
and of feeling in The Awkward Age, in which the narrative apparatus continually and diegetically 
undermines a social world predicated on theatrical modes of relation; in The Sense of the Past, 
where the spectatorial experience of self-discontinuity creates a knife’s edge of panic along 
subjectivity’s unbroken surface; and in The Golden Bowl, where consciousness slides between 
figuration as an object and figuration as a scene, generating an unease that clings, for us, to 
consciousness’s content. Indeed, this final formulation of emotion as a kind of veridical 
hallucination—a belief whose object is both illusory and present—pertains across the late works. 
Throughout, I have used feeling in ways that selectively erode strong distinctions among tone; 
emotion attributed to characters; and the emotive response of the novels’ readers. My purpose in 
so doing is not to suggest anything like a total identification between reader and character or an 
affective correspondence between reader and text—and not even, more to the point perhaps, an 
intentional correspondence between character and text. I aim, rather, to elaborate a structure I 
name in my introduction: a particularly Jamesian, unintending form of modernist irony whereby 
the text’s generative self-difference does not compel readers to ally themselves with a properly 
skeptical stance toward realistically rendered novelistic effects like character and plot, but rather 
suggests the co-incidence of 1) the downright stagey constructedness of these effects and 2) their 
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absolute emotive effectiveness. 
To note the congruity between these two perceptual registers is, to a certain extent, to 
advocate for a particular kind of attention. The types of reading respectively implied—
essentially, close reading and lay reading—tend to be held as disparate in ways that have 
authorized literary disciplinarity, an attitude implicit even in those arguments that assert the 
legitimacy of heterogeneous readerly experiences. As a corrective to the air of rarefaction that 
tends to hover around the literary, Rita Felski urges us instead to celebrate the non-instrumental 
“usefulness” of literary experience. Felski faults modernism in particular for touting an “art of 
disenchantment” as distinct from the inhabited wisdom of “everyday forms of experience” and 
“everyday thinking.”173 In rehearsing these well-worn indictments of modernism’s cultural 
mandarinism, Felski proposes to locate literature’s usefulness not in the radical alterity of high 
modernist experiments or in the affective immediacy sometimes attributed to popular artifacts, 
but in what she calls “emphatic experience”: 
[By] leaving open the nature and content of that…experience, as well as the criteria used 
to evaluate it, [the idea of emphatic experience] grants the sheer range of aesthetic 
response: individuals can be moved by different texts for very different reasons. This 
insight has often been lost to literary studies, thanks to a single-minded fixation on the 
merits of irony, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that leaves it mystified by other structures 
of value and fumbling to make sense of alternative responses to works of art.
174
 
The final sentence in the excerpt could have been written about James. Notoriously difficult to 
teach and, not incidentally, a darling of the New Critics, for whom “[fungibility] and 
translatability were the enemy” and “an adequate paraphrase would be the sign of a bad 
                                                 
173
 Felski, 52-3, 6, 13.  
174
 Ibid., 21. 
 146 
 
poem,”175 James and the late fiction in particular might be accused of embodying the 
recalcitrance of high modernism and, by extension, the cultural-gatekeeping vocation often 
imputed to literary studies. Yet the self-satisfaction, not to say the ideological bluntness, of the 
kind of “irony, ambiguity, and indeterminacy” Felski cites seems remote from the penumbral 
weight of Jamesian ambiguity, whose chief undecidability, I would venture, is the rather ascetic 
question of where one’s pain is actually coming from.  
Indeed, as I have aimed to show, the late novels invite a reading practice attuned to 
precisely these kinds of lived effects, effects whose indeterminacy in no wise dilutes their force. 
And while the particularities of the late style do not permit a simple “application” of a Jamesian 
readerly tack to all other literary texts and cultural objects, I maintain that the specific 
phenomenality of moving through late James weaves “close” reading into “lay” reading in a way 
that obviates the distinction. That is, to read the late novels “well” involves also reading them 
“poorly,” with a somewhat under-absorptive disposition. It is worth briefly noting that the late 
style results from James’s practice of dictation and that listening to these novels, to marshal 
anecdotal evidence, tends to render the Jamesian sentence shockingly comprehendible. One finds 
a note of advocacy for this kind of mixed reading in James’s remarks, quoted in an earlier 
chapter, on the surprising effectiveness of what he considers to be minor Ibsen: “there is by the 
nature of the case no catching the convinced, or call him the deluded, spectator or reader in the 
act of a mistake. He is to be caught at the worst in the act of attention, of the very greatest 
attention, and that is all, as a precious preliminary at least, that the playwright asks of him, 
besides being all the very divinest poet can get” (AA 14). This delusory form of attention is not, 
for James, an epiphenomenon of theatrical experience but attention proper, and its effect flies in 
the face of what we consider to be one of the windfalls of attentive reading: security from 
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falsified experience. John Guillory has traced the ways in which the practice of close reading 
itself, as promulgated by I.A. Richards, originates in an institutionally inflected worry over the 
quality and kind of attention students were devoting to literary texts: 
Richards sees his generation as already overwhelmed by a saturated media environment, 
buffeted by stimuli that produce conditioned responses supervening even on those 
modernist literary works intended to challenge the conditioned response. So he observes 
in Practical Criticism that “those who are discovering for the first time that poetry can 
cause them emotion do often, for this very reason, pay little attention to the poetry.”176 
As Guillory argues, close reading was always already a response to the deleterious habits of 
cognition engendered by what we would now call “new media.”177 Two decades prior, we see an 
apologia for precisely this kind of “irresponsible” attention in James’s critical writing—a kind of 
attention that, while keeping the colorless “stock responses”178 of Richards’s students at bay, 
seems by a different reflex to render loving responses in spite of the regrettable gap between the 
text’s intent and its achieved form.   
 It is just such a gap that James intently worries over in his Preface to the New York 
Edition of The Wings of the Dove, a novel that, if the prefatory remarks are to be believed, seems 
to consist entirely of “gaps” and “lapses,” “absent values,” “palpable voids,” “missing links,” 
“mocking shadows,” and “intentions that…were not to fructify.”179 This rueful diction is directed 
specifically at Kate Croy, or, rather, at James’s failed intention for the presentation of Kate Croy. 
The distinction is a crucial one, as this ambiguity between a person and the idea of that person 
recurs throughout the Preface and, crucially, near the end of the novel when Merton Densher 
mourns the letter from Milly that Kate has burned: 
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Then he took to himself at such hours, in other words, that he should never, never know 
what had been in Milly’s letter. The intention announced in it he should but too probably 
know; only that would have been, but for the depths of his spirit, the least part of it. The 
part of it missed for ever was the turn she would have given her act. This turn had 
possibilities that, somehow, by wondering about them, his imagination had 
extraordinarily filled out and refined. It had made of them a revelation the loss of which 
was like the sight of a priceless pearl cast before his eyes – his pledge given not to save it 
– into the fathomless sea, or rather even it was like the sacrifice of something sentient and 
throbbing, something that, for the spiritual ear, might have been audible as a faint far 
wail. (527) 
The “something sentient and throbbing” emitting a “faint far wail” might be the novel’s most 
live, fleshly rendering of a character otherwise afflicted, famously, with a representational 
vagueness—except, of course, that it does not actually describe Milly Theale. Yet we know, too, 
that it does. Just as the language of ruinous impoverishment in the Preface seems irresistibly to 
be “about” Kate’s frustrations as much as it is about her author’s in constructing her, if the novel 
appears to reserve its release of near-bathetic emotional energy for the sacrifice of a letter, the 
letter’s dead author does not thereby “lose out” in the novel’s emotive economy. The principle 
by which subjective absence or contingency itself becomes saturated with feeling is here 
literalized through the passage’s emotive reference to the absent—provisionally absent because 
not the ostensible object of Densher’s emotion, and irrevocably absent because dead—Milly. 
Densher’s mourning of Milly’s letter yet generates an access of feeling that undeniably also 
nominates Milly herself as its object; it is unclear whether the novel “knows” this any better than 
Densher does, by which I mean it is unclear whether the novel moralizes Densher’s incognizance 
of this emotive structure.  
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If The Wings of the Dove is, in these various registers, about sacrifice, and moreover is 
also about the authorial sacrifice of what it is not about, then what is the novel actually not 
about? We can do worse for an answer than to turn to the opening sentence, a syntactically hasty 
sentence about waiting that necessitates an equally hasty volte-face:  
She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come in, but he kept her unconscionably, and 
there were moments at which she showed herself, in the glass over the mantel, a face 
positively pale with the irritation that had brought her to the point of going away without 
sight of him. (23) 
If Amerigo at the end of The Golden Bowl can know it before we can be sure what it is, Kate 
Croy’s position in the opening sentence of The Wings of the Dove allows Kate Croy’s waiting to 
precede Kate Croy.
180
 Indeed, the idiosyncratic placement of this plosive-velar spondee—was 
ever such an emphatic sound so de-emphasized?—gives it the appearance of an adverb 
modifying the action of waiting. Catercorner could fit in its place, and would have the benefit of 
being, one imagines, spatially accurate.
181
 Yet to vocalize “Kate Croy” as an adverb would be to 
stress the name in exactly the way its placement in the sentence prohibits: “She waited 
impatiently for her father to come in.” By contrast, “She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come 
in,” with the proper name almost swallowed, is how James’s sentence naturally leaves the 
mouth—as it were, against the grain of grammar. Rarely in a moment of naming is the ontic 
solidity of a name so efficiently macerated. One might detect in the syntactic sidling of this 
opening a narrative method that develops over the course of the novel: a sidestepping of 
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inhabited consciousness (Kate’s consciousness first and with least ceremony) in pursuit of a 
lateral perspective from which one must read for the effects of consciousness rather than for 
these effects’ authors. This adjacency encourages one to approach The Wings of the Dove if not 
as a novel about Kate Croy, then perhaps as one about what is enabled by the condition of not 
being about Kate Croy. Such an approach would allow “siding” with Kate to mean not 
necessarily taking up or championing her point of view—though the novel does indeed briefly 
ask just this work of the reader—but seeing what comes of standing, with Kate, to the side of a 
novel that has much to say about margins, and ultimately standing with Kate beside herself.  
 The remainder of this chapter will move through the first book of The Wings of the Dove, 
showing 1) that Kate’s consciousness and emotive experience are theatrically constructed, 2) that 
the first book’s excruciating tone emerges not despite, but because of this theatricality, 3) that the 
narration’s movements toward and away from Kate amplify this theatrical effect by appearing to 
posit both depth and externalization as modes of characterization and appropriate to Kate, 4) that 
not only Kate, but the external things through which her self is often formulated are shown to be 
self-differential and theatrical, 5) that Kate’s theatrically externalizing self-construction is both 
opposed and related to her father Lionel’s mercenary materiality and phenomenal immateriality, 
Kate’s theatricality being a mode of characterization and subject-formation, and Lionel’s 
theatricality being proximate to the aesthetic and moral attributes traditionally adduced to indict 
theatre, and 6) that the novel’s sacrifice of Kate (or, to say nearly the same thing, of Kate’s 
perspective) is essentially homologous to the authorial sacrifice held up by James as the art of the 
novel, and that insofar as the novel indirectly generates feeling “for” Kate or “about” its own 
abandonment of Kate, it is generating feeling for and about the novel as such.  
 James’s first notebook entries on The Wings of the Dove enact Kate’s marginalization 
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with a sleight-of-hand similar to that in the novel’s opening lines. James first gets hold of his 
“heroine,” the yet-to-be-named Milly Theale—“some young creature…who, at 20, on the 
threshold of a life that has seemed boundless,” suddenly learns she is soon to die of 
“consumption, heart-disease, or whatever” (James ultimately settles on the last).182 Into this 
ready-made tragedy steps “a young man” (Merton Densher) whom Milly loves without 
reciprocation, but who, “in his pity, wishes he could make her taste of happiness.” He, 
meanwhile, is “entangled with another woman, committed, pledged, ‘engaged’ to one—and it is 
in that that a little story seems to reside.” The narrative possibilities in this tense triangulation 
take shape slowly; the penniless couple is, to whatever end,  
waiting. The young man in these circumstances encounters the dying girl as a friend or 
relation of his fiancée. She has money—she is rich. …He takes his betrothed, his fiancée, 
fully into his confidence about her and says, ‘Don’t be jealous if I’m kind to her—you 
see why it is.’ The fiancée is generous, she also is magnanimous—she is full of pity too. 
She gives him rope—she says, ‘Oh yes, poor thing: be kind to her.’ It goes further than 
she quite likes; but still she holds out—she is so sure of her lover. …But they are weary 
of their waiting, the two fiancés—and it is their own prospects that are of prime 
importance to them. It becomes very clear that the dying girl would marry the young man 
on the spot if she could. 
Kate’s notorious patience is already on display in this early formulation, albeit in the form of 
passivity rather than a calculating quiescence. If this inchoate Kate seems in danger of a moral 
failing, it most closely resembles Maggie’s in the first half of The Golden Bowl: an uxorial laxity 
that “gives…rope” without duly considering the potential for hanging. The last sentence of the 
entry, tremulously noting Milly’s willingness to marry Densher “on the spot,” picks up an earlier 
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thread that seemed, in its place, non sequitur if still portentous: “She has money—she is rich.” 
James ends by positing a clarity without specifying a perceiving subject: it is implicitly both 
Kate and Densher to whom Milly’s devotion to Densher—and, one must infer, the material 
benefits that might accrue from it—becomes “very clear.” The sinister sliding into place of 
almost geometrically aligned fortuities, left largely unspoken in the novel, is thus only darkly 
insinuated even in these first notes—or, to put it differently, the crucial condition of 
unspokenness is in place even at the moment of the story’s conception. In the next entry, 
however, James, ostensibly by way of synopsis, writes of these previous notes: “I had asked 
myself if there was anything in the idea of the man’s agreeing with his fiancee that he shall 
marry the poor girl in order to come into her money and in the certitude that she will die and 
leave the money to him—on which basis (his becoming a widower with property) they 
themselves will at last be able to marry” (104, original emphasis). With explicitness of action 
comes a finer differentiation of actors. The pair see and feel no longer in unison, but with 
gradations of temporal and intentional difference. Densher’s “agreeing with his fiancée that he 
shall marry the poor girl” may lay slightly less blame at Kate’s feet than would his agreeing with 
her to marry Milly, but the suggestiveness of their individuated agency is nonetheless sufficient 
to cast Densher’s fiancée in the more indictable—though grammatically less active—role. Kate 
becomes the novel’s villain in the space between notebook entries, the second of which manages 
to establish, through a synopsis that is actually a crystallization that is actually a revision, that 
she always had been.  
This could all be chalked up to the vagaries of James’s creative practice, to the inevitable 
discursive lacunae and non-continuous registration of ideas endemic to writers’ notebooks—
except that the strategic amnesia and retroactive typing of Kate performed in these entries are so 
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powerfully analogous to those performed by the novel itself. Which is not to claim any 
particular evolutionary relationship between the structure of the notes and that of the novel; 
rather, the analogy gives special point to the spectacular cruelty underwriting the novel’s famed 
shifting of focalizers, from Kate to Milly to Milly’s friend Susan Stringham to Densher. It would 
be more accurate to say un- or anti-spectacular, as the domestic melodrama that opens the novel 
is so effectively buried as to be forgotten even by the novel’s technologies of characterization—
leaving us with a Kate most memorable for her brutally efficient reticence and Cheshire-like 
“smile.” The flatness and concomitant impenetrability of this smiling Kate—she smiles and 
smiles, because she’s the villain—seems diametrically opposed to the near bathos of the opening 
scene, much as her plot-driving patience seems to invert that scene of impotent waiting. Yet the 
cruelty of the novel’s abandonment of her perspective is felt most keenly in the psychological 
agnosticism of this move. When Milly’s perspective is lost, the conditions of the loss (including 
the biological death of the character) allow her to be mourned by the novel, whereas the novel’s 
abandonment of Kate seems to involve a shift in modes of characterization from a mode 
sympathetic to a depth model of psychology (and hence to Kate herself), to one that not only 
takes up a non-sympathetic stance toward Kate, but relinquishes the only stance from which 
sympathy for her was appropriate. I use the term “psychological agnosticism” to refer to the fact 
that the trajectory of the novel’s way of characterizing Kate seems to say, “There may be a 
psychology here, but it doesn’t make a difference either way.” Quite uniquely in late James, the 
opening scene fills in a psychoaffective history that can be held to account for Kate’s later 
actions (and, famously in Eve Sedgwick’s reading, for her subject-formation). The question the 
novel’s structure raises, then, is why go to the trouble of creating a character with such an 
explicitly staged history and of introducing the novel through the excruciating scene of her 
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rejection by her father (a scene made all the more painful by the contrast between our ostensible 
position of perspectival closeness to Kate and the askesis of her dialogue, a humiliated dignity 
formalized), only to abandon her—in much the same way, to indulge in some of the bathos, that 
her father does—to the unflattering reports of third-person observation?  
Compared with The Golden Bowl’s (pretense, at least, of) equal moieties of free indirect 
discourse, the narrative division of labor in Wings of the Dove produces an alienation effect that 
forces the loss of Kate’s perspective to be felt, and felt to be strange.183 This perspectival 
jockeying has its spatial and temporal correlates. The duration of Kate’s waiting in the novel’s 
opening sentence is marked only by occasional glances at the mirror that specularly redouble her 
sentence-level besideness; irritation here is something not felt inside you, but rather seen next to 
you in a reflection of your face. In Terada’s succint formulation of the theatricality of emotive 
experience, “Emotion demands virtual self-difference—an extra ‘you.’”184 Kate’s name may be 
subject to a syntactical demotion, but her position as the focalizing and accessible center of 
consciousness is compromised even before the narrative properly takes up (in order later to 
abandon) her point of view. To refresh our memory of the opening sentence: 
She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come in, but he kept her unconscionably, and 
there were moments at which she showed herself, in the glass over the mantel, a face 
positively pale with the irritation that had brought her to the point of going away without 
sight of him. 
James’s comma placement briefly inspires the belief that Kate will show herself, when she is 
actually engaged in the mimetic act of showing a face to herself. (Along these lines, it might also 
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be noted that there is something vastly unforthcoming about classifying a feeling that can turn 
one’s face “positively pale” as mere “irritation”—and not only “irritation,” which would at least 
allow this oft-invoked Jamesian feeling its due measure, but “the irritation that—”, muffling the 
impact of an already pedestrian affect.) Kate’s “showing” reminds us that Lionel Croy’s absence 
is specifically an absence from sight, and that, obversely, to have “sight of him” would confer a 
visual fulfillment that is here supplanted, but whose absence is not compensated for, by his 
daughter’s eyeing of her own mirror image. Kate’s relationship to herself is thus immediately 
established as one of multiple estrangement—estrangement not only in the syntactic and 
phenomenal registers already discussed, but as the logic of an affective economy in which one’s 
own visage stands in as the sign of another’s absence.185  
 These first lines introduce a clutch of the novel’s most salient characteristics: a 
preoccupation with impatience and irritation, shifts in narrative perspective, indirectness, 
temporal and spatial disjunction, and, crucially for us, processes of dematerialization. The 
opening cataphora, the use of a pronoun in the absence of an antecedent subject, is suggestive in 
ways that Fredric Jameson’s recent discussion of cataphora may help to underline:  
For just as the ancient mariners feared the approach to an edge of the world from which 
they fantasized a drop into nothingness, so this peculiar beginning seems to betoken a 
nothingness, a void, before the opening of the text itself. The cataphora articulates some 
inauguratory mystery, some absolute darkness before the voice begins, which no doubt 
carries intimations of all the primal fears of beginnings, creations, the waking up without 
a memory or an identity, birth itself. But in fact, the cataphora, far from being a rarity, 
has been elevated, in much contemporary literature, to the status of an incipit: “He was 
there, waiting. He was the first one, standing, lounging, trying to look occupied or at least 
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innocent.” The cataphora, however, rarely succeeds in looking innocent; nor does it really 
mean to. For this kind of sentence most often announces a thriller of some kind, and the 
unidentified pronoun stands in fact for the unidentified serial killer of the novel in 
question.
186
  
Jameson takes his example from Faulkner, but the epigraph to his chapter “The Swollen Third 
Person” is the opening sentence of James’s “The Beast in the Jungle” (1903): “What determined 
the speech that startled him in the course of their encounter scarcely matters, being probably but 
some words spoken by himself quite without intention—spoken as they lingered and slowly 
moved together after their renewal of acquaintance.” James appears as something of a bugbear 
throughout The Antinomies of Realism, though Jameson never engages with his work at length. 
Jamesian cataphora and Jamesian point of view more broadly are positioned as the moment of 
décadence of a literary realism whose constitutive tension was between 1) the récit, the past-
present-future system of storytelling in which narrative events are sealed in an irrevocable past 
(instantiated in the anecdote, which can be “expanded and contracted at will”187), and 2) a 
narrativity that enacts an “eternal present,” characterized by “impulses of scenic elaboration, 
description and above all affective investment, which allow it to develop towards a scenic 
present which in reality, but secretly, abhors the other temporalities which constitute the force of 
the tale or récit in the first place.”188 In James and later in literary modernism proper, Jameson 
argues, the ideology of point of view and its temporal correlate, the eternal present, overtakes the 
pole of the récit. Cataphora acts as a double-agent in this putsch; its function: 
to construct a secret and a mystery which is the result only of the author’s withholding of 
information, rather than latent in the plot itself. … [Faulkner’s novels] thereby bear 
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witness to a modern necessity of constructing a narrative out of what were not initially 
narrative materials: in other words, they testify to the weakening of the pole of the récit, 
of the past-present-future system itself, by the dominance of an eternal present which 
seeks then to disguise itself as récit and narrative to be told and story or destiny to be 
revealed.
189
 
The question of what constitutes “narrative materials” shades into a question of what 
constitutes character in The Wings of the Dove. Kate, in the midst of her escapist absorption in 
her reflection, is described as “agreeable to see,” and agreeable specifically in terms of an 
insubstantiality that, unlike that which marks her father’s social unacceptability, conduces to 
social success: “She had stature without height, grace without motion, presence without mass” 
(24). The specific qualities of her winningness—“stature,” “grace,” and “presence”—are 
explicitly opposed to those of physical existence—“height,” “motion,” and “mass”—and are 
unfixable as either “cause” or “effect” of her general charm. Kate’s reverie, still anchored to her 
mirror image, appears to follow an increasingly self-effacing course in these opening pages. 
Initially a visual stand-in for her father, Kate’s face becomes for her a “partial escape” from a 
reality in which Lionel’s shame is “the great thing in one’s life”—an escape, notably, not into the 
self, but laterally to a space of social adjudication where the immateriality that is her father’s 
legacy becomes a boon. That Kate’s “presence” lacks “mass” does not make it identical to her 
father’s absence. The lines that follow continue this dematerializing trajectory:  
If she saw more things than her fine face in the dull glass of her father’s lodgings she 
might have seen that after all she was not herself a fact in the collapse. She didn’t hold 
herself cheap, she didn’t make for misery. Personally, no, she wasn’t chalk-marked for 
auction. She hadn’t given up yet, and the broken sentence, if she was the last word, would 
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end with a sort of meaning. There was a minute during which, though her eyes were 
fixed, she quite visibly lost herself in the thought of the way she might still pull things 
round had she only been a man. It was the name, above all, she would take in hand—the 
precious name she so liked and that, in spite of the harm her wretched father had done it, 
wasn’t yet past praying for. She loved it in fact the more tenderly for that bleeding 
wound. But what could a penniless girl do with it but let it go? (25) 
Kate’s rhetorical efforts to pull herself up and apart from her familial situation are subtly 
derailed. Oddly for a moment of individuation, the opening note is an ambiguous one: “If she 
saw more things than her fine face in the dull glass of her father’s lodgings she might have seen 
that after all she was not herself a fact in the collapse.” The phrase “more things” asks not from 
what the self is being distinguished, but whether distinction is even the mode of self-making at 
work. Does “more things” denote the material squalor of Lionel’s rooms, a riot of vulgarity of 
which Kate might realize she is not a part? (That she “wasn’t chalk-marked for auction,” unlike 
the misery earlier associated with “the table-cloth and the centre-piece and the lamp,” would 
seem to corroborate this reading.) Or is the phrase “more things” an abstraction, a way of 
indicating what the remainder of the paragraph will make explicit: that Kate finds something of 
unsuspected value and substance behind the flat surface of her reflection—more things in heaven 
and earth than are shown above the mantel? Another way to put this question would be: is Kate 
Kate because she contains such depths, or because she is not her material environment? 
  If these lines hold out a pair of mutually undermining options, the associative 
movements that follow perform a barely perceptible substitution. Kate’s resolution to be the “last 
word” that would restore meaning to the “broken sentence” of her family history hangs 
suspended between the novel’s first sentence, which seems hobbled by her interpolated full 
name, and her words of mourning for “the name” that will have to be relinquished in a 
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financially expedient marriage. This makes for an inauspicious first leg in what will soon be the 
novel’s anfractuous (and ultimately failed) marriage plot, as Kate’s hypothetical union is cast not 
only in terms of the loss of her family name, but as the site where even this mourned and 
mournable family name stands in a position of relative privilege over the given name that 
presumably differentiates her.
190
 It is not quite that Kate’s given name disappears from her line 
of thought, but that it manages to cede its position to her family name without ever having been 
called to the surface of consciousness in the first place—a sacrifice humble to the point of 
interment.
191
 “Kate” is an unauthored effect in this passage, not manifestly present but still 
exerting a gravitational pull. One would be wrong, that is, to believe that Kate is thinking of her 
given name when she calls herself the “last word,” since this “last word” is ostensibly only a 
metaphor for her self; yet one would also be right in inevitably associating “word” with “name,” 
because this self-as-word metaphor so evidently launches the associative train that ultimately has 
Kate bemoaning the bloodied condition of her other name, “Croy.” The all too suggestive 
metaphor of the “last word” just quivers on the edge of becoming a metonym for “name.” It is 
this never-explicit invocation of Kate’s given name in the guise of the salvific “last word” that 
allows her acknowledged loss of “Croy” to signpost the unacknowledged absence of “Kate.” In 
the same vein, the unwritten “Kate” has the effect of conjuring “Croy” without itself ever 
needing (or being permitted) to materialize in order to do this work. At this point, one might 
notice the preponderance of “she”s and the sustained dearth of “Kate”s in this protracted passage 
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of waiting, so that “She” precedes “Kate” even in the opening lines; “Kate” literally is not there 
until (Lionel) Croy enters the scene.
192
 
 The novel that begins by showing the effect of Lionel Croy’s absence goes on to show 
the irresistible effectivity of a man who ultimately, even once he has “at last appeared” for Kate 
and the reader, “doesn’t exist for people” (27, 72). His first effect, for that matter, is to render 
Kate “instantly aware of the futility of any effort to hold him to anything,” of his inability to 
“touch you ever so lightly without setting up”—jarringly somatic tropes for the elusivity of a 
man whose entrance on the scene should have made him at least somewhat more physically 
available (25). If Kate’s consciousness is already theatricalized in the novel’s opening lines 
through a visual engagement with her mirror image, her acute sense of awareness upon her 
father’s arrival places her in the audience before a haunted stage.193 The force of Kate’s painful 
awareness seems undampened by its familiarity and repetitiveness, by the sense that it is the 
“usual” and being experienced “again.” And not only is this feeling characterized by an 
automaticity and iterability, it is someone else’s repetitious feeling—“all the old ache, her poor 
mother’s very own.” Although Kate initially ascribes her pain to the lack of “finish” in Lionel’s 
pretense of illness—the “sketch of a design”—under which he summoned her, this explicitly 
painterly metaphor soon gives way to a tacitly theatrical attitude and mode of self-understanding. 
This trajectory builds on a thread from the previous paragraph, which begins with a disorienting 
and necrotic admixture of aesthetic signifiers: “the whole history of their house had the effect of 
some fine florid voluminous phrase, say even a musical, that dropped first into words and notes 
without sense and then, hanging unfinished, into no words or any notes at all” (24). It is unclear 
whether “a musical” is meant to be shorthand for “a musical phrase” or a proper noun denoting a 
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type of entertainment found at a social gathering; for either one to be “hanging unfinished” 
evokes an incomplete painting or, even, the “lack of finish” against which late nineteenth-
century anti-Impressionists so fulminated, and to which Kate herself later takes exception.
194
 
Taken together, these semantic nictitations have the effect of an insinuation with no content, 
which seems nonetheless to engender a sickly porousness among at least three art forms—
literature, music (whether performed at a party or not), and painting. The decay of the Croys’ 
fortunes is evinced by the co-morbidity of these forms within the sentence, a composition falling 
into first formlessness and then nothingness. Even the absence of the “moderate finish required 
for deception” could constitute one of two distinct but related types of transgression: a disregard 
for the requirements of techne, or an allegiance to an illegitimate aesthetic regime and its moral 
correlate—that which allows Lionel’s “unconscionable” lateness to signify an unconscionable 
disregard for the conventions of performing a successful dissimulation.  
Lionel Croy, with his “perfect look,” is unambiguously an “unspeakable” aesthete, and as 
in The Tragic Muse, the dematerializing tendencies of this aesthete has a certain strange 
commerce with the presumed materiality of theatre. The theatricality of Kate’s affective mode in 
these opening passages is set in relief by Kate’s hypothetical re-staging of the scene and of its 
effect on her consciousness: “He might have awaited her on the sofa in his sitting-room, or might 
have stayed in bed and received her in that situation. She was glad to be spared the sight of such 
penetralia, but it would have reminded her a little less that there was no truth in him” (26, 
emphasis added). The contrast between the might have of alternative stagings and the would have 
of alternative consciousness has particular point—all the more so that we are not given the 
standard subjunctive-conditional formulation, “had he___, she would have___”, which would 
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subordinate the import of the hypothetical staging to that of the hypothetical feeling. Instead, the 
physical reality of the mise-en-scène is actively and autonomously imagined as contingent and 
manipulable, while the feeling or state of consciousness effected by a particular scenario is 
assumed to be thoroughly and “instantly” determined by the presented scene. 
 While Kate’s awareness of Lionel’s “impossibility” operates theatrically, this 
impossibility is characterized by its dissolution of the generic registers that help to render 
theatrical scenes intelligible: 
…not only, face to face with him, vain irritation dropped, but he breathed upon the tragic 
consciousness in such a way that after a moment nothing of it was left. The difficulty was 
not less that he breathed in the same way upon the comic: she almost believed that with 
this latter she might still have found a foothold for clinging to him. He had ceased to be 
amusing—he was really too inhuman. (26) 
An echo of the corporealizing language of “holding” returns us to the beginning of this passage; 
the moral impossibility underlying the “futility of any effort to hold him to anything” shades, at 
this later moment, into the melancholy of an impossible filial relation, figured as the absence of 
“a foothold for clinging to him.” The metaphor of the “foothold” positions dramatic conventions 
not only as affective indices, but as the condition of possibility, the very ground, for all feeling. 
With both the “tragic consciousness” and the “vain irritation” sported in the novel’s opening 
lines negated, feeling itself is abruptly “dropped,” giving the remainder of the paragraph over to 
a more thorough description of Lionel’s physical attributes. Here as throughout these opening 
passages, Lionel’s impossibility for his daughter—the sense that there was “no truth in him”—
stems not from a manipulative or artful theatricality, but precisely from a failure to accede to the 
theatrical modes of feeling, relation, and perspicuity valued and inhabited by Kate. Just as the 
disgrace that Lionel brings on his household is evoked through the perilous indeterminacy of 
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aesthetic signifiers, his monstrousness is signaled by his nullification of theatrical categories. His 
inattention to the criterion of “finish,” then, not only indicts him as both aesthetically and 
otherwise “unconscionable,” but does so by revealing him to be operating in the wrong artistic 
form—at least, so far as the thoroughly theatrical Kate is concerned.  
Having been so thoroughly and, to risk a redundancy, imperceptibly effaced at the start of 
the novel for which she is ostensibly being introduced as a center of consciousness, Kate 
represents a particular kind of limit case for the “going behind” of Jamesian free indirect 
discourse. How does one “go behind” a character who is alternately beside herself and 
perpetually undergoing one kind of dematerialization or another? James, in the preface to The 
Awkward Age, makes note of the English reading public’s distaste for published plays, quipping 
that the difference between placing “he said” after a dialogue in a novel and placing the 
character’s name before a dialogue in a playscript was enough to determine the public’s 
preference. The first line of spoken dialogue in The Wings of the Dove occupies something of a 
middle ground: “Kate’s only actual expression of impatience, however, was ‘I’m glad you’re so 
much better!’” (27). The closed circuit of this formulation manages to report an “expression of 
impatience” without attributing action to the speaker; it appears to substantialize Kate by 
presenting the dialogue as an “expression” of her feeling, but paradoxically only does so by 
displacing her as the subject of the sentence.  
 Early in the chapter, the phrase “more things” places an ambiguity at the center of Kate’s 
self-understanding. The material “more things” that comprise the “ugliness” of the “setting” 
press in on the immaterial “more things” of personal quality whose recognition should be 
safeguarded through focalization. These two meanings are mutually hostile and muddying, and 
converge in Lionel’s (and later her sister Marian’s) perception of Kate as being “in her way a 
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tangible value” (27). The allusion to Hamlet’s ghostly father, first among the “more things in 
heaven and earth…than are dreamt of in your philosophy,” is reiterated as Kate reflects on 
Lionel’s physical attractiveness as itself a “tangible value”: “if there was much she neither knew 
nor dreamed of it passed between them at this very moment that he was quite familiar with 
himself as the subject of such quandaries” (29). At the moment his son delivers the famed line, 
Hamlet’s father is both present and dematerialized—addressing the characters, it seems, from 
beneath the ground, a stage effect whose emplaced corporeality Hamlet acknowledges with some 
cheek: “Well said, old mole!” Lionel, paradoxically, is a man of striking physicality (with “such 
a face and such a manner”) who “doesn’t exist for people,” “an actual person if there ever was 
one” who is “really too inhuman,” and one “much more firm on [his] feet” than the daughter 
whose “foothold” he disintegrates (31).  
A variant of Kate’s “more things” retains one of the original phrase’s functions of self-
constitution through negation: “‘And what in the world else could [Aunt Maud] possibly want [if 
not you]?’ ‘Oh I don’t know—many things’” (31). Kate’s slack self-deprecation takes on some 
of the ambiguity of the earlier more things that could either denote or exclude her. Even as 
“many things” here refers explicitly to that which is not Kate, the dual nature of the things that 
come before imbues this first spoken iteration with a specific irony—an irony found in the 
translucency of Kate’s direct speech to the free indirect discourse that originally gave us these 
“things.” Shortly after this dialogue, the phrase is lobbed back to the narrator: “She rose now, as 
if in sight of the term of her effort, in sight of the futility and the weariness of many things, and 
moved back to the poor little glass with which she had communed before” (32). Certainly “many 
things” can be futile, but can they be weary? The theatricalizing syntax of the sentence turns the 
external cause of a feeling into the feeling’s subject, just as the character who is “in sight of” this 
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feeling—as though she were visible to it—is in the act of placing herself back in front of her 
mirror image.  
 When Lionel starts to speak of “things,” the word’s dualities becomes starker and the 
semiotic shifts more abrupt. His claim that “‘If you had [family feeling] as I have it you’d see 
I’m still good—well, for a lot of things” (33). The drop from a moral register to an economic 
one, from “good” to “good for a lot of things,” is clear enough. These differences are even more 
boldly outlined in his exchanges with Kate: 
“Oh I think [Aunt Maud’s] idea,” said Kate almost gaily now, “is that I shall get a great 
deal.” 
He met her with his inimitable amenity. “But does she give you the items?” 
The girl went through the show. “More or less, I think. But many of them are things I 
dare say I may take for granted—things women can do for each other and that you 
wouldn’t understand.” 
“There’s nothing I understand so well, always, as the things I needn’t!” (33) 
From Kate’s discreet “a great deal” and eventually back to “things,” this passage finds Kate 
going “through the show” by dissipating the mercantile concretion of Lionel’s preferred term, 
“items.” Once again, Kate understands materiality, perhaps especially in this crudely monetary 
register, to demand a theatrical mode of engagement. Yet going through the show appears to 
require that the word “things” shift the focus of this casual accounting to the vague perquisites of 
feminine homosociality. Following on this shift, Lionel’s contention that “There’s nothing I 
understand so well, always, as the things I needn’t” not only signals his queer comprehension of 
this feminine relation; it emphasizes that Aunt Maud and Kate’s relationship is accessible to 
Lionel’s mercenary understanding at least in part because of this relationship’s vulnerability to 
pecuniary calculations—because of its undeniable basis in material disparity.  
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Lionel’s comparative formulation, “nothing…as…”, is suggestively followed up later in 
the conversation, as Kate declares: “‘I don’t know what you’re like.’ ‘No more do I, my dear. 
I’ve spent my life in trying in vain to discover. Like nothing—more’s the pity’” (35). The line 
evokes and temporalizes Kate’s earlier experience of how “vain irritation dropped” when “face 
to face with him,” which lightly punned on vain’s dual meanings of futile and fixated on one’s 
own appearance. Not only is irritation pointless, it is unclear whether its pointlessness is 
mitigated or amplified by Kate’s “showing herself” her irritated face. When the irritation is 
described as having “dropped,” one has the impression of the face that showed it dropping 
accordingly. Lionel’s use of the word vain also denotes futility while suggesting a continuous, 
reconnaissant self-regard. While Kate feels and conceives herself in a theatrical register, Lionel, 
whom we can only approach through his dialogue, formulates himself—or attempts to do so—
through simile and litotes. Rather than locating feeling or consciousness outside of himself, 
Lionel describes a self by way of a series of negative comparisons, or more accurately, 
comparisons with negativity.  
 Even moments in which James specifies “material things” are quickly qualified through 
formulations that are presumably literal, but traffic in the distinct pitch of Jamesian figuration: 
“She saw as she had never seen before how material things spoke to her. She saw, and she 
blushed to see, that if in contrast with some of its old aspects life now affected her as a dress 
successfully ‘done up’, this was exactly by reason of the trimmings and lace, was a matter of 
ribbons and silk and velvet” (41). In this familiar Jamesian rhetorical device, the physical object 
and the metaphor are identical in every regard except insofar as they occupy different semantic 
registers—that is, there is an actual cache of ribbons and lace at Lancaster Gate, but these 
sartorial signifiers also retain a figural function. They therefore contain a self-difference that 
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exists solely on a linguistic level, with no corresponding difference in the diegetic world. The 
only substantive difference between the metaphorical things and the material things is that the 
former are a metaphor. The uniqueness of this rhetorical move lies not in these objects’ 
metaphorizing something, but in their metaphorizing themselves. It may be helpful to conceive 
of this self-differential loop as a prose analogue to the signifying matter of the theatre. Bodies 
and objects on the stage, as Josette Féral argues, “evince possible world-views whose veridical 
and illusory aspects are grasped simultaneously by the spectator.”195 As in James’s conception of 
readerly “attention,” “The spectator is never completely duped.” Féral goes on to elaborate the 
actor’s body as a 
locus continually threatened by a certain inadequacy, by faults, by a certain lack. By 
definition, it is imperfect; as matter, it is vulnerable. Although it knows its limits, it is 
shocked when it surpasses them. However, this body is more than just performance. 
Transformed into a system of signs, it semiotizes everything around it: space, time, story, 
dialogue, scenery, music, lighting, and costumes. It brings theatricality to the stage.
196
 
Even as he explicitly invokes “material things,” James makes a point of designating these things 
as—much like the actor’s body—both sign and matter, self-different precisely insofar as they 
refer to themselves. In that regard, they also constitute a rich analogy to Kate Croy, to whom one 
might accurately say, as her father does, “‘You can describe yourself—to yourself’” (32). These 
“things,” finally, at the highest level of abstraction, make a rhetorical display out of the 
legerdemain by which the material world of novels typically emerges. To describe the particular 
action of the sentence’s rhetoric and of Kate’s thought as homologizing the figural and material 
while retaining an embarrassing fissure—an embarrassment indicated in Kate’s self-conscious 
blush at the slippage between her meaningful metaphor for a more beautiful life and the 
                                                 
195
 Féral, “Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language,” 100.  
196
 Ibid. 100-01.  
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decidedly less meaningful “things” that make for beauty. Here Kate again gestures toward the 
difficulty of distinguishing oneself from the things that surround one—particularly when those 
things are different from themselves, that is, when they are not only things but the language 
through which one understands one’s own desires.  
 Given that The Wings of the Dove declines to occupy its focalizing characters’ 
consciousness at their moments of heightened cognitive unease—Milly as she is dying in Venice, 
Kate when she gives herself to Densher—there is something faintly punishing about the novel’s 
opening scene, its flat articulation of emotional brutality, and our subsequent, abrupt withdrawal 
from its governing emotive and moral perspective. The novel announces its intentions with 
regard to Kate Croy and immediately abandons them, with effectively no indication as to 
whether we should thereafter pick them up. My primary question about this novel is, in this 
sense, a formal one, but because of the peculiar emotive indirectness of the novel’s form, it rings 
oddly quaint: Do we read the rest of The Wings of the Dove with the weight of the first scene in 
the moral scales? This question is precisely one that cannot be answered, and, more to the point, 
is perhaps not what the novel is “about.” Yet because the novel has so thoroughly evacuated 
intent, it is possible to read it, without perversity, as being about what it is not about. As a 
structure of intention, this Jamesian about-but-not-aboutness stages how fiction works, and how 
we might feel about it.  
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